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This dissertation examines the motives and central visions of three student demonstrations, 
each taking place within different historical and political contexts and each organized by a 
different generation of Kosovo Albanian students. The years 1968, 1981 and 1997 
witnessed a proliferation of student mobilizations as collective responses demanding more 
national rights for Albanians in Kosovo. I argue that the students' main vision in all three 
movements was the political independence of Kosovo. Given the complexity of the students' 
goal, my analysis focuses on the influence and reactions of domestic and foreign powers 
vis-à-vis the University of Prishtina (hereafter UP), the students and their movements. 
Fueled by their desire for freedom from Serbian hegemony, the students played a central 
role in "preserving" and passing from one generation to the next the vision of "Republic" 
status for Kosovo. Kosova Republikë or the Republic of Kosovo (hereafter RK) status was 
a demand of all three student demonstrations, but the students' impact on state creation has 
generally been underestimated by politicians and public figures. Thus, the primary purpose 
of this study is to unearth the various and hitherto unknown or hidden roles of higher 
education – then the UP – and its students in shaping Kosovo's recent history. By arguing 
that the students' demands were also part of a wider quest for human rights rather than 
merely a straightforward nationalistic matrix, this study reclaims the critical character of 
the 1968 and 1981 uprisings, as well as the social struggles and all-out war of the 1990s, 
effectively leading the country to the implementation of the political ideas of self-
determination and independence. I also focus on how the student movements and public 
opinion interacted concerning the violence of the Yugoslav and, later, Serbian regimes.  
This dissertation intends to look at multiple layers of the student movements as 
pivotal historical events. This approach will offer me the best opportunity to understand the 
participation of all parties involved in the wider context. As such, my data collecting 
strategy concentrated on sources held in the Archive of Kosovo, Archive of Yugoslavia, 
Archive of Serbia, Central Archive of the Republic of Albania, and the Archives of 
Albania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reason for consulting sources from these 
countries is that they were directly involved in the process of the initial founding and 
subsequent development of the UP. The present study also utilizes insights from oral 
history: interviews with activists, academics, politicians, and other officials, conducted in 
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Prishtina, Tirana, Belgrade, and Skopje, because these actors participated in, influenced, or 
had in-depth knowledge of the student movements in Kosovo. The eruption of the first 
student movements in Kosovo during the last century depended not only on the dynamics 
of that particular time (the 1960s) but also on pre-existing conditions. Thus, to understand 
the overall picture, one must be aware of previous state transformations, relations between 
communities living in the area as well as with the authorities, etc. That is why this 
dissertation offers a historical overview of how the Albanians living in the SFRY viewed 
themselves and were viewed externally by other peoples in the country. Whereas the third 
chapter seeks to understand the emergence and development of collective actions during 
the late 1960s, particularly in Belgrade (the SFRY's capital) and Kosovo. Here I analyze the 
conceptual connections and differences between student movements in Belgrade and 
Kosovo during the specific historical period. I explicitly look at the interactions between 
regional/local policies, institutions of higher learning, and student movements in Kosovo 
(1968) and the impact of these movements on the establishment of the UP. Thereafter I 
present and analyze the eruptions and development of the student demonstrations of March 
and April 1981. These demonstrations will be remembered in history as events that 
triggered deep societal divisions in addition to generating destabilization and bringing about 
great changes both at the level of Kosovo and at the level of the SFRY. Another chapter 
covers the fraught atmosphere which dominated Kosovo during the 1990s. 
The key concepts of the analysis revolve around the links between higher education 
(specifically the UP), political influences and students. By examining the dynamics of the 
demonstrations, I analyze the dimensions, forms and implications of student uprisings and 
resistance, as well as the struggles for dominance by local (Kosovo), federal (SFRY), 
regional (Albania and Serbia) and international actors (outside the Balkans). To help the 
reader understand that these demonstrations, although organized by students, were not 
necessarily academic but rather political, this dissertation presents and analyzes the impact 
that students had on mobilizing society to demonstrate for self-determination. Given that 
each demonstration took place under different historical and political circumstances, and 
that each was organized by a different generation of Kosovo Albanian students, this 
dissertation examines how the vision of independence impacted the first and subsequent 
student movements. Additionally, this dissertation elucidates the influence and reactions of 
domestic and foreign powers vis-à-vis the students and movements of 1968, 1981 and 1997 
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in Kosovo. Taking into consideration the complexity and scope of the topic, I am aware that 
this dissertation cannot claim to be either perfect or complete. However, I hope that my 
modest offering will inspire further interdisciplinary discussions as well as an appreciation 







Dit proefschrift bestudeert de motieven en centrale visies van drie studentenbetogingen, die 
plaatsvonden in verschillende historische en politieke contexten en georganiseerd werden 
door verschillende generaties Kosovaars Albanese studenten. In de jaren 1968, 1981 en 
1997 kwam het tot een snelle toename van studentenmobilisaties als collectieve reacties 
met de eis voor meer nationale rechten voor Albanezen in Kosovo. Ik betoog dat de centrale 
visie van de studenten in alle drie bewegingen de politieke onafhankelijkheid van Kosovo 
was. Gezien het meervoudige karakter van het doel van de studenten spitst mijn analyse 
zich toe op de invloed en reacties van lokale en internationale mogendheden vis-à-vis de 
Universiteit van Prishtina (hierna: UP), de studenten en hun bewegingen. Gedreven door 
hun streven naar vrijheid van Servische hegemonie, speelden de studenten een centrale rol 
in het “beschermen” en overdragen van de ene generatie op de andere van de visie dat 
Kosovo de status van “Republiek” moest krijgen. De status Kosova Republikë of Republiek 
Kosovo (hierna: RK) was de centrale eis van alle drie studentenbetogingen, maar de impact 
van de studenten op staatsvorming is algemeen ondergewaardeerd door politieke en 
publieke figuren. Aldus is het eerst doel van deze studie het blootleggen van de 
verschillende tot dusver onbekende of verborgen rollen van hoger onderwijs – en later de 
UP – en haar studenten in de vorming van de moderne geschiedenis van Kosovo. Ik 
beargumenteer dat de studenteneisen ook deel waren van een breder streven naar 
mensenrechten in plaats van louter een rechtlijnig nationalistische matrix. Op die manier 
ontgin ik het kritische karakter van de opstanden van 1968 en 1981 en ook de sociale strijd 
en de algemene oorlog van de jaren 90, die het land uiteindelijk tot de implementatie van 
politieke ideeën van zelfbeschikking en onafhankelijk brachten. Ik besteed ook aandacht 
aan de interactie tussen de studentenbewegingen en de publieke opinie omtrent het geweld 
van het Joegoslavische en later Servische regime.  
Dit proefschrift poogt de verschillende lagen van de studentenbeweging als pivotale 
historische gebeurtenissen te bekijken. Deze benadering biedt me de beste mogelijkheid de 
deelname van alle partijen te begrijpen in de bredere context. Mijn strategie voor 
dataverzameling concentreerde zich op bronnen in het Archief van Kosovo, het Archief van 
Joegoslavië, het Centrale Archief van de Republiek Albanië en het Archief van het 
Albanese Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. Ik heb bronnen van deze landen geraadpleegd 
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omdat deze landen direct betrokken waren in het proces van de initiële vorming en latere 
ontwikkeling van de UP. Deze studie benut ook inzichten van oral history: interviews met 
activisten, academici, politici en andere functionarissen, afgenomen in Prishtina, Tirana, 
Belgrado en Skopje, omdat deze actoren deelnamen in, invloed uitoefenden op, of diepere 
kennis hebben van de studentenbewegingen in Kosovo.    
De uitbraak van de eerste studentenbewegingen in Kosovo tijdens de vorige eeuw hing niet 
alleen af van de dynamiek van die bijzondere periode (de jaren 60) maar ook van de vooraf 
gegeven condities. Om het algemene beeld te verstaan moet men zich dus bewust zijn van 
de voorafgaande staatstransformaties, relaties tussen gemeenschappen in de regio en met 
de autoriteiten, etc. Daarom biedt dit proefschrift een historisch overzicht van het zelfbeeld 
van Albanezen in de Socialistische Federatieve Republiek Joegoslavië (SFRJ) en hoe zij 
van buitenaf werden gezien door andere volkeren in het land. Het derde hoofdstuk betracht 
de opkomst en ontwikkeling van collectieve acties in de late zestiger jaren, in het bijzonder 
in Belgrado (hoofdstad van de SFRJ) en Kosovo, te begrijpen. Hier analyseer ik de 
conceptuele verbindingen en onderscheiden tussen de studentenbewegingen in Belgrado en 
Kosovo tijdens deze specifieke historische periode. Ik kijk in het bijzonder naar de 
wisselwerkingen tussen regionaal/lokaal beleid, instellingen voor hoger onderwijs en 
studentenbewegingen in Kosovo (1968) en de impact van deze bewegingen op de vorming 
van de UP. Daarna belicht en analyseer ik de uitbraken en ontwikkeling van de 
studentendemonstraties van maart en april 1981. Deze demonstraties blijven herinnerd in 
de geschiedenis als gebeurtenissen die diepe sociale breuken teweegbrachten en 
destabilisatie en verregaande veranderingen zowel in Kosovo als op het niveau van de SFRJ 
in gang zetten. Een ander hoofdstuk behandelt de gespannen atmosfeer in Kosovo tijdens 
de jaren 90.  
De basisconcepten van deze analyse draaien rond de links tussen hoger onderwijs (in het 
bijzonder de UP), politieke invloed en studenten. Met een onderzoek naar de dynamiek van 
de demonstraties, analyseer ik de dimensies, vormen en implicaties van studentopstanden 
en verzet, alsook de strijd voor dominantie tussen de lokale (Kosovo), federale (SFRJ), 
regionale (Albanië en Servië) en internationale actoren (buiten de Balkan). Om de lezer in 
staat te stellen te begrijpen dat deze demonstraties, ook al waren ze georganiseerd door 
studenten, niet noodzakelijk academisch maar politiek waren, presenteert en analyseert dit 
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proefschrift de impact die studenten hadden op de mobilisering van de samenleving om op 
straat te komen voor zelfbeschikking. Gezien elke demonstratie plaatsvond onder 
verschillende historische en politieke omstandigheden en georganiseerd werd door een 
verschillende generatie Kosovaars Albanese studenten, bestudeert dit proefschrift de impact 
van de onafhankelijkheidsvisie op de eerste en daaropvolgende studentenbewegingen. 
Daarnaast belicht dit proefschrift de invloed en reacties van lokale en buitenlandse 
mogendheden op de studenten en bewegingen van 1968, 1981 en 1997 in Kosovo. Gezien 
de complexiteit en reikwijdte van het thema, ben ik me ervan bewust dat dit proefschrift 
geen aanspraak kan maken op perfectie of volledigheid. Toch hoop ik dat mijn nederige 
bijdrage zal inspireren tot verdere interdisciplinaire discussies en erkenning voor de 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
This dissertation is an original contribution to the advancement of knowledge. It 
investigates the roles of the student movements of 1968, 1981, and 1997 in Kosovo in 
shaping the history and political status of what is now the Republic of Kosovo. The choice 
of these three moments and their respective student movements is because these were three 
key points in the history of Kosovo, and understanding them is crucial to understanding 
Kosovo’s contemporary history and politics. It analyzes the motives and central visions of 
these three movements, each taking place within different historical and political contexts 
and each organized by a different generation of Kosovo Albanian students. The years 1968, 
1981 and 1997 witnessed a proliferation of student mobilizations as collective responses 
demanding more national rights for Albanians in Kosovo. I argue that the students' main 
vision in all three movements was the political independence of Kosovo. Given the 
complexity of the students' goal, my analysis focuses on the influence and reactions of 
domestic and foreign powers vis-à-vis the University of Prishtina (hereafter UP), the 
students and their movements. Fueled by their desire for freedom from Serbian hegemony, 
the students played a central role in articulating, in three successive generations, the vision 
of "Republic" status for Kosovo. Kosova Republikë or the Republic of Kosovo (hereafter 
RK) status was a demand of all three student demonstrations, although in the first two, the 
status of the Republic was presented as being within the SFRY, while in the third, the 
demand was for independence.  The students' impact on state creation has generally been 
underestimated by politicians and public figures. Thus, by explaining how student ideas for 
the “Republic” status of Kosovo traveled, were inherited and were radicalized, the primary 
purpose of this study is to unearth the various and hitherto unknown or inadequately 
investigated roles of higher education – the University of Prishtina (henceforth UP) and its 
students — in shaping Kosovo's contemporary history. It is important to emphasize that 
there were differences between what the students themselves were thinking when chanting 
for the “Republic of Kosovo” and what their opponents in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (hereafter SFRY) imputed to them. As compared to the demonstrations of 1997, 
when the entire political situation of what had become by then the FRY was transformed, 
the students' demand during the demonstrations of 1968 and 1981 was for a Republic status 
of Kosovo within the SFRY. Yet, as Victor Friedman of the University of Chicago, who 
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was in Yugoslavia during the events of 1981, recalls, at the time of the 1981 demonstrations, 
popular discourse claimed that demands for a Republic within the SFRY would open the 
door to secession. Strictly speaking, this was not true in terms of the SFRY constitution. 
The Republics did not have a constitutional right to secede, but the circulation of such 
rumors at the time of the 1981 demonstrations (Friedman: December 2015), opened the 
doors to the regime for even more aggressive reactions against the students and Kosovo 
Albanian society in general. By arguing that the students' demands were also part of a wider 
quest for human rights rather than merely a straightforward nationalistic matrix, this study 
reclaims the critical character of the 1968 and 1981 uprisings, as well as the social struggles 
and all-out war of the 1990s, effectively leading the country to the implementation of the 
political ideas of self-determination and independence. Student engagement directly served 
to mobilize all levels of Kosovan society to participate in social resistance actions aimed at 
securing independence and statehood. 2  This dissertation captures a precious historical 
moment: people who remember and were involved in all three student movements — and 
the significance of 1968, 1981, and 1997 are undeniable — are all still alive. 
In an effort to shed light on the student movements, this dissertation also focuses on 
the historical role that institutions of higher education, particularly the UP, played in the 
political and national emancipation of Albanians in Kosovo from the late 1950s to the 
1990s. Having evolved from a series of institutions of higher education into a university in 
its own right in the 1970s, the UP became an inspiration for political action, demonstrations 
and the building of national consciousness. From its foundation in 1970 until 1974, the UP 
was an institution closely involved with initial nation-building ideas. Between 1974 and 
1981, the UP was an institution of enlightenment, while during the 1980s and 1990s it 
became a bastion of resistance.3 It can thus be argued that the UP played an important role 
in the region's political life (Koliqi 2010). Both the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) and the Republic of Albania's leadership used the UP to channel their political 
interests. While the SFRY proclaimed the political emancipation of Albanians in Kosovo 
coincided with the "brotherhood and unity" platform or "Titoism,"4 the Republic of Albania 
 
2 Elliott (2017) specifically examines the role of language management during this time period. His work supplies 
an added dimension to the issues being considered here, but the focus here is on the student movements as opposed 
to the way such ideologies were reflected and stimulated in and by language planning. 
3 From a Serbian point of view, during the period 1974-81 the UP was an institution for rapprochement with 
Albania, while subsequently it was a hotbed of nationalism. 




proclaimed national emancipation amongst Albanians in the SFRY, trying to expand on 
nationalist ideas about a "perfect" Albania and "Enverism."5 Given that Albanians in the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and then subsequently in Yugoslavia, including the 
SFRY, were discriminated against and treated as second class citizens most of the time, it 
is not surprising that Kosovo Albanians would come to identify with the Republic of 
Albania, as well as because of their common language-based identity.  
After analyzing Kosovo's developments in the field of higher education, I then look 
at how such actors as political or state representatives and intellectuals reacted to and 
interacted with student actions. I also focus on how the student movements and public 
opinion interacted concerning the violence of the Yugoslav and, later, Serbian regimes. It 
is worth mentioning that the foundation of the university – one of the students' crucial 
objectives during the 1968 protests – was achieved primarily due to the students' demands. 
After more than a decade (and approximately ten months after the death of Tito), students 
started to ask for changes once again. On March 11, 1981, during lunchtime, one student, 
feeling humiliated by the wretched food served at the dining hall, threw his food down on 
the floor. More than 500 students followed his lead and began to call for "Food and Better 
Conditions." 6  As police started arresting students, thousands of student demonstrators 
gradually occupied the center of the city. Slogans demanding better food and better 
conditions changed to "While some of you are sitting in soft chairs – others of us don't have 
anything to eat." While permissible as cartoons in satiric journals in Socialist Yugoslavia, 
a country promoting itself as a land of equals, in the context of street demonstrations, such 
slogans were a slap in the face of the political elites, the "red bourgeoisie," who were reaping 
the benefits of the system while keeping silent about the suffering of other social groups. 
Other political slogans of the 1981 demonstrations included "We are Albanians – not 
Yugoslavs," "For whom is Trepça/Trepča7 working?," "Republic of Kosovo," "Unification 
with Albania," etc. (Hetemi 2018). Furthermore, similar to 1968, during the 1981 and 1990s 
 
5 Here, “Enverism” is understood to mean the policies or principles advocated by former Albanian communist 
leader Enver Hoxha. 
6 Professor Victor Friedman confirms that in 1976, when he was housed in a UP dormitory and fed at the UP dining 
hall as a participant in the Third Annual Seminar on Albanian Culture for Foreigners, University of Prishtina, the 
conditions in the dormitory were already very bad, and for the most part the food varied from disgusting to inedible. 
Participants in the seminar were all housed in the women’s dormitory, because conditions in the men’s dormitory 
were even worse. 
7 The Trepča Mines, which in Albanian are known as Miniera e Trepçës and in Serbian as Rudnik Trepča, 
constitute a large industrial complex in Kosovo. Located close to Kosovo's northern city of Mitrovica, Trepča was 
once one of the biggest companies in Yugoslavia and is Europe's largest lead-zinc and silver ore mine.   
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demonstrations, Kosovar Albanian political elites publicly condemned the protests and 
disapproved of people's participation in these demonstrations, which they dubbed as 
"nationalist acts." Changes in the public attitudes of intellectuals and politicians occurred 
only after 1990. Some politicians and professors changed their approach and started to view 
the demonstrations in a positive light, particularly after the October 1, 1997 demonstration, 
again organized by the students. This time some of the political activists and UP professors 
demonstrated together with their students. During the 1997 demonstrations, it was again the 
students who were the first to contest Ibrahim Rugova's8 political concept of peaceful civil 
resistance. Even though Rugova did not fully support these demonstrations, after almost 
seven years of "peaceful" – but as the students labeled it – "inactive" resistance, no one 
could quell the student demonstrations (October 1, 1997) or, later, prevent the escalation of 
the situation into an armed conflict between the Belgrade regime, Albanian self-organized 
forces and, later on, NATO's interventions (Clark 2000).  
The key concepts of this dissertation revolve around the links between higher 
education (specifically the UP), students and political influences in constructing a political 
and, later, unified national resistance of Albanians in Kosovo and the SFRY. This 
dissertation takes a historical approach by examining the political dimension of the topic 
through empirical analysis that attempts to dissect the links among higher education, 
students, a divided intelligentsia, and the other actors struggling for control over the UP. 
With the historical approach, I do not refer only to the collection of archival and oral sources 
but rather to the following of the inquiries for source criticism while evaluating the qualities 
of the collected materials for this dissertation.  Thus, the 'source criticism' method is 
followed as a technique while investigating this topic, especially given that the unique value 
of this dissertation is in its combination of oral history and archival research. In their ‘Guide 
for Historical Method’, Garraghan and Delanglez divided source criticism into six inquiries: 
date of the source, location, authorship, analysis, integrity and credibility (Garraghan and 
Delanglez, 1946: 168). Contemporary scholars also suggest similar methods for researching 
social movements from historical perspectives: close attention to detail and context, 
skeptical and judicious questioning of sources via internal and external criticism, and the 
use of narrative – the roles played by later and current narrative discourse (Dill and 
 
8 Ibrahim Rugova was the first President of Kosovo, serving from 1992 to 2000 and again from 2002 to 2006, and 
a prominent Kosovo Albanian political leader, scholar, and writer. 
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Aminzade, 2010; 272). By critically reviewing the written and oral sources of all relevant 
languages that this dissertaton brings together, I contribute to an understanding of the 
history of Kosovo that is both of value to future generations and provides testimonies that 
have never been recorded.  The central questions that this dissertation seeks to address are: 
what was the impact of the UP and its students on mobilizing society to protest for a 
"Republic" status for Kosovo? Also, were the students "real heroes" or simply "manipulated 
puppets" of local, federal, regional, and international political interests struggling for 
dominance?  
By assessing the authenticity and validity of the archival sources and critiquing the 
interview materials, paying particular attention to the role of students, my intention is to 
document how the student movements interacted with political practices at the UP and on 
the state level. More specifically, the dissertation shows how the internal dynamics of the 
UP affected students' strategies of resistance in all three demonstrations.  
Nowadays dysfunctional state of higher education in Kosovo remains a national 
problem. The percentage of Kosovans who consider the quality of the tertiary educational 
system in Kosovo as “poor” or “very poor” has increased throughout the years (see figure 
1). When these statistics are analyzed on the basis of gender, the findings reveal that men 
are more dissatisfied with the quality of the tertiary educational system than women. And, 
I contend that the current situation at the UP cannot be understood or resolved without 
broader awareness of previous politically related difficulties faced by the country and its 














Figure 1: What is your opinion of the quality of the tertiary educational system in Kosovo?  
 
Source: UNPD-Kosovo Public Pulse Dataset (detailed informatios about this dataset are 
provided below) 
Thus, this dissertation also aims to open the way for future research, respectively analyzing 
the UP's role during the period 1999–2020. What is the situation at the UP today? Are the 
current political parties using the UP as a recruiting ground for their cadres? What was the 
role of students after the war (1999) in Kosovo? Can the UP be transformed from a former 
nation-building tool into a meritorious and academically competitive institution? This 
research will hopefully contribute toward further analyses of the transformation of the UP 
into a social agent for the development of the country and this region. Is this possible, given 
the UP's (in)ability to adhere to liberal values, as already demonstrated among its activist 
students in the previous century? 
1.1. Mapping the process and unpacking the topic  
As will be revealed in subsequent chapters, different interpretations of origins and history 
have caused tensions in the relations between Albanians and Serbs. As will be explained 
more in the next chapter, negative perceptions of ethnic Albanians living within Yugoslavia 
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were not granted the right to education in their native language. That is the reason why 
institutions of higher education in Kosovo have a relatively recent history.  
The establishment of a university-level institution in Kosovo is directly linked to the 
student movements of the late 1960s and the demand by Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority 
to elevate their status from that of a province of Serbia to that of a constituent republic of 
its own. Seven years after Kosovo's provincial government gained direct and separate 
representation in the main federal Yugoslav bodies through the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution, the students were again at the center of political turmoil. Namely, in 1981 
another wave of student demonstrations erupted in Prishtina over the deplorable conditions 
in the residence halls; what began as a local campus disturbance escalated into bloody and 
province-wide demonstrations demanding the status of a republic for Kosovo. These 
demonstrations ended in several dozen deaths and the imposition of martial law by the 
regime (Hetemi, 2018).  
The most challenging period for the survival of the UP, however, was the period 
between 1990 and 1999. Until the imposition of the so-called interim measures on the UP 
in 1990, under which ethnic Serbs were appointed to all senior positions, the languages of 
instruction at the UP were Albanian and Serbian (Hyseni, H., Salihaj, J., Shatri, B., Pupovci, 
D. 2000). Within six months after the imposition of these so-called interim measures, 
Albanian professors and students were expelled or had left the university because of the 
political pressure to eliminate the teaching of Albanian literature, language, and history.  
During the 1990s, Kosovo's ethnic Albanians ran their own parallel educational 
system, which has also been referred to as "the world's largest NGO" (Kostovicova 2005, 
OECD 2001). The UP became a symbol of Kosovo Albanian resistance against Slobodan 
Milošević's regime, which abolished the autonomy of the province in 1989 and attempted 
to Serbianize education and other public sectors in Kosovo. But as Kosovo Albanians were 
now openly forced out of state-run education, police, health and governmental institutions 
by means of clearly discriminatory policies, by having to set up their parallel networks, the 
UP suffered in tandem with the rest of Kosovo Albanian society. Having refused to comply 
with the new Serbian curriculum, most university lecturers were dismissed in 1991, which 
forced them to organize separate classes for students, mostly in private homes, but also in 
such non-university buildings as elementary schools. This enabled the Serbian regime to 
consolidate its total control over university buildings, and such a situation persisted for 
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several years. After more than half a decade of this parallel education, a new wave of student 
protests erupted from the parallel Albanian UP in late 1997. As was previously the case, the 
purpose of this student demonstration was political – to demand the liberation of university 
premises, human rights and, later, self-determination for Kosovo.  
The student movements have been analyzed by Kosovo authors such as Selatin 
Novosella (2008), Jakup Krasniqi (2011), Bajram Kosumi (2011), Ethem Çeku (2017) and 
Bujar Dugolli (2013), as well as others. While Albanian authors consider the student 
demonstrations as a patriotic and inevitable reaction from one of the most discriminated 
against communities in the SFRY, the common Serbian view of these same demonstrations 
has mainly been that they were of a nationalist and separatist character as well as 
overdramatized (Mišović 1987, Bataković 2012, Bogdanović 1990). The Albanian authors 
were also among the participants/organizers of the demonstrations. In contrast, most of the 
Serbian authors offered their interpretation without being directly involved. Hence, these 
authors offer general chronological descriptions of the development of the student 
movements rather than a nuanced analysis of the conjuncture of the student movements 
with educational, political and social processes and their mutual interdependence. These 
student movements are not presented at all in Serbian textbooks (Gashi, 2013),9 while the 
Albanian books (Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, 2010) mention them very briefly as a 
strike for the reinstitution of rights for Albanians.10 The Council of Europe has recognized 
that in the ex-Yugoslav countries, history has been mainly treated as a mono-cultural, 
ethnocentric and exclusive rather than inclusive process (Stradling, 2003; 10). Moreover, 
history was based on the assumption that the national narrative inevitably coincided with 
the history of the largest national, linguistic or cultural group (ibid.). Therefore, I also intend 
to challenge the official version of this specific period of history and explore why both the 
Serbian and the Albanian side as well either omit or minimize the contributions of the 
 
9 In Kosovo, Albanian primary school pupils learn contemporary history in 9th grade, and it is covered by the book, 
Rexhepi, Fehmi. Historia 9. Libri Shkollor, 2013, whereas in gymnasiums (secondary schools), the history books 
for the 11th and 12 grades cover the contemporary period using the following books: Rexhepi, Fehmi and Frashër 
Demaj. Historia 11, Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2013; Abdyli, Ramiz and Emine Bakalli. Historia 11, Prishtinë: 
Libri Shkollor, 2012; and Bajraktari, Jusuf and Arbër Salihu, Historia 12, Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2013. In Serbia 
and at the schools of the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo, whose education system implements the “Serbian state 
curricula,” in primary schools the contemporary period is covered by Đurić, Đorđe and Momčilo Pavlović. Istorija 
8. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010, whereas in gymnasiums (secondary schools) the contemporary period is 
covered by Đurić, Đorđe and Momčilo Pavlović. Istorija 3. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010. For more about 
the “Reconstructing the Nation through History Textbooks in Serbia and Croatia,” see Tamara Pavasović Trošt, 
published in June 2018, and accessible at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nana.12433. 
10 See also: Rexhepi, Fehmi. Historia 9. Prishtina: Libri Shkollor, 2010. page 168. 
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students in keeping alive the visions of RK. What conditions produced such an ellision of 
the students' role by the Serbian as well as the Albanian sides? The Kosovo student 
movements have attracted the attention of other regional11 and international scholars. Dejan 
Jović, for example, in his book "SFRY: A State that Withered Away," presents a rather 
superficial picture of the Kosovo student demonstrations in Yugoslavia, but his arguments 
give the impression that the movements were part of a general popular movement, rather 
than a student rebellion (Jović, 2008: 196). Similarly, Julie A. Mertus in her book, "Kosovo, 
How Myths and Truths Started a War," dedicated an entire chapter to the 1981 
demonstrations, however, without paying much attention to details concerning the various 
dimensions of the political, social and national reasons that prompted students to initiate the 
protests (Mertus, 1999). Noel Malcolm’s study, "Kosovo – a Short History," reflects a 
recognition of Tito's12 efforts to correct the ethnic imbalance in the power structure in 
Kosovo (at least after 1966). He also covers the demonstrations of 1968, 1981 and 1997 as 
historical processes through which Kosovo passed, but this study similarly underestimates 
students’ central role (Malcolm, 1998). These important events are mentioned by Miranda 
Vickers (1998) and Tim Judah (2008) as well, but most of these studies treat the student 
demonstrations primarily as events where a dissatisfied population openly started protests, 
and none of them treats the central role the students played in transmitting the vision of 
independence from one generation to the next, as well as the students' role in mobilizing 
society to express their desire for and vision of independence.  
My main thesis - that the three abovementioned student movements were crucial in 
shaping the events in Kosovo that ultimately resulted in its current independence - is well 
supported by my research and the presentation of the results in this dissertation. At the same 
time, the complex interplay of other factors with these student movements is also elucidated 
to the extent possible, given that not all the relevant archives are as yet open. Of particular 
value in this work is the oral history that I collected due to the ability to speak to participants 
and organizers of all three demonstrations, and in a few decades, such broad scope will no 
longer be possible. It is notable that the students' key role in the Kosovo demonstrations has 
somehow been omitted. Thus, to respond to the "why" question and fill in the gaps in the 
 
11 The regional authors also include; Branko Horvat, “Kosovsko pitanje,” Dusan Bilandzić, “Jugoslavija poslije 
Tita,” Kosta Nikolić and Srdjan Cvetković, “Srbi i Albanci,” etc. 
12 Josip Broz Tito (1892 –1980), commonly known as Tito, was Yugoslavia’s main political figure, communist 
revolutionary and political leader, serving in various roles from 1943 until his death in 1980. 
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existing literature, I analyze the following dilemmas: how were the first and subsequent 
student movements organized and triggered? Who were the leaders and the main figures? 
What were the main protest slogans? How were people from different social backgrounds 
mobilized and influenced by the students? Could we consider Kosovo's earliest student 
movements as part of a larger network of protests occurring during this period (the 1960s)? 
What were the principal manifestos of the students between 1968 and 1997? Specifically 
looking at the interactions between local/regional policies, institutions of higher education 
institution, especially the UP, and Kosovo student movements, I argue that even though 
some of the students' demands can be considered to be of a nationalist character, they mainly 
emerged in response to the discriminatory policies against Albanians in the SFRY as well 
as because of the Republic of Albania's influence over the UP and its students. Highlighting 
that it was students, rather than politicians, who were committed to changing organizational 
aspects of life and prolonged discrimination, I argue that students were the key actors and 
icons of the ongoing resistance and protest. They initiated long-lasting expected "changes" 
during both the heyday of socialism and also during the most difficult political crisis in 
Kosovo and the Balkans in the period between 1990 and 1999.  
In addition to the emancipatory role that students played in Kosovo's eventual 
independence, I will also reflect on the fissures and disjuncture within the student 
movement itself. Arguably, the student movement was not monolithic. It also suffered from 
multiple tensions and power struggles. To what extent were the initial directions of the 
student movements transformed into a nationalist agenda by other actors, especially during 
1968 but also in 1981? To what extent were nationalism and the enlightenment project 
compatible or mutually exclusive? What were the larger contexts and effects of the student 
movements on the capitals of the various Yugoslav republics (Belgrade, Skopje, Podgorica, 
and Zagreb)? Were the students and their supporters aware of the broader implications of 
their demonstrations? These and other heretofore unanswered research questions presented 
below could be addressed only using the qualitative methodological approach applied in 
this study. This dissertation is therefore unique in its effort to provide a comprehensive 
account of the UP's and the students’ impact on maintaining a vision of a "Republic of 
Kosovo."  
This dissertation addresses issues of importance for Southeast European area studies 
research and is firmly grounded in a historical approach. Owing to the nature of the material, 
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its findings are also of interest to ethnographers and students of politics. In the historical 
dimension of this study, I intend to locate the student movements meaningfully in time and 
place as well as relate them to other times and places. The political and ethnographical 
dimensions seek to underscore the involvement of students, the UP, state(s) and their 
institutions as well as the public (society) as participants or influential parties in this process 
(Pierson 2004, Tilly 2001). The dissertation is grounded in area studies as such, and it is the 
combination of oral history and archival research that sets the dissertation apart as original. 
Whereas I have chosen the historical approach since in different contexts and periods, social 
movements are produced due to internal histories, changing relations between potential 
claimants and objects of claims, and overall transformations of the political context/s (Tilly 
1993). This approach fits into the topic because, similar to Rosa Luxembourg's conclusions 
on Russian Revolution (1905), for the case of Kosovo as well, I assume that the student 
demonstrations were a 'historical and not an artificial product' (Scott 2008, 115). According 
to Luxembourg, the Russian Revolution teaches us above all that the mass strike is not 
artificially "made," not "decided" at random, not "propagated," but that it is a historical 
phenomenon, which, at a given moment, results from social conditions. Scott's analysis of 
the Rosa Luxembourg's 'Mass Strike', highlighted how history has shown how economic 
struggles become political, and vice versa, as the two are inseparable and interdependent 
(ibid. 117). Nevertheless, as it will be shown in the next chapters, both Kosovo Albanians 
(1968, 1981) and Kosovo Serbs (1986) have rebelled in the periods when their political 
rights and economic standards stood better compared to their earlier decades. Other scholars 
as well read social movements of different geographical territories through Rosa 
Luxemburg's approach (see Zemni et al 2012), however here such an approach is not 
entirely suitable, because the nature of Kosovo student movements were neither 
revolution(s) nor (induystrial) strike(s). Moreover, as opposed to Luxembourg, which 
resists the notions that political and economic struggles can be different and unconnected, 
my findings showed that a crucial element which provoked the student movements in 
Kosovo was the increase of the level of society’s awareness, which was facilitated by the 
UP and made possible by the SFRY's political and economic progress. While politics and 
economics were implicated in the original demands for mother tongue higher education 
(1968), the demand for better living conditions at UP (1981), and the demand for UP's 
academic autonomy (1997) — all of which involved the kind of access to economic and 
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political resources that are generally intimately connected to higher eduction — the 
subsequent demands for RK (whether within or without the SFRY/FRY) merged from them 
without actually being the initial goal. 
1.2. Theoretical aspects relevant to this dissertation  
Due to the nature of the Kosovo student movements, whose political dimensions extended 
beyond the educational system, this dissertation utilizes historical approaches to examine 
the political dimensions of the Kosovo student movements (1968, 1981 and 1997). As is 
seen in their instigation of the 1968, 1981 and 1997 demonstrations, the students were 
inextricably linked to the politics of the country. Charles Tilly stresses that "every 
significant political phenomenon lives in history, and requires historically grounded 
analysis for its explanation" (2006, 433). However, no comprehensive research study has 
been undertaken on the politically related challenges for the establishment and further 
existence of the UP in Kosovo, including the interference of all the various political actors 
at the local, regional and federal levels during the periods 1968, 1981 and 1997. The absence 
of solid research on the role and contribution of students in mobilizing Kosovo's Albanian 
society towards maintaining a vision of the major political cause (Republic status) therefore 
requires an historico-political study to further explore and bring to the fore this important 
aspect of Kosovo's contemporary history. My research relies mainly on findings gathered 
from archives, libraries, and interviews, which makes this study unique in its effort to 
provide a comprehensive and situated account of student visions for the independence of 
Kosovo. Its revelations will help to fill in current gaps in the literature with unpublished 
materials and analyses. I hypothesize that the students were the key actors in the 
mobilization of society, the internationalization of the Kosovo issue, and that they were 
crucial in maintaining and passing from one generation to the next the vision of "Republic" 
status for Kosovo. The students’ steadfastness to this vision significantly influenced 
Kosovo's becoming a UN protectorate (1999) and later gaining its independence (2008).  
Archival materials and interviews with the organizers, activists, and officials 
involved in the processes as well as with academics knowledgeable about this topic enabled 
me to argue that a vision of independence, fear of repression, and ambitions for political 
opportunities – given that some student leaders entered political careers afterward – were 
factors which motivated the organizers and other students to engage in the movements. By 
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analyzing various dimensions of the political, social and national causes that motivated 
students to initiate the demonstrations, I examine their central role in the mobilization 
around the vision of a "Republic of Kosovo." The flux of each demonstration (1968, 1981 
and 1997) is sequentially added, thus grounding the case studies in solid theoretical and 
historical contexts. In order to document the students’ impact on the mobilization of the 
population, as well as the regime's responses utilizing torture and other forms of repression, 
this study systematically examines students' organized resistance, their determination to 
gain political independence, and the consequences thereafter.  
When historians study social movements, they focus on specific phenomena located 
meaningfully in time(s) or place(s) and do not necessarily develop their research by means 
of or based on general theories (idiographic vs. nomothetic knowledge) (Tilly 2006). 
Nevertheless, scholars recognize that by exposing aspects of the process, context, sequence, 
and timing, the examination of a social movement with historical methodologies can make 
important contributions to the kind of data collection that is vital to theory building and 
hypothesis testing (Bosi and Reiner 2014, Frisch et at. 2012). Bosi argues that theoreticians 
can learn from historians to look beyond short-term explanations by taking time into serious 
consideration (Bosi 2007). Hoping to contribute in this regard, the historical aspect of my 
empirical analysis refers to how students related and reacted to the multiple levels of state 
presence since 1968. State power is disseminated through ideological state apparatuses that 
rely on school, education, religion, and family (Althusser 1971). I examine the formation 
of student movements in Kosovo under Socialist Yugoslavia and their transformations in 
the "post-Yugoslav (1990-1997)” period by paying particular attention to the intersection 
of education and the state. By examining domains outside the "repressive state apparatus," 
such as the military, police, or other such state institutions, I place the establishment of the 
UP (1970) at the center of my focus in order to scrutinize the opportunities that opened up 
for student movements related to larger transnational ideas of freedom and justice, but also 
to nationalist and anti-Yugoslav (anti-Serbian) sentiments that, in the context of a struggle 
for Kosovo's independence, often turned chauvinistic. The roots of these antagonisms can 
be traced back to the post-1878 period, which was the time of international recognition of 
Serbian independence, the formation of the Albanian national movement, the collapse of 
Ottoman rule, and territorial disputes over the territory of present-day Kosovo and Northern 
Albania. However, it is arguably the resulting continuous propaganda and unfavorable 
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political decisions that proved crucial in the formation of the South Slav-Albanian enmity 
that accumulated in the province of Kosovo (Pavlović 2014). It is therefore the socialist 
period and the formation of the Yugoslav Federation that requires an in-depth analysis at 
different levels of the state and its articulation within the other segments of Kosovo's society 
that complied with or contested its power. In the case of Kosovo, which during the socialist 
period was an autonomous province of Serbia, it is also important to illuminate the grounds 
on which the multiple state formations acquired mutually constitutive but also exclusionary 
parameters between the Yugoslav socialist state, the Serbian and Albanian elites in Kosovo, 
the emerging Kosovar intelligentsia, and the role played by Albania. 
In this attempt to examine the multiple parties involved in the struggle for RK, I 
move the discussion beyond the realm of state politics alone and beyond the hierarchical, 
top-down imposition of state control. The notion of power as dispersed through the 
mechanisms of biopolitics and knowledge enable me to identify education as a critical site 
where the articulation between the state and its political actors — but also the students and 
other potential opponents of the regime — interact. Knowledge, in general, is viewed as the 
result of a power play between contending groups, but one where those with the most power 
have the resources to advance the kind of knowledge that serves their interests (Evans 1997, 
191–223; Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob 1994, 198–237). The insistence of the different interest 
groups (SFRY, Kosovo, Serbia and Albania) on deploying their power within the 
educational system, namely in (mis)using the UP in a way that best reflected their interests, 
was also a relevant angle in understanding the struggles for dominance as well as the ethnic 
and ideological identities in Kosovo/SFRY throughout the historical period covered here. 
That is why I use an approach called "historical institutionalism." This approach allows me 
to analyze the historical role that UP played in the political and national emancipation of 
Albanians in Kosovo during the period between the late 1950s and 1990s. Historical 
institutionalism is neither a particular theory nor a specific method. It is best understood as 
an approach for studying the politics of particular institutions which brought about social 
change. This approach is distinguished from other social science approaches by its attention 
to real-world empirical questions, its historical orientation, and its attention to how 
institutions structure and shape social behavior and outcomes. However, as Steinmo argues, 
not all researchers who use historical methods and who engage in case studies are 
institutionalists. Only those who place special emphasis on the role that particular 
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institution(s) play in structuring social behavior are considered to be institutionalists 
(Steinmo 2008). By focusing on the key concepts of the links between UP, a divided 
intelligentsia, and other actors struggling for control over Kosovo, this dissertation 
highlights the importance of educational institutions in the structuring of the political 
behavior of students and society. The intra-action 13  between state agendas, a higher 
educational institution (UP), and students can be also seen as a key conjuncture where 
structures and the individual agency gave meaning and force to one another (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The intra-action between state(s) agendas and educational institutions (UP) 




Using history as an analytical tool allowed me to see both the forest and the trees. This 
approach helped me to understand how UP and other state institutions were (mis)used by 
different interest groups – including student movements – to shape historical and political 
outcomes. It is indeed, as Anderson (1991) pointed out, a unified system of education that 
becomes central for the emergence of nation-states and the accompanying process of nation-
building (Anderson 1991). I argue here that the history of the development of university-
level education in Kosovo, political interferences/consequences, and student movements 
 
13 Intra-action is Karen Barad’s term used to replace 'interaction,' which necessitates pre-established bodies that 









(1968, 1981 and 1997) are not isolated, independent events. On the contrary, all of these are 
tightly interlinked and cannot be properly understood without careful and critical 
investigation of the ideas, values, and beliefs of all the actors involved. That is why I will 
particularly try to address the following questions concerning the UP and its students: what 
was the nature of the relationship between the university as an institution, the state(s) (SRS, 
Albania, Kosovo) and students?  Was the UP an institution of academic enlightenment or a 
fortress of ideological and nationalist indoctrination? Were students' demands academic, 
political or a blend of both, blurring the clear distinctions between the two? What has been 
done so far to document and remember the regime's crimes perpetrated against students 
during the period 1968-1997 (collective use of violence, torture, imprisonment, and 
murder)? These research questions are answered by mapping out the genealogy of the UP 
and the first student protests in 1968, by examining the dynamics of the 1981 and 1997 
demonstrations, and by analyzing the dimensions, forms, and implications of student 
protest, uprising, and resistance. My findings are consistent with those of scholars such as 
Anderson (1991), who identified unified educational systems and language as central in 
creating a sense of horizontal comradeship, and also with Bhabha's analysis, in which he 
insists on the liminal role of the nation-space. This liminality ensures that no "political 
ideologies could claim transcendent or metaphysical authority because the agency of a 
people is split in the discursive ambivalence that emerges in the contest of narrative 
authority between the pedagogical and the performative" (Bhabha 1994: 148). More 
precisely, the people's status as "historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy and their 
ability to perform themselves as 'subjects' of a process of signification that must erase any 
prior or original [national] presence" (ibid.:145). In this dissertation, however, I am 
concerned with the empirical rather than the theoretical. While my results support the 
aforementioned theories, my point is to discuss original emprical data that are completely 
original to this investigation and, moreover — with regard to the oral history component — 
would otherwise have been lost in the coming years.  This dissertation addresses the 
role/impact of students in promoting the vision of "Republic" status for Kosovo (whether 
within or without the SFRY/FRY) and in mobilizing society to protest against the violation 
of human rights and persistent discrimination against Albanians in Kosovo. It will also 
highlight the character of Albanian "intellectuals" and "politicians" during socialism who, 
arguably, enjoyed the benefits of the Tito regime and kept silent regarding injustices 
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committed against the Albanian population in Kosovo. Indeed, most of the scholars who 
have written about the region have underscored the continuous violation of Albanians’ 
human rights in Kosovo. Malcolm confirmed their work, citing plans in the interwar 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia to expel Kosovar Albanians to Turkey (Malcolm, 1998, p. 140-1). 
However, by emphasizing that it was students who raised their voices and mobilized society 
to protest against humiliation and widespread discrimination, I propose that students were 
actors and icons of ongoing resistance and protest. To provide both a framework and a 
structure to the historical argument of my dissertation, this research is divided along 
temporal and thematic axes, which allows me to integrate the study of the past with the 
study of its impact on the present. 
1.3. Accounting for the methodological frameworks of this dissertation 
Given that the demonstrations were organized by Kosovo students of the ethnic Albanian 
majority desirous of elevating their status from that of an autonomous province of Yugoslavia 
– and, later, part of Serbia – to that a a constituent republic or independent country, they had 
a significant impact on the political lives of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Albania as well.14 While 
discussing the state transformations and systems of social movements in particular, Charles 
Tilly (2006, 433) argues that every significant political phenomenon lives in history and 
requires historically grounded analysis for its explanation. At the same time, establishing 
historical "facts" by a careful and extensive reading of archival sources is considered the 
essence of a historian's work (Blouin and Rosenberg 2011, 14). This dissertation intends to 
look at multiple layers of the student movements as pivotal historical events. This approach 
will offer the best opportunity for understanding the participation of all parties involved in 
the wider context. As such, my data collecting strategy concentrated on sources held in the 
Archive of Kosovo, Archive of Yugoslavia, Archive of Serbia, Central Archive of the 
Republic of Albania, and the Archives of Albania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some 
newspaper materials in the Albanian language were collected from the National Libraries in 
Tirana and Prishtina, whereas for the Serbian language I used the Library of the City of 
Belgrade (except for "Jedinstvo," which was found at the National Library in Belgrade).15 
 
14 The demonstrations also had a significant effect on Macedonia (today’s Republic of North Macedonia). This 
significance, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation and requires a separate study. 
15 The field research was supported in part by a grant from the Open Society Foundation. 
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The reason for consulting sources from these countries is that they were directly involved in 
the process of the initial founding and subsequent development of the UP.  
The present study also utilizes insights from oral history: interviews with activists, 
academics, politicians, and other officials, conducted in Prishtina, Tirana, Belgrade, and 
Skopje, because these actors participated in, influenced, or had in-depth knowledge of the 
student movements in Kosovo.16 As highlighted by Bosi and Reiner (2014, 144-146), the 
subjectivity that might be represented by archival materials viewing the developments 
primarily through the lens of state agencies is balanced by approaches which use oral history 
techniques. The utilization of oral history techniques to analyze social movements is known 
and has already been used to assess the global political events of 1968 (Gildea, Mark, and 
Warring 2013), and the civil rights and feminist movements in the United States (Morris 
1984, Gluck and Patai 1991). Thus, to grasp the interrelation and co-dependence of different 
actors as well as the different periods of the Kosovo student movements, the following groups 
of people were interviewed17 for this dissertation:  
a) Members of “illegal groups” 18  and the organizers of the student 
movements, e.g., Selatin Novosella,19 Mejreme Shema,20 Sahit Berisha21 
 
16 The written materials collected in the field and most interviews conducted for purposes of this research were in 
the Albanian and Serbian languages. All materials appearing in this dissertation have been translated into English 
by the author. 
17 The materials of all recorded interviews are available and can be provided upon the request of the jury members 
of this dissertation. The individuals interviewed were academics, politicians, organizers, participants or witnesses 
of the demonstrations at the times under scrutiny. However, their later or current political positions can lead us to 
doubt their “neutral” recollection of events. That is why in the text and footnotes, I tried to add some information 
regarding their political activism. Their years of birth (for a few individuals the approximate years of birth) are 
also provided. 
18 For more information about the reasons why these formations were labeled as “illegal groups”, see page 65. 
19 Selatin Novosella (1939) was a founder and member of ‘illegal groups.” He was also one of the key organizers 
of the 1968 student movements in Kosovo. 
20 Mejreme Shema (1948) was one of the female activists who was wounded and then imprisoned in the aftermath 
of the 1968 demonstrations. 
21 Sahit Berisha (1951) was an activist and a contact point of the organizers of the 1968 demonstrations in one of 
the high schools in Prishtina. Berisha received instructions for the mobilization of the pupils from his school 
directly from Osman Dumoshi – another key organizer of the 1968 student movements in Prishtina.  
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(1968), Hydajet Hyseni,22 Ethem Çeku,23 Gani Koci,24 Jakup Krasniqi25 
(1981) and Bujar Dugolli, 26  Driton Lajçi, 27  Albin Kurti, 28  Muhamet 
Mavraj29 (1997)  
b) Political representatives of the historical periods covered: Azem Vllasi,30 
Dušan Janjić,31 Paskal Milo,32 Muhamet Hamiti.33  
c) Professors, academics, journalists and intellectuals familiar with the topic 
of this dissertation: Petrit Imami,34 Rexhep Qosja,35 Denisa Kostovicova,36 
 
22 Hydajet Hyseni (1954) is an ex-political prisoner, a founder and famous personality in the illegal group known 
as “Revolutionary Group.” Hyseni is also currently active in politics and a member of the Kosovo Assambly.   
23 Ethem Çeku (1962) is a historian and an ex-political prisoner as a member of the illegal groups in Kosovo. 
After the Kosovo war (1999) Çeku was active in politics and held the position of minister in Kosovo’s government 
(2001-2007). 
24 Gani Koci (1958) was one of the organizers of the March 11, 1981 student demonstrations in Prishtina. After 
the Kosovo war (1999) Koci was actively engaged in politics, as a member of the Kosovo Assembly and deputy 
minister in Kosovo’s government.  
25 Jakup Krasniqi (1951) is an ex-political prisoner, a founder and famous personality in the illegal groups. After 
the Kosovo war (1999), he was an actively engaged politician, former acting President of Kosovo and a former 
chairman of the Assembly of Kosovo. 
26 Bujar Dugolli (1969) studied at the Department of History and was later a president of the Student Union at 
the University of Prishtina and one of the main organizers of the non-violent demonstrations in October 1997. 
After the war (1999) he was actively engaged in politics, serving also as a minister in Kosovo’s government (2004-
2008).   
27 Driton Lajçi (1974) was a vice president of the Student Union at the UP and one of the main organizers of the 
non-violent demonstrations in October 1997. After the war in Kosovo, Lajçi became actively engaged in politics. 
As a part of interview, it was suggested to me by Driton Lajçi to use his insights about the same topic, shared with 
the newspaper Epoka e Re during October 2005.     
28 Albin Kurti (1975) studied computer and telecommunications sciences and was a vice president of the Student 
Union at the University of Prishtina and one of the main organizers of the non-violent demonstrations in October 
1997. For more than a decade, Kurti has been actively engaged in politics and is considered one of the main 
opposition leaders.  
29 Muhamed Mavraj (1973) studied at the Technical Faculty and was a secretary of the Student Union at the UP, 
and one of the main organizers of the non-violent demonstrations in October 1997. He is currently involved in 
journalism and media. Special thanks to Muhamet Mavraj for taking the time to share numerous articles from 
Epoka e Re, as well as pictures and other materials.   
30 Azem Vllasi (1948) was a member of the SFRY League of Communists Provincial Committee (LoCPC) and 
became the leader of the Kosova League of Communists (LoC) in 1986. 
31 Dušan Janjić (1950) was a member of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (SRS) LoC (1968-1988), as well as 
founder and a vice president of Social Democracy (1997-1999). 
32 Paskal Milo (1949) is an Albanian historian, politician, and currently a leader of the Social Democracy Party of 
Albania. He has also been a member of the Albanian parliament since the early nineties and held various posts 
under the Albanian government, notably that of Foreign Minister (1997 - 2001)  
33 Muhamet Hamiti (1964) is a Kosovar politician and UP professor. As an advisor and close collaborator of 
Ibrahim Rugova, he was a founding member and chief editor of the English-language service of the Kosova 
Information Center (KIC), a Kosovar news organization close to President Rugova.  
34 Petrit Imami (1945) is a professor of Albanian origin and has been at the University of Belgrade since 1981. He 
authored a number of publications, including the book “Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove” (Serbs and Albanians through 
the centuries), which makes him one of most competent scholars on Serb-Albanian relations. 
35 Rexhep Qosja (1936) is a prominent Albanian politician and literary critic, the author of various anthologies and 
scholarly monographs. 
36 Denisa Kostovicova (1971) is an Associate Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
She is the author of “Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space” (2005) and co-editor of a number of special 
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Rexhep Ismajli, 37  Victor Friedman,38  Sonja Biserko, 39  Jusuf Buxhovi,40 
Afrim Krasniqi, 41  Shkëlzen Maliqi, 42  Fahri Musliu, 43  Sabile Keçmezi 
Basha.44    
d) Civil society activists and Leader of the Council for the Defense of Human 
Rights and Freedoms from Kosovo, Bexhet Shala, 45  and from Serbia, 
Nataša Kandić.46 
e) Interviews were also conducted with ex-employees of the state security 
service of the SFRY (Abdulla Prapashtica47 - online interview - and Ilmi 
Hetemi48) as well as with doctors who witnessed torture by the ex-regime 
(Agim Bytyqi49) and relatives of those who lost their lives participating in 
these movements (Faton Abazi50). 
 
issues and books including “Transnationalism in the Balkans” (2008) and “Civil Society and Transitions in the 
Western Balkans” (2013), etc.  
37 Rexhep Ismajli (1947), is UP professor and a member of Kosovo’s Academy of Sciences since 1993.  
38  Victor A. Friedman (1949) is Professor Emeritus in the Humanities at the University of Chicago. His 
multidisciplinary research involves fieldwork in the Balkans for over 40 years. He was in Kosovo in1981, and he 
was part of a Council on Foreign Relations Mission in 1995. 
39 Sonja Biserko (1948) is a founder and president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, that 
actively followed and wrote about political developments in Kosovo. 
40 Jusuf Buxhovi (1946) is a Kosovar-Albanian author, journalist, history writer. As a political activist, he was one 
of the founding members and the first secretary of the LDK.  
41 Afrim Krasniqi (1971) is a researcher at the Albanian Academy of Sciences in Tirana and the executive director 
of the Institute of Political Studies. He is a lecturer on political parties, political systems and electoral systems at 
the University of Tirana and a close follower of political developmens in Albania and Kosovo.  
42 Shkëlzen Maliqi (1947) is a Kosovar political analyst. Since the beginning of the 1980s, he has been a regular 
contributor to the most important media outlets in Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. Maliqi was also involved 
in politics during the nineties.   
43 Fahri Musliu (1948) is a retired Albanian journalist, living and working in Belgrade since 1968. He reported for 
the BBC and the Voice of America in Belgrade. He was a correspondent and associate for many news agencies in 
Serbo-Croatian, Albanian and English. He was one of the founders, director and editor in chief for the magazine 
"Europe" in Serbian and English (1996-1998) in Belgrade. 
44 Sabile Keçmezi Basha (1954) was a permanent researcher at the Kosovo History Institute (1978-2018). During 
her long career, she mainly focused on explaining the founding and development of “illegal groups” (1945–1990s) 
in Kosovo.   
45 Bexhet Shala (1958), head of Kosovo’s Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in 
Kosovo, an organization that played a crucial role in Kosovo’s daily politics, especially from the late eighties. 
46 Nataša Kandić (1946) is a Serbian human rights activist and the founder of the Humanitarian Law Center, an 
organization campaigning for human rights and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. 
47 Abdulla Prapashtica (1957) was one of the investigators of the state security intelligence service in SFRY. He 
is also one of the founders of one illegal group organization which claims to have been the organizers of the 1981 
demonstrations.  
48 Ilmi Hetemi (1945) was Chief of a Police Station in Ferizaj/Uroševac (1962-1981) 
49 Agim Bytyqi (1960) is a medical doctor.  In 1981, he was a student at the Faculty of Medicine in Prishtina.  
50 Faton Abazi (1969) is a brother of Afrim Abazi, who was arrested during the attempt to commemorate the first 
year of 1981 demonstrations. The torture to which Afrim Abazi was subjected caused him to jump from the fourth 
floor of the police building, as a result of which he died. 
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The insights gathered from about thirty-three interviewed personalities are utilized in this 
dissertation. The respondents are chosen mainly based on the importance of their roles or 
institutional positions during the historical period(s) covered by this research. In addition to 
other sources, these interviews also provided insider information, which allowed for a 
thorough analysis of the issues affecting actors on all sides (students, citizens, and the 
regime). I also benefited from the generosity of interview participants, most of whom gave 
me books, important trial documents, newspaper articles, pictures and other useful materials 
related to my research topic. In addition to examining archival and interview materials, I 
looked at videos and textual documents from relevant institutions to gain a better 
understanding of the students' emotions and their fear of the acts committed by the regime 
against them (collective use of violence, torture, imprisonment). The aim was also to 
document the experiences of the masses of men and women affected by the regime's actions. 
Additionally, I also utilized some statistical data collected from Public Pulse. 51  My 
academic and professional background, in addition to my knowledge of the local languages 
(Albanian and Serbian) and local culture and social dynamics, was a great advantage in 
carrying out this research and bringing to the surface the complexity of this topic. This 
enabled me to follow a data collecting strategy that combined a variety of different sources 
and available literature on this topic.  
Given that the dissertation provides an historical perspective of the student movements 
in Kosovo (1968, 1981 and 1997), three temporal phases are used for each of the cases: 
before, during and after the demonstrations. The analyses are then elaborated using the 
following paradigms: 
 micro level: personal emotions, experiences, and identities (ethical and ideological) 
 meso level: UP, students, inter-generational dynamic elements, state elites, 
academics/intellectuals (waves of contentions) 
 
51 The author was a founder of the Public Pulse Project (2008). He also managed and administrated this project for 
a period of 10 years. This is a research project implemented by the United Nations Development Program in 
Kosovo using a quantitative research methodology. The results are based on an opinion poll sample that surveyed 
1,306 citizens of Kosovo over 18 years of age, of both sexes and from all municipalities and regions of Kosovo, 
covering both rural and urban areas. The sample included 896 Kosovo Albanians, 210 Kosovo Serbs and 200 
Kosovo non-Serb minorities (namely Turkish, Bosnian, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian). The survey’s 
method is multi-staged random probability sampling. The sample is representative of households in Kosovo. Since 
2010 this survey has been conducted every six months, while earlier it was conducted on a quarterly basis. Public 
Pulse surveys oversample minorities in Kosovo (K-Serbs, K-Others) in order to be able to disaggregate data by 




 macro level: regional impact (Serbia, Albania) and influences on broader 
international levels (Yugoslavia, West/East) 
As recommended by Dill and Aminzade (2007), the following steps were used in the 
utilization of the archival and oral history materials for this dissertation:  
 relevant sources were identified, found, and selected,  
 sources were registered and classified in preparation for further analysis, 
 the materials collected were subjected to critical inquiry, in particular concerning 
"the institutional processes that produced them,"  
 finally, the analyses proceeded in multiple directions (Dill and Aminzade 2007, 
269).  
By examining information gathered from archives (and libraries) in Prishtina, Tirana, 
and Belgrade, along with data gathered via interviews, I was able to determine the central 
role that students had in carrying out ideas of freedom, peace and RK. This methodology 
also allowed me to examine whether the UP, student mobilization and state-creation were 
interrelated and co-dependent. By analyzing archival documents from 1968 onwards, I was 
able to assess how the historical shifts of the UP affected student movements and 
mobilization practices. Analysis of the materials gathered in the archives and interviews, as 
well as videos and media materials which had not been previously explored, produced new 
knowledge on this topic. 
1.4. Literature review framework: assessing social movements and protests 
Although this dissertation is developed using a historical approach and does not examine the 
Kosovo student movements from various social science perspectives perspectives; to address 
some sets of questions I also turned to the social science literature dealing with social and 
student movements comparatively, taking place at different temporal and geographic 
junctures.52  A number of scholars who have written about social movements have had 
difficulties in providing a precise definition of social movements. For example, American 
 
52 See for instance: Skcopoli 1979, Tilly 1981, 2004 and 2006, Dunn 1989, Marwick 1998, Day 2005, Flam and 
King 2005, McIntyre 2005, Klimke and Scharloth 2008, Klandermans and Roggerband 2010, Johnston 2011 and 
2014, Bosi and Reiter 2014, Fahlenbrach, Klimke, and Scharloth. 2016, Jian et al. 2018, Della Porta and Diani 
2006, Della Porta and Keating 2008, Della Porta 2016, etc. 
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abolitionist and orator Wendell Phillip (1811-1884) said in his speeches that 
"Movements/revolutions are not made; they come," and Skocpol offered arguments that 
movements are not made by theorists but are rather products of complex connections between 
socio-political conditions (Skocpol 1979). However, this lack of a comprehensive definition 
may be because social movements are usually organized by interest groups that are 
themselves not necessarily well defined or that are not recognized institutional entities aiming 
to gain direct access to political power. Instead, they bloom as a reaction of undefined groups 
embedded somewhere in between the political elites and disaffected members of society. As 
such, it may be plausible to assume that the actions of a particular larger group of individuals 
demanding particular political or social changes or improvements constitutes what may be 
considered a social movement.  
The term "social movement" was introduced into scholarly discussion by German 
sociologist Lorenz von Stein in his book entitled "History of the French Social Movements 
from 1789-1850 (Werner 1966). Later, Marx and Engels adopted the term in their 
"Communist Manifesto" (1884) and defined it in the following terms:  
"… all previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in 
the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, 
independent movement of the immense majority."(Tilly 2004; 7, citing Marx 
and Engels (1958) "Communist Manifesto"; 1, 44). 
When first used in the early 19th century, the concept of a social movement had a rather 
specific meaning: it stood for the movement of the new industrial working class and had 
socialist, communist, and anarchist tendencies. According to Charles Tilly, the relationship 
between politics and society enabled Westerners to invent social movements during the 18th 
century. Tilly argues that social movements became vehicles of popular politics across the 
world in diverse contexts and historical periods (Tilly; 2004). In his book "Social 
Movements, 1768-2004," Tilly argues that from their 18th-century origins onward, social 
movements have proceeded not as solo performances but as interactive campaigns 
promoted mainly by democratization and heavily dependent on political entrepreneurs for 
their scale, durability, and effectiveness. Tilly also emphasizes that to enable a social 
movement to survive, people usually participate as volunteers offering their time and skills 
(Tilly; 2004).  
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In David Aberle's (1966) writings compiled by McKeen and Pecho, four kinds of 
social movements were identified: alternative and redemptive social movements (both of 
which are at the individual level, where one advocates for minor and the other for radical 
changes) and reformative and revolutionary social movements (at the level of a broader 
group, or societal level, where one advocates for minor, and the other for radical changes) 
(McKeen and Pecho, 2009). The first modern social movements appeared in the mid-18th 
century, and they were associated with economic and political changes that appeared in 
England (Tilly, 2004). Other historical movements that followed in the late 18th century 
included the British movement against slavery, the French and American revolutions, and 
19th-century labor movements, which in a way paved the way for the establishment of 
communist and socialist political parties and organizations. Spreading across Europe and 
America, the pressure of the masses to continue with reforms was also manifested in Russia 
in the 19th century, leading to various movements that culminated in the 1905 and 1917 
revolutions that toppled the Czarist regime (Tilly, 1981, Defronzo, 2011). If the 18th and 
19th centuries’ movements are analyzed based on Aberle's theory of type of social 
movement, we might easily consider them as reformative and revolutionary social 
movements. Hence, they all fall under the rubric of broader groups or societal level 
movements, which advocate for both minor and radical changes.  
After the Second World War, the Western world in particular embarked on a journey 
of reform and change. This was mostly achieved through reformative but did not exclude 
radical social movements. There emerged different types of social movements, often labeled 
as New Social Movements, i.e., national movements, the civil rights movement, the 
women’s rights movement, environmental movements, etc. Richard J.F. Day uses the 
theory of affinity to explain that the Newest Social Movements developed as an alternative 
to the, by then, old social movements (unions, political parties, strikes, etc.) because, 
according to him, activists are always already doing theory and theorists are always already 
political subjects; the challenge lies in increasing our awareness and acceptance of this 
mutual implication, as well as in searching for more ways to discover the possibilities and 
tensions this creates (Day 2005; 193). Day also focuses his attention on "radical activism" 
(Day 2005; 22), which attempts to modify or build alternatives for main structures, 
processes, practices, and identities. Day proposes that radical movements should overcome 
the logic of hegemony and favor the logic of affinity. However, the majority of scholars 
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recognize that most transformations throughout history, particularly those that occurred 
during the 20th century (primarily in the Western world), happened due to decades of work 
and effort invested by various activists and thinkers who organized and participated in social 
movements (ibid.).  
"Social movements" are considered a specific kind of long-lasting and extensive 
type of action, spreading beyond various boundaries and extending over an entire society, 
i.e., concerted action groups that are more integrated but not organized in the sense of 
political clubs and other associations. The term "protest movements," on the other hand, is 
used to denote movements of a limited or mostly local, national or regional character 
(Heberle & Gusfield; 2008). Della Porta's definition of protest includes non-routinized ways 
of affecting political, social, and cultural processes (e.g., signing petitions, boycotts, 
blocking traffic and lawful demonstrations). She considers protests to be a channel of 
political expression and mobilization and suggests different typologies of protest. Protest 
can be more or less radical in nature, ranging from more conventional petitioning to more 
conflictual blockades and including episodes of violence. Forms of protest can also be 
distinguished according to the logic or modus operandi which the activists ascribe to them: 
the logic of numbers, the logic of damage, or the logic of testimony. (Della Porta 2016; 26-
28). Kosovo students used this logic as well, proclaiming that although larger in numbers, 
Albanians were damaged and discriminated by the regime, being treated as second-class 
citizens with no right for a republic of their own.    
1.4.1. The goals and pathways of social movements 
The goals of social movements and protests are multiple. From a rational perspective, they 
originate from the different ways in which organizers and individuals participating in 
protests or social movements are able to organize, use, and create their solidarity networks. 
Movements extend beyond mere organizations; they emerge once those actors who had 
explicitly stated the goals of the movement find alternative ways to achieve them. Social 
movements and protests are common tools used to achieve social change, justice, and 
nationalist-related goals. However, Della Porta and Diani also argue that when the goals of 
one movement differ from the goals of others, various divisions may occur within a given 
movement. For example, in opposing capitalism, leftist organizations may stress the 
exploitative practices of global free markets and call for an overthrow of capitalism, while 
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their nationalist opponents may found their opposition to capitalism on very different 
grounds, stressing the threat of transnational powers to national sovereignty, therefore 
calling for protectionist economic policies and stricter limitations to the circulation of goods 
and people. The authors agree that in modern societies, social movements are often 
represented as "characters" bearing a specific cultural role with a strategic capacity for 
action.  As a result, leadership in social movements is often ad hoc, short-lived, oriented 
toward specific goals, and concentrated in a limited area of the movements themselves 
(Della Porta and Diani 2006; 77, 109, 154). However, in the case of Kosovo, most of the 
student leaders that were involved in the organization of the demonstrations became active 
political figures. Later one some of them served as Prime ministers, Speaker of the 
Parliament, and other senior positions of Kosovo's administration. Although we cannot 
assume that political opportunities were main goals, it is for sure that being the organizers 
of a “patriotic movement" helped them gain political benefits afterward. Movements 
typically seek social change, which necessitates the use of different means to mobilize in 
specific and global contexts. The most common methods used to achieve social movements’ 
goals may include petitions, public marches, and other types of strikes, where the organizers 
do their best to try to win the masses over to their causes at the local, state, and broader 
levels. A view taken by certain authors, however, is that "emotions" present an important 
tool used by social mobilization to achieve the goals of diverse social movements (shame, 
pride, anger, solidarity, loyalty, joy, hope, fear, contempt, sadness, distrust, empathy, 
compassion, altruism, outrage, gratitude, happiness, etc.). Ron Eyerman also considers the 
use of emotion as a crucial component in the mobilization of masses to reach certain goals 
or to "move" the movement. He uses performance theory to relate cognitive framing to the 
preparation of mobilization for the movement (Eyerman 2005; 41-57). Experts such as 
Hopkins, McKie, Watson, and Hughes have also observed how emotion, through disputed 
political constructions of care, has been imagined by theorists of disability and feminism. 
They argue that important lessons about the "micro-processes of emotion power" (Hopkins 
et al 2005; 131) in social movements and beyond reside within the tensions between these 
two types of social movements (disability and feminism). Other authors have viewed 
emotions from an opposite perspective: as an important factor for the demobilization of 
social movements. In that vein, Kleres, for example, has made some theoretical remarks on 
shame and inferiority, documenting that emotion plays a crucial role during the 
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demobilization process of activists as well. His analysis also demonstrates that emotions are 
very powerful tools in gaining a comprehensive understanding of the demobilization 
processes of social movements (Kleres 2005; 181). Kosovo student movements were also 
driven by emotions. However, in addition to Thompson's concept of the moral economy, 
that the feelings of injustice “provokes indignation and action” (Thompson 1971, 98), the 
next chapters of this dissertation will also show that Kosovo Albanian society succeeded in 
mobilizing only when, parallel to the emotions of unjust treatment by the regime(s), they 
managed to raise their level of political maturity. The UP had a significant role in this regard 
and that is why it is considered an important political player in the region. On the other 
hand, authors such as Janet J. McIntyre have developed a set of "thinking tools" (McIntyre 
2005; 25) to help trace collective webs and reach goals of social movements throughout 
different frameworks of social and cultural values. McIntyre argues that society can be 
taught to perform the norms and ideas that will lead to common developmental interests. 
Her approach claims that the only way to help people move from competitive to egalitarian 
thinking is by using thinking tools to create shared webs of meaning that both shape and 
question the social world. The primary purpose of McIntyre's thinking tools is not to solve 
the problems. Instead, the purpose is to help us understand the nature of the concerns and 
define the set of circumstances and phenomena of the problems in question. McIntyre 
argues that ideas can be used to empower the powerless and the powerful and that 
understanding this presents the first step towards liberation (McIntyre 2005; 8). We cannot 
pretend that the demonstrations “solved the problem” in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the 
mobilization of the students helped the society to understand and define the liberation, or 
the “Republic” status for Kosovo, as an issue of common interest. 
1.4.2. Different disciplinary approaches to research the variability of social movements 
Even though the methodological decisions for this dissertation have been elaborated in the 
previous section(s), I still consider it useful for readers to highlight some of the main 
approaches used by scholars to study social and student movements. An enormous body of 
literature, many theories and a variety of concepts on the theoretical approaches to 
researching the variability of social movements have been published.53 Jackie Smith and 
 
53 See for example: Skcopoli 1979, Tilly 1981, 2004 and 2006, Dunn 1989, Marwick 1998, Day 2005, Flam and 
King 2005, McIntyre 2005, Klimke and Scharloth 2008, Klandermans and Roggerband 2010, Johnston 2011 and 
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Tina Fetner consider social movement research to be by and large state-centric. They add 
that two notions have emerged from what is largely a state-centric body of social movement 
research: political contexts and mobilizing structures provide useful analytical tools that can 
help scholars analyze how states and other actors and structures shape the dynamics of 
social movements. These authors claim that political contexts affect both how people can 
try to influence political outcomes and how they can come together as a group (Smith and 
Fetner 2010; 21, 22). Smith and Fetner similarly conclude that state policies present critical 
components of the political context in which social movements take place. Other scholars 
focus more specifically on the socio-psychological ways in which social context influences 
individuals' behavior. They argue that there are four basic social psychological mechanisms 
(social identity, cognition, emotion, and motivation) that mediate between collective 
identity and collective action (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2010; 161). Another 
important approach to the study of social movements is the anthropological, according to 
which the analysis of social movements needs to take into account the cultural dimensions 
of social movements' identities, discourses, and actions. Authors promoting this approach 
argue that the anthropological emphasis on cultural dimensions contributed to clarifying the 
recurring debate between more structuralist and more agency-focused approaches to the 
contexts in which social movements take place. The analysis of a certain culture's manifold 
presence in social movements, the concrete incarnation of culture in social movements, and 
distinct "temporalities" of culture and protest actions have enabled researchers to explore 
the multifarious ways in which culture manifests itself in social movements and reflect on 
the consequences of the apparent mismatch between culture's "slow time" and movements' 
"rapid time" (Salman and Assies 2010; 206, 219, 261). Social movement studies have not 
been developed as a specific area within political science. Although no specific social 
movement framework has been developed within this field, political scientists have 
introduced important ideas and theoretical concepts for the analysis of social movements, 
including "resource mobilization" and "political opportunity." However, most of the use 
and theoretical developments of those concepts have taken place outside the discipline, 
generally in sociology. Political science rather examines the role of social movements as 
players in the political arena and how collective actions may be shaped by political 
 
2014, Bosi and Reiter 2014, Fahlenbrach, Klimke, and Scharloth. 2016, Jian et al. 2018, Della Porta and Diani 
2006, Della Porta and Keating 2008, Della Porta 2016, etc. 
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opportunities. Indeed, political science touches on many aspects of social movements and 
the politics of protest and emphasizes the connections among organized actors and their 
interests, state structures, and public policies. Consequently, social movements are an area 
of inquiry within three major subfields of political science (American politics, comparative 
politics, and international relations), but the study of social movements is not a field in and 
of itself (Meyer and Lupo 2010; 139). Also, the historical context of any social movement 
presents a major consideration for its analysis. To understand why and how social 
movements emerge, it is necessary to understand the context. Dill and Aminzade remind us 
that, as a discipline, history is organized along lines of time and space, and claim that, when 
it comes to social movements, there are three historical methods for their research: close 
attention to detail and context, skeptical and judicious questioning of sources via internal 
and external criticism, and the use of narrative – the roles played by later and current 
narrative discourse (Dill and Aminzade, 2010; 272). Since the bulk of theories and concepts 
informing social movement research are either based on studies of the present or of the 
relatively recent past, deeper historical knowledge will always provide for a better 
understanding and thereby foster more contextualized theory. However, there is also a range 
of additional techniques which a researcher can use to approach the study of social 
movements, such as surveys, formal models, discourse analysis, in-depth interviews, 
participant observation, case studies, network analysis, other historical methods, protest 
event analysis, macro-organizational analysis, and comparative politics (Della Porta 2016).  
Student movements have been examined and interpreted in a multiplicity of different 
ways. When scholars have assessed them from the micro-level perspective, some have 
linked student activism with the characteristics of youth, such as limited responsibility and 
the availability of free time (Allerbeck 1972), whereas others have adduced enthusiasm, 
idealism and exposure to new ideas (Altbach 1967), or even portrayed such students as 
spoiled, emotional rebels, irreverent, adventurist radicals unable to handle ambiguity and 
devoted to an ethic of absolute ends, etc. (Lipset 1976). But when student movements have 
been analyzed from macro-level perspectives, the interpretations of scholars have 
recognized the interactions between student movements, the spheres in which universities 
were embedded and the transformations of the states or the broader systems. Student 
protests have been seen to respond to historical changes (Martinelli and Cavalli 1972). 
Student movements have often accompanied — and sometimes even started — cycles of 
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protests, as was the case in Kosovo. That is why, as Delgado and Ross (2016, 144) noted, 
"Students are often considered to be ‘catalysts' of political and social action or ‘barometers' 
of the social unrest and political tension accumulated in society." On many occasions, 
students quickly found allies within the political system and contributed to more general 
mobilizations, and, as I shall so, this applies to Kosovo. 
1.5. Conclusions  
All periods of the UP's life were marked by the high political mobilization of the student 
body with regard to the national(ist) interests of Kosovar Albanians. In 1968, 1981 and 
1997, UP campuses and cities in Kosovo were bursting with student activism, which mainly 
focused on opposition to the SFRY’s status quo, and, in 1997, to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY’s) political regime. Students organized demonstrations to protest the 
regime's human rights violations and persistent discrimination against Kosovo Albanians 
between 1968 and 1997. However, the student demands during the demonstrations of 1968 
and 1981 also included nationalist slogans. The eruption of the first student movements in 
Kosovo during the last century depended not only on the dynamics of that particular time 
(the 1960s) but also on pre-existing conditions. Thus, to understand the overall picture, one 
must be aware of previous state transformations, relations between communities living in 
the area as well as with the authorities, etc. To offer comprehensive and credible 
explanations for these developments, history must seriously be taken into account. Hence, 
as Tilly (2006) points out, "from beginning to end, the process belongs to history." That is 
why I have chosen a historical approach for researching Kosovo student movements (1968, 
1981, 1997). 
The second chapter of this dissertation offers a historical overview of how the 
Albanians living in the SFRY viewed themselves and were viewed externally by other 
peoples in the country. Here I argue that while the Orientalist and Balkanist expositions of 
this region shaped a variety of discourses among communities living in Yugoslavia, 
particularly due to the diverse histories and specificities of each ethnic group, a uniform 
interpretation of Orientalism and Balkanism in the context of Yugoslavia cannot be made. 
Additionally, I will provide a historical overview of the disputes between Albanians and 
Serbs related to the establishment and development of educational institutions in the 
Albanian language as well as their role in political and national emancipation. 
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The third chapter seeks to understand the emergence and development of collective 
actions during the late 1960s, particularly in Belgrade (the SFRY's capital) and Kosovo. 
Here I analyze the conceptual connections and differences between student movements in 
Belgrade and Kosovo during the specific historical period. The main focus, however, 
remains on the student movements in Kosovo (1968). I explicitly look at the interactions 
between regional/local policies, institutions of higher learning, and student movements in 
Kosovo (1968) and the impact of these movements on the establishment of the UP. Further, 
the connections between politics and education are highlighted in every phase of the 
development of university level education in Kosovo. Here I present the connections 
between education and the objectives of two different political agendas (the SFRY and 
Albania). Thus, it was not the academic values, i.e. the desire to preserve and create 
knowledge as such,  but the intentions of fostering political ideologies that were the main 
interest of multiple parties involved in the struggle for the "establishment and development" 
of the UP. Even though it functioned to some extent as an academic institution, the UP 
became an arena where different political forces struggled for control. Thereafter I present 
and analyze the eruptions and development of the student demonstrations of March and 
April 1981. These demonstrations will be remembered in history as events that triggered 
deep societal divisions in addition to generating destabilization and bringing about great 
changes both at the level of Kosovo and at the level of the SFRY. The fifth chapter covers 
the fraught atmosphere which dominated Kosovo during the 1990s. This was also the most 
challenging period for the survival of the UP. In September 1991, the Serbian police and 
army were deployed in front of elementary and high schools and the UP. The purpose was 
to prevent instruction in the Albanian language as well as exclude professors and students 
from the UP premises. Subsequently, after almost a decade of "forced patience," the parallel 
educational structures that had been formed in response to Serbian exclusion were 
considered as unacceptable by Kosovar Albanian students. Only when students started to 
organize demonstrations did the attention of Western diplomats and media began to focus 
on Kosovo. This is the background against which the three student movements in Kosovo 
(1968, 1981 and 1997) are analyzed in this dissertation. The key concepts of the analysis 
revolve around the links between higher education (specifically the UP), political 
influences, and students. By examining the dynamics of the demonstrations, I analyze the 
dimensions, forms and implications of student uprisings and resistance, as well as the 
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struggles for dominance by local (Kosovo), federal (SFRY), regional (Albania and Serbia) 
and international (outside the Balkans) actors. I also argue that patriotic emotions, fear of 
repression/assimilation, or – given that some student leaders subsequently became political 
figures – ambitions for political opportunities, were also factors prompting the students, and 
especially the organizers among them, to become committed to their respective movements. 
To help the reader understand that these demonstrations, although organized by students, 
were not necessarily academic but rather political, this dissertation presents and analyzes 
the impact that students had on mobilizing society to demonstrate for self-determination. 
Given that each demonstration took place under different historical and political 
circumstances, and that each was organized by a different generation of Kosovo Albanian 
students, this dissertation examines how the vision of independence impacted the first and 
subsequent student movements. Additionally, this dissertation elucidates the influence and 
reactions of domestic and foreign powers vis-à-vis the students and movements of 1968, 
1981 and 1997 in Kosovo.  
Taking into consideration the complexity and scope of the topic, I am aware that this 
dissertation cannot claim to be either perfect or complete. However, I hope that my modest 




Chapter 2: Uneasy liaison: Albanians and South Slavs in the Former Yugoslavia 
2.1. Application of Orientalist and Balkanist theoretical lenses to Albanians in Yugoslavia 
This chapter deals with the perception of Albanians by the South Slav majority in 
Yugoslavia, especially focusing on the Serbian perspective. To offer a comprehensive 
picture of these relations, I also examine the role of the Orientalist and Balkanist discourse 
in the Former Yugoslavia with a particular focus on Albanians. While the Orientalist and 
Balkanist expositions of this region shaped a variety of discourses among communities 
living in Yugoslavia, particularly due to the diverse histories and specifics of each ethnic 
group, a uniform interpretation of Orientalism and Balkanism in the context of Yugoslavia 
cannot be made. The multilayered and polyphonic character of Orientalism reflected in how 
the people living in Yugoslavia viewed themselves, were viewed externally by other 
peoples in the country, and were viewed by the West. By applying Orientalist and Balkanist 
theoretical lenses on Albanians living in Yugoslavia, this chapter provides some reflections 
on how Albanians defined themselves and how they were perceived by the South Slavic 
majority within Yugoslavia. Moreover, I ask why Albanians considered their nationality as 
the chief factor in defining themselves, unlike the other peoples living in Yugoslavia. Since 
the central angle of this dissertation is higher/university education in Kosovo, in this 
chapter, I also turn my attention to the historical disputes that these two ethnicities had about 
education.  
2.2. Connections between Orientalism and Balkanism: Zooming onto the Balkans 
Edward Said describes Orient as a label that designates the East in contrast to the Occident 
(referring to the West), while Orientalism, as a concept, is often used as an analytical term 
referring to how the East is seen by the West (Said, 1977: 210). Since the 18th century, 
Orientalism has been used as a traditional term for Oriental Studies, however, Said 
redefined this term forever in 1978 in his influential and provocative book "Orientalism" 
(Said, 1977). Using a philosophical analysis, Said positions the West as though gazing down 
from a position of superiority on "the Orient" as "the other," different, unusual, fanatical, 
violent, religious, and inferior. By analyzing the Western attitudes towards the East, Said 
considers Orientalism to be a powerful European ideological creation, and a way for writers, 
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philosophers, and colonial administrators to deal with the "otherness" of Eastern culture, 
customs, and beliefs. He describes the West's tendency to deal with the East through a 
generalized and systematic vocabulary portraying the Orient as unchanging and uniform 
and as something that the West should fear. He analyzes European and American 
observations of Arab and Islamic culture and the generally dichotomous ways in which the 
former try to delineate the East: barbarous vs. civilized, Westen progress behind “us” vs. a 
backward “them,” or Christianity and civilization vs. primitivism and Islam (Said, 1977; 
137-151, 240). Orientalism also addresses universal clichés of human nature involving 
power and discourse that resonate beyond the broader "East-West" divisions (Said 1977: 
246). By dismantling the West's tendency to present itself as rational, developed, humane, 
and superior while presenting the Orient as underdeveloped, aberrant and inferior, Said 
maintains that the Orient appeared as “the other” in Western descriptions of its domination. 
Even though Said’s theories have received criticism (Buruma and Margalit, 2005), 
they remain useful in understanding how the West perceives the Balkans. Building on Said's 
concept of Orientalism, Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden argue that the Balkans 
can be viewed as a variation of the Orientalist theme that distinguishes this region as a part 
of Europe which used to be under the Ottoman rule (M. Bakić-Hayden & R. Hayden 1992). 
Milica Bakić-Hayden employs the term "nesting Orientalism" (1995); by introducing the 
notion of "nesting," she tends to dismantle the likeliness of each region to view the cultures 
and religions to their East as more conservative and primitive (M. Bakić-Hayden, 1995, 
917). She argues that identities become fluid and overlapping in the process of nesting, 
while ethnic, national, religious, or gender identities could shift or become fixed for a time, 
yet are ever changing. In her theory, she also explains how a group that creates the 
Orientalized "other" can also be the subject of Orientalization by a different group. 
According to this concept, Asia is more "East" or more "other" than Eastern Europe and, 
within Eastern Europe, the Balkans are perceived as the most "Eastern.' Such a hierarchy 
also exists within the Balkans. For example, Yugoslavs who reside in areas that were 
formerly part of the Habsburg monarchy regard themselves as more European than the 
Eastern Orthodox peoples, who in turn consider themselves to be more European than those 
who identify as European Muslims and who further differentiate themselves from the 
ultimate Orientals, non-Europeans (M. Bakić-Hayden, 1995; 922). On the other hand, Maria 
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Todorova, the author who launched the popular use of the term Balkanism,54 challenges 
Bakić-Hayden's argument and insists that Balkanism is an altogether different discourse and 
that this part of Europe does not present an Orientalist variation, which requires a thorough 
historical analysis (Todorova, 1994; 454, 455). She convincingly presents historical 
evidence that Balkanism cannot be considered as a sub-species of Orientalism, because the 
concept evolved independently from Orientalism, and was strongly motivated by aggressive 
and passionate nationalism, not religion. Even though Todorova claims that the Balkans’ 
inconsistent (but usually negative) image inside Western culture impacts the paradoxes of 
cultural reference and its assumptions, she still argues that the Balkans form a part of 
Europe, albeit a provincial or peripheral part for the last several centuries. Balkanism, 
according to Todorova, treats the differences within one type, Europe, rather than the 
difference between imputed types (the "Occident" and the "Orient").  
Todorova thus insists on the difference between Said's theory of Orientalism and her 
theory of Balkanism: 
Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed 
as "the other," the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of 
externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have 
served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a 
positive and self-congratulatory image of the "European" and "the 
West" has been constructed. Balkanism conveniently exempted "the 
West" from charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and 
Christian intolerance: the Balkans, after all, are in Europe, they are 
white and they are predominantly Christian (Todorova, 1994; 456). 
The importance of Balkanism as a concept is also emphasized in identity 
constructions. In the case of the Balkans, the identity constructions involve the dual 
perception of the Balkans as a part of Europe, but also its opposition and its "darker side." 
 
54 Maria Todorova developed a theory of Balkanism. She argues that there is a discourse, which she termed 
Balkanism, that creates a stereotype of the Balkans, and politics is significantly and organically intertwined with 
this discourse (1994, 454). However, it was A. Seliščev who actually coined the term Balkanism in a seminal 
article. In its linguistic sense, Balkanism means exactly the opposite of Torodorava’s usage:  it is a linguistic 
convergence among different Balkan languages that is the result of mutual multilingualism (1925, 37 – 54). 
Todorova does acknowledge this in a footnote.  
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Thus, according to Todorova, Balkanism evolved independently from Orientalism and, in 
certain aspects, in opposition to or despite it, and that, partially, because Southeastern 
Europe has been considered geopolitically distinct from the Near or the Middle East 
(Todorova, 2004, 20).  
Nevertheless, both Todorova and Bakić-Hayden agree about the Balkans’ perceived 
"otherness" in Western eyes, although the former argues that it is motivated by aggressive 
and passionate nationalism (Todorova, 1994), while the other stresses that religion impacted 
further division between the East (Orthodox churches and Islam) and the West (Catholic 
and Protestant churches) (M. Bakić-Hayden & R. Hayden 1992). When narrowing the focus 
further to only one part of the Balkans, namely Yugoslavia, it becomes clear that areas 
populated by a majority of inhabitants belonging to the Catholic faith, who resided in the 
former Habsburg monarchy, perceived themselves as different or "European" when 
compared to other areas formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire.  
Also, Bakić-Hayden analyzed how the Orthodox community perceived themselves 
as more European compared to those who identify as European Muslims (Bosnians). After 
these analyses, Bakić-Hayden concluded that while Slovenes and Croats used their Catholic 
faith and former affiliation with the Habsburg Empire to achieve their European aspirations, 
there did not appear to be any advantages inherent in having once been part of the Ottoman 
Empire, particularly for Muslims (M. Bakić-Hayden & R. Hayden, 1992; 923). The 
northwest portion of the Former Yugoslavia stresses its European character and the apparent 
advantages of having once been a part of the Habsburg Empire, while blaming their 
Ottoman heritage for the ills of the rest of the country. Although most of the peoples of 
Yugoslavia used their religion as an important tool to acquire Western and European 
identities and thus break free from their Ottoman past and each other, Albanians were an 
exception, according to Bakić-Hayden. Religion did not impact the Albanians’ strong sense 
of national and "non-Slavic" identity (M. Bakić-Hayden, 1995; 925, 926). Therefore, it was 
Albanian nationalism based on language, ethnicity, and territory, rather than religion 
propagated by the Albanian elites, which unified ideologically both the country and its other 
territories. Yugoslavia's ethnic Albanians lived mainly in Kosovo, Macedonia, Southeastern 
Serbia, and Montenegro. Due to the Ottoman Empire’s lengthy rule over some of the lands 
they inhabited, Albanians are also included in Maria Todorova's realm of Balkanism, where 
she argues that "it is preposterous to look for an Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. The Balkans 
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are the Ottoman legacy" (Todorova 2004; 83, 161). In addition to Todorova's example, the 
main way in which Balkanism has been internalized among Albanians living in Yugoslavia 
includes internal differentiation based on imputed Balkan characteristics, or what Bakić-
Hayden describes as "nesting Orientalisms."  
2.3. Self-definitions: Albanians' non-Slavic labels and points of origin 
Perceived through an Orientalist/Balkanist lens and as a non-Western society, Albanian 
nationalist elites demanded that their community resemble their Western counterparts, 
which served as a source of reference for "modernization" and "progress" during the 
processes of modernization in the 18th and the 19th century (Todorova, 1996). Nathalie 
Clayer states that Albanian nationalism in the Balkans has been a product of political 
transformations permeating the Ottoman Empire (Clayer 2012). In their writings, Rrapaj 
and Kolasi periodized the curious development of Albanian nationalism into three main 
phases; 
a) The first commences with the highly symbolic publication of the first Albanian 
alphabet in 1844 and ends with the collapse of the League of Prizren (1881) or the 
publication of Sami Frashëri's55 nationalist Manifesto in 1899. 
b) The second phase intensifies after the crushing of the League of Prizren by the 
Sublime Porte, and especially after the Greek-Ottoman crisis in 1897 and continues 
even after the declaration of independence, because of the amorphous state structure.  
c) The third phase of the spread of nationalism to the masses started only after 1920, 
with the establishment of a proper state structure and political stability (Rrapaj and 
Kolasi, 2013; 195). 
This general periodization is also supported by Clayer (Clayer 2012; 137), who 
corroborates that, like most of the Balkan nations, Albanians also embarked on a quest for 
their pre-Christian lineage that, in their case, was constructed as being Pelasgian and later 
on as Illyrian. One of the main propagators of this idea, which was then adopted by Albanian 
activists, was the Austrian von Hahn, who in 1854 published in Vienna a book entitled, 
"Albanische Studien," which among other things says that the Albanians are autochthonous 
 
55 Sami Frashëri (1850 - 1904) was an Albanian writer, philosopher, playwright and a prominent figure of the 
Rilindja Kombëtare, the National Renaissance movement of Albania. 
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because they descend directly from the Illyrians, as do the people of Macedonia and Epirus, 
all stemming from prehistoric Pelasgians (Hahn, 1854). As the first step in their 
"modernization," as they sought to differentiate themselves from other populations in the 
Balkans and, obviously, "non-Slavic," Albanians started to view themselves as descendants 
of the Illyrians. The main reason for this, according to Dukagjin Gorani, is that the process 
of society's "Westernization" entailed the simultaneous exercise of their "de-
orientalization”; thus one's "Westernness" could have only been measured through the 
prism of one's "non-easternness" (Gorani, 2011, 77). Even nowadays modern Albanians 
consider the idea of Illyrian heritage as part of their shared heritage.56 Wilkes book, "The 
Illyrians" (1995), highlighted the notion that the lands between the Adriatic and the Danube 
River, now Yugoslavia and Albania, were the home of the peoples known to the ancient 
world as Illyrians. This is one of the few books in English which focuses solely on these 
ancient peoples and their province and, as such, it carries a lot of weight, but it also raises a 
lot of problems and disputed historical conclusions (Wilkes, 1995). There are historians, 
such as John V.A. Fine, who have concluded that Albanians are descendants of populations 
of the prehistoric Balkans, such as the Illyrians (Fine 1991; 10), whereas studies in genetic 
anthropology, which should not be disregarded, show that Albanians share the same 
ancestry as most of the other European peoples (Belledi, S. Poloni, Casalotti, Conterio, 
Mikerezi, Tagliavini and Excoffier, 2000).57 However, very little evidence of pre-Christian 
Albanian culture survived, although their mythology and folklore are of Paleo-Balkanic 
origin and almost all of their elements are pagan (Bonefoy 1993; 253). The legitimacy of 
these claims has been contested and has led to a conflict between Balkan ethnic groups 
(Kelley, 2012l 7).  
 
56  The theory that Albanians were related to the Illyrians was proposed for the first time by 
Swedish historian Johann Erich Thunmann in 1774. The scholars who advocate an Illyrian origin of Albanians are 
numerous. 
57 Michele Belledi, Estella S. Poloni, Rosa Casalotti, Franco Conterio, Ilia Mikerezi, James Tagliavini, and Laurent 
Excoffier. "Maternal and paternal lineages in Albania and the genetic structure of Indo-European populations." 
European Journal of Human Genetics, July 2000, Volume 8, Number 7, pp. 480-486. "Mitochondrial DNA HV1 
sequences and Y chromosome haplotypes (DYS19 STR and YAP) were characterized in an Albanian sample and 
compared with those of several other populations from the European continent that speak Indo-European 
languages. No significant difference was observed between Albanians and most other Europeans, despite the fact 
that Albanian is a distinct branch within the Indo-European language family. The authors observe a general lack 
of a uniformly distinct genetic structure among Indo-European-speaking populations for both maternal and 
paternal polymorphisms, as well as low levels of correlation between linguistics and genetics, even though slightly 
more significant for the Y chromosome than for mt DNA. Altogether, the results show that the linguistic structure 
of continental Indo-European-speaking populations is not reflected in the variability of the mitochondrial and Y 
chromosome markers. This discrepancy could be due to very recent differentiation of Indo-European-speaking 
populations in Europe and substantial amounts of gene flow among these populations"  (Belledi, S. et al 2000). 
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In tandem with the production of their claims of Illyrian non-Slavic identity, 
Albanians went about shedding their connection to their Ottoman past. Ottoman words were 
thrown out from Albanian language dictionaries,58 and Albanian-born Grand Viziers59 and 
other important officials who ruled the Ottoman Empire went unmentioned in official 
Albanian historical records. In addition, history textbooks started treating the Ottoman 
period of Albanian history as dominated by violence. Recently, there were heated debates 
when the Turkish government requested that Albania and Kosovo make certain 
interventions and remove inappropriate words describing the Ottomans. For instance, in a 
12th-grade history textbook, it was suggested that the phrase on page 48, "stirred hatred 
against Ottoman rule,” be replaced with "caused dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule," etc. 
(Gashi, 2015; 2). 
Tirana-based sociologist Enis Sulstarova notes that the combination of being 
positioned as the Illyrians, as well as being counted as one of the "Westernized" nations, 
has led some Albanian intellectuals and politicians to emphasize Albania’s early conversion 
to Christianity, declaring it to be the "true religion of Albanians" or the "religion of 
forefathers" (Sulstarova, 2012). Sulstarova also justifies this approach by saying that 
"creating a Western identity was a matter of survival for Albanian elites in the late 19 
century" (Sulstarova, 2006; 9). Such history-telling started during the 19th century as part 
of the nation-building process known as the "national revival," which portrayed the 
Ottomans as the enemies of the Albanians. However, the practice of considering the legacy 
of the Ottoman Empire as responsible for almost every economic, cultural or political ill 
that the Albanians encountered throughout their history has continued throughout the entire 
20th century and into the present. It is the position of this chapter that other reasons affected 
the survival of this tendency to dismiss the legacy of the Ottoman past. First, people may 
find it convenient to blame the Ottomans for today's problems by claiming that if the 
Ottomans had not invaded "us," we would have been a developed Western nation today. 
 
58 It is noted that every Balkan standard language did this, and modernizing Turkey actually did the same thing 
with much of this vocabulary, as it was of Arabo-Persian origin. This was first observed in: Kazazis, Kostas. 1972. 
The Status of Turkisms in the Present-Day Balkan Languages. Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change. 
Contributions to the International Balkan Conference Held at UCLA, October 23-28, 1969, ed. by Henrik 
Birnbaum and Speros Vryonis, Jr., 87-116. The Hague: Mouton. 
59 In the Ottoman Empire, the “Grand Vizier” was the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Sultan, with the absolute 
power of attorney and, in principle, dismissable only by the Sultan himself (see Collins English Dictionary. 
Copyright © Harper Collins Publishers).  
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This could also be considered as a sort of nesting Balkanism by the Albanians vis-à-vis the 
Ottomans.  
Second, there is the fact that the political elites that ruled Albania after the First and 
Second World Wars, led by King Ahmet Zogu (1928-1939) and communist dictator Enver 
Hoxha (1945-1985), were brought to power with the initial agreement and support of Serbia. 
Thus, these Albanian rulers needed someone to blame for the fact that their political 
agreements with the "real enemy" made Albania one of the states that left half of its nation 
outside of its borders. 
A third reason that should be considered as an important factor influencing these 
anti-Ottoman approaches toward history and national mentality – especially during 
communism, which itself had a revisionist character – was simply that the official ideology 
dictated that any reality created by foreign rule must always be considered as dark and hated. 
However, Albanian cultural anthropologist, historian, and philologist Rigels Halili, in one 
of his valuable comments about this chapter, considers the social factors, or the materialist 
interpretation of history as a long chain of class struggle, to be the most important factors 
influencing the Albanians’ predilection for dismissing the legacy of their Ottoman past. 
Halili emphasizes that Ottoman rule was perceived as the rule of the aristocratic class over 
the people. Such an approach emerges directly from a Leninist approach to history. Even 
though communication between Albania and Yugoslavia was also difficult for Albanians, 
ethnic Albanians living in Yugoslavia were still very much affected by Albania's approach 
toward national, historical and identity definitions and approaches. It is mainly because of 
this impact that literature in the Albanian language produced and shaped in Albania also 
influenced the Albanians who were living outside of its borders. 
However, there are ongoing debates in Albanian society about the necessity to re-
interpret, change or improve historic materials from which Albanian pupils and students 
learn history in schools and at universities (Telegrafi, March 2013). Dritan Egro, an 
Ottoman-era historian, explains that this "softening" towards the Ottomans is the result of 
a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to social sciences combined with a renewed 
general curiosity about the period.60 All these circumstances and tendencies to erase or 
 
60 Dritan Ego’s interview is available here: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albanians-question-negative-
view-of-ottomans [Last accessed on 07/02/2019] 
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ignore four or five centuries of history lead us toward the reasonable concludion that, so 
far, history has been a lesson Albanians have been taught in a particular way.  
Other intellectuals also agree that Albanian historical records were influenced by 
nationalistic propaganda during the 19th century’s "national revival" and the communist 
regime of the second half of the 20th century (Albphilosopher and reporteri August 2014). 
Other elements that made Albanians "look different" from others living in Yugoslavia were 
their religious diversity, strong sense of national identity and their distinctly non-Slavic 
language. In contrast to all of the other constitutive “nations” living in Yugoslavia, who 
used religion as one of the most important identifiers, this did not hold true among 
Albanians. It should be underscored that while the national identity of South Slavs was 
strongly based on religion, in the case of Albanians, national identity was constructed rather 
on the basis of such elements as language, territory, history, and culture, while the role of 
religion did not play a central role. As Gorani puts it, "the nation retained the position of a 
genuine religion for Albanians" (Gorani 2012; 279). Bakić-Hayden also highlights that 
religion did not shape Albanians' strong sense of national and "non-Slavic" identity (M. 
Bakić-Hayden 1995; 926).  
Isa Blumi theorizes that such an identity was politically mobilized and that it was 
culturally opaque and ideologically fluid prior to the 1912 Balkan Wars. In relation to the 
competition among various state and power structures, be it in the shape of a great power 
intervention or attempts at building new national identities, Blumi has shown that Ottoman 
reforms were successful in encouraging most subjects of the empire to commingle local 
interests with the fate of the empire, meaning that parochial concern for the survival of the 
immediate community, as it transformed over time, was directly linked to the survival of 
the Ottoman state (Blumi, 2011).  
Thus, Albanians in Yugoslavia were perceived first as the national "other" and then, 
depending on who was looking at them, as the religious other. Even though they were seen 
as part of another nation and not necessarily as Muslims, which was reserved for Bosnians, 
giving priority to Albanian – linguistic and ethnic – identity still presented a reasonable 
approach, taking into consideration the fact that Albanians were one of the Balkans’ most 
religiously diverse. It can be argued that another reason, which influenced prioritizing 
national rather than religious identity, is the fact that until the 20th century there were 
instances when Albanian Muslims were regarded by other communities living within 
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Yugoslavia as "Turks;" Albanian Orthodox were regarded as "Greeks;" and Albanian 
Catholics as "Latins."  This is confirmed not only by oral sources who lived during the 
Yugoslav era, but may also be found in such written sources as Pashko Vasa61 in 1879 
and Sami Frashëri, who, in 1899, wrote about this phenomenon in those very same 
terms.Trying to cope with their anxiety about being considered Turks or Greeks, etc., as 
well as to unify and strengthen national identity from the Ottoman era and onwards, 
Albanian elites followed a process of replacing religious differences with a common, 
language-based national identity that was neither Turk nor Greek nor Latin. 
2.5. South Slavic majority's perception of Albanians within Yugoslavia 
As stated earlier, the multilayered and polyphonic character of Orientalism and Balkanism 
was also reflected in how the peoples living in Yugoslavia were viewed by others. 
Albanians were also portrayed negatively within Yugoslavia, particularly by the Serbs, due 
to beliefs about their origins and for historical reasons. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers 
(2008) considers this powerful stereotypical imagery against Albanians to be a sub-category 
of Balkanism that she calls "Albanianism." Some of the negative features of "Albanianism," 
or "Arnautism,"62 include perceptions of Albanians as corrupt, violent (in the sense of being 
unpredictably cruel), dirty, poor, ignorant of both state and religious law, open to bribery 
and prone to alcoholism, theft and murder (Schwandner-Sievers 2008; 57). When creating 
stereotypes, groups typically consider religion, ethnicity, culture, history, politics or other 
ideas. They use these categories in elaborating both reasonable and ridiculous ways to 
differentiate between “us” and “them.” In the case of Serbian stereotypes of Albanians, 
available sources suggest that Albanians were portrayed very negatively in the context of 
Yugoslavia, not necessarily due to religious or other ideological differences. Noel Malcolm 
asserts that the ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is less a battle over 
bloodlines and religion than it is one over differing conceptions of national origins and 
history (Malcolm, 1998). However, in addition to these arguments about the secular and 
ethnic character of Albanian stigmatization, there are certain Serbian tendencies to use 
religion as a tool to deepen the stereotypes between these two nations which appeared 
 
61 Pashko Vasa (1825 – 1892) was an Albanian writer, poet, and publicist of the Albanian National Awakening, 
and Governor of Lebanon from 1882 until his death. 




during the 1970s and 1980s. These stereotypes promoted the notion that Albanians from 
Kosovo were experiencing an Islamic revival, as illustrated by the popular media in Serbia 
of that time: 
the truth about Kosovo and Metohija has not changed much over time, 
so that even today Muslim fundamentalism, persistently knocking at 
the door of Kosovo and Metohija, is trying to approach Europe. Even 
those in Europe who do not hold Serbia close to their hearts know 
very well that this old Balkan state represents the last barrier to the 
ongoing onslaught and aggression of Islam (Sarić 1990; 67-69, quoted 
by Bakić Hayden 1995). 
 When constructing social perceptions, different actors compete to render their 
portrait in the most effective way so that their particular community can impart whatever 
meaning they wish to a particular event. In line with their interests, different social groups 
or individuals build different constructs suitable for these purposes. Findings show that the 
Serbs’ negative stereotypes about the Albanians were initiated through direct high 
institutional lines – mainly academic and political or state-controlled – and did not 
necessarily come from society itself. In his article "Rep kao argument za izlaz na more" 
(Tail as an Argument for Access to the Sea), Božidar Jezernik (2007) tried to explain 
Serbia’s purpose in constructing negative stereotypes about Albanians in general. Digging 
back into history, Jezernik argues that these negative stereotypes mainly appeared due to 
the Serbian desire to gain access to the Adriatic Sea through northern Albania. Jezernik 
argues that Serbia's most offensive propaganda campaign against Albanians, in general, 
began with Vladan Đorđević’s (1913) book entitled "Arnauti i velike sile" (Albanians and 
the Great Powers) (Jezernik, 2007).  
By referring to J.G. von Hahn who wrote about some hearsay he heard in southern 
Albania, and to Edith Durham's book "High Albania," who wrote about meeting some 
Albanian highlanders, Vladan Đorđević – a member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences and a famous politician who also served as Prime Minister (1897–1900) – with 
the intention of influencing the Great Powers, (mis)quoted the aforementioned sources and 
described Albanians by citing reports and hearsay about people among the Albanians with 
tails, similar to monkeys hanging down from trees, and so ignorant that they were unable to 
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distinguish sugar from snow (Đorđević 1913). Jezernik notes that in this context Vladan 
Đorđević's "arguments" were also used by Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić in the 1930s 
government, who argued that the independence of Albania would neither be in the interest 
of Albania nor in the interest of Europe, because Albanians were neither ready for nor did 
they deserve independence, and they did not have people who would know how to rule the 
country (Jezernik, 2007).  
Đorđe Stefanović (2005), in his reaction entitled "Seeing the Albanians through 
Serbian Eyes," also mentions the origins of Serbia's negative stereotypes against Albanians. 
The rise of the modern nation-states in the post-Ottoman Balkans, as Stefanović states, was 
accompanied by stigmatization, coercive assimilation, deportation and even extermination 
of ethnic minorities, especially local Muslims who were seen as former oppressors. 
Stefanović concludes that ethnic Albanians were repeatedly subjected to exclusionary 
stigmatization and discriminatory policies in the formative periods of the Serbian state and 
Yugoslavia. While these actions of the Serbian elite were guided by geopolitical security 
pressures and the coercive utopia of a homogeneous nation-state, Serbian policymakers 
were also influenced by a strong intellectual tradition of intolerance towards Albanians 
(Stefanović, 2005). Expansionist tendencies in territories inhabited by Albanians, as well as 
Serbia's negative perceptions of them, were also addressed by Serbian publisher Dimitrije 
Tucović. In his book "Srbija i Albanija" (Serbia and Albania) published in 1946, Tucović 
criticized Serbian policy towards Albanians revealed in direct reports from the front about 
Serbia's military violence against this nation. Tucović's famous statements about this 
military campaign are: "We walked into someone else's country […] we have carried out 
the attempted premeditated murder of an entire nation […] we were caught in that criminal 
act and have been obstructed. Now we have to suffer the punishment […]" (Tucović, 1946). 
Prishtina-based academic Pajazit Nushi added a list of cultural and scientific 
institutions and individuals who, according to him, contributed to and further expanded on 
Serbian stereotypes against Albanians. In his book "Të Vërtetat Për Kosovën" (Truths on 
Kosova), published in Prishtina, Nushi stresses that the negative campaign of Serbian 
authorities against Albanians living in Yugoslavia was conducted because the Serbian 
regime wanted to expand into Albanian territories. After the First World War, the Yugoslav 
government initiated a program aimed at colonizing Kosovo with the families of its officer 
corps. As compared to Jezernik, for example, who argues that the campaign against 
45 
 
Albanians began with Vladan Đorđević's book "Arnauti i velike sile" (Albanians and Great 
Powers), published in Belgrade, other Albanian authors such as Pajazit Nushi conclude that 
these efforts had started even earlier. According to Nushi, the roots of these negative and 
discriminatory approaches toward Albanians originated from the intellectual and political 
elites or, more specifically, from the Serbian historical treatise "Načertanije." This treatise 
documents the experiences of the Serbian army in 1878, 1913, 1937, 1945; works by 
Serbian scientists, writers and deceased politicians (Jovan Cvijić, Vasa Čubrilović, Ivo 
Andrić, etc.); and activities of Serbian cultural and scientific institutions, deceased policy-
makers (Serbian Cultural Club, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Associations of 
Writers of Serbia, Serbian Orthodox Church) (Stavileci & Nushi, 2000; 136). Serbs' 
negative  perceptions of Albanians became even more obvious to the ethnic Albanians 
living within Yugoslavia. Tito's Yugoslavia was a nationally pluralistic country, where the 
slogan Bratstvo i Jedinstvo (Brotherhood and Unity) was among its cornerstones. Despite 
the fact that the 1981 census counted 1.7 million ethnic Albanians (Stanković, 1982), and 
that they exceeded the number of Macedonians and Montenegrins in the then-Yugoslavia, 
they were not recognized as one of the "constituent peoples" under the 1974 Constitution 
of the SFRY63 (and also in the previous constitutions) because, according to the Yugoslav 
government, their traditional homeland was outside of Yugoslavia (Stavileci & Nushi, 
2000).  
Under the First (1921-1943) and Second Yugoslavia (1943) and until almost the 
1970s, Albanians continued to be perceived as one of the most backward nations, with high 
illiteracy rates (which, by the way, constantly decreased during the communist period), a 
peculiar social structure bordering on a tribal mentality, and intrinsically criminal 
tendencies in Yugoslavia (Vickers 1998). Unemployment rates were high among the 
majority of Albanians, resulting in poverty, and even though Kosovo Albanians 
outnumbered   Serbs and Montenegrins, these latter dominated the administration of 
Kosovo. It is worth mentioning, however, that this started to change at the turn of the 1960s 
and into the 1970s, especially after students began to graduate from the University of 
 
63 The Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, February 21, 1974, is available at the 
archive of Yugoslavia online: 
http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije
/ustav_sfrj_1974.html [Last accessed on 07/02/2019]  
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Prishtina.64 Institutional pressures upon Albanians in Yugoslavia were particularly visible 
during the late 1940s and 1950s, regarded by many in Kosovo as a particularly painful and 
repressive period. Miranda Vickers blames the regime for extreme measures which, at 
times, differed very little from those employed by occupation forces during wartime 
(Vickers 1998; 148). Also, various sources used by Miranda Vickers show that 
stigmatization of Albanians continued uninterrupted between 1944 and 1946, when over 
36,000 and maybe as many as 47,000 Albanians were the victims of systematic mass 
executions by communists during the days of revolutionary fervor and, later, through 
"search and destroy missions," "pacification," "disarming," "rehabilitation programs," 
police torture and epidemics of typhoid fever affecting military units. 65  The situation 
changed for the better when the influence of Albanian politician Fadil Hoxha of the 
Yugoslav Communist Party grew during the 1960s and 1970s. However, as everywhere else 
in Yugoslavia at that time, those who acted against the regime faced repression, 
imprisonment and, at times, death. Nevertheles, the majority, who just wanted to make a 
decent living, had opportunities to do so.  
Even though the next chapters will offer more detailed explanations of the role of 
the students, it is worth mentioning here the student movement of 1968 in Prishtina. The 
movement significantly affected positive developments for Albanians in Yugoslavia during 
these two decades. However, perhaps due to their nationalist nature, as well as the politically 
sensitive student demands, the demonstrations in Kosovo were far more violent than those 
in other republics of the SFRY. In response to the 1968 movements, for example, the SFRY 
Constitution would be amended in 1968. In 1971, it allowed even more local control in 
autonomous provinces, and in November 1969 UP was founded. The amendments adopted 
in June 1971 closely corresponded to the positions advanced by the Croatian leadership and 
 
64 The ethnic Albanians had Yugoslavia's lowest literacy rate: 68.5% individuals over the age of ten were able to 
read in 1979. In 1981 only 178,000 of 1.5 million Albanians in Kosovo were employed; one in four of those held 
nominal bureaucratic positions. Meanwhile, the student population of 470,000 was a constant source of political 
unrest and potentially higher unemployment upon graduation. (Sources: The Library of Congress Country Studies; 
CIA World Factbook - Data as of December 1990: 
http://www.photius.com/countries/yugoslavia_former/society/yugoslavia_former_society_albanians.html) [Last 
accessed on 07/02/2019] 
65 These sources include: S. Repishti, “Human Rights and the Albanian Nationality in Yugoslavia,” in Oskar 
Gruenwald and Karen Rosenblum-Cale (eds), Human Rights in Yugoslavia, New York, 1986, p. 238. Several 
Albanians who had been participants in the signing of the Bujan Resolution in 1944 paid with their lives for the 
ideal of the unification of Kosovo and Albania. Rifat Berisha died fighting in the hills of Drenica in 1948, and 
Xheladin Hana was murdered by the UDBA (Yugoslav State Security Service) in 1948. Rusinow, The Yugoslav 
Experiment, 1948- 1974, p. 25. 
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its representatives and strongly supported by the leadership of the Macedonian republic. 
The amendments did, however, maintain the integrity of the Serbian republic. Albanian 
pressure to elevate the status of Kosovo from that of an autonomous province within the 
Serbian republic to that of a separate republic was only partially accommodated by 
provisions intended to ensure regional equality through representation and participation in 
federal organs and interrepublican committees. Kosovo was to remain, at least 
symbolically, part of Serbia. In addition to the conflicts between the developed and 
underdeveloped regions over the allocation of investment credits obtained through 
international loans and over the determination of domestic investment strategies, the policy 
of the more rapid development of the insufficiently developed areas, and especially of 
Kosovo, became of special concern to all SFRY republics (Burg 1983; 213, 289). 
Amendments VII through XIX to the SFRY Constitution granted the provinces of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina more autonomy. Amendment VII redefined the SFRY as having eight rather 
than six constituent parts: six socialist republics and two socialist autonomous provinces. 
Instead of Serbia, the SFRY became the custodian of the provinces' rights and duties, and 
Kosovars were given the right to elect representatives to the SFRY legislature. Amendment 
XVIII renamed Kosovo-Metohija as Kosovo (Vickers 1998; 169-170).  
Within a year after Tito's death (1980), deep-rooted antagonisms between Serbs and 
Albanians had once more resurfaced. In 1981, seven years after Kosovo's provincial 
government gained direct and separate representation in the main SFRY bodies via the 1974 
SFRY Constitution, students in Kosovo were again at the center of the political turmoil. 
The level of intolerance and tension between the Serbian minority and the Kosovo 
Albanians was soon transformed into a war between the Serbian regime and the Albanians. 
This tense situation was (ab)used by Slobodan Milošević, who, by expelling Kosovo 
Albanians from institutions, also consolidated his authority in Serbia. Milošević also took 
measures to drastically reduce Kosovo's autonomous status within Serbia and instigated 
cultural oppression of the ethnic Albanian population (Malcolm 1998, Vickers 1998, Clark 
2000, Judah 2008, etc.). All of these discriminatory measures, which lasted for decades, 
greatly affected the local Kosovo Albanian population, marginalizing it and resulting in 
consistent underdevelopment. The lack of employment opportunities led to widespread 
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migration.66 Thousands of Kosovo Albanians left Kosovo in search of employment in other 
parts of Yugoslavia or outside of the country (Rusinow, 1980: 10). It is worth noting that 
discriminatory politics were one reason for migration, but social conditions and both the 
privileges and the pressures of modernization also led to migration, especially during the 
1990s.  
Long-standing ethnic tensions between the Albanian and Serb populations left 
Kosovo ethnically divided, resulting in inter-ethnic violence, including the Kosovo War of 
1999 (Ramesh and Albrecht 2000; 44). The state media in Serbia played a crucial role in 
reviving ideas and opinions originating from the works mentioned above, encouraging hate 
speech. The warmongering campaign was promoted to such an extent that the media were 
identified as a military target, and on May 23, 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)67 aircraft bombed the building of Radio Televisija Srbije (RTS) in the center of 
Belgrade (Laursen 2002; 779). The Serbian government was informed of the attack and the 
time it was supposed to happen. The interest of the Western powers (mainly USA) in the 
Albanians living in Yugoslavia increased throughout the 1980s, particularly when inter-
ethnic tensions continued to worsen in Yugoslavia (Rogel, 2003; 167). Kosovo Albanian 
political leader Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006),68 through building strong relations with the 
USA in particular, as well as with some of the most powerful European countries, managed 
 
66 Literature on Kosovo migration (Riinvest 2007; Vathi & Black, 2007; ESI, 2006; IOM, 2004) distinguishes four 
emigration waves from Kosovo since the 1960s and onwards: 1. The late 1960s-early 1970s: Unskilled young men 
with little education from rural Kosovo emigrate to Germany and Switzerland as guest workers. 2. Beginning of 
1989-1997: Kosovo's autonomy is abolished, and mass dismissal of Kosovan Albanians from their jobs follows. 
More skilled and better educated young men from both rural and urban areas migrate to Western European 
countries to find jobs and escape Yugoslav military service; 3. Latest war in Kosovo during 1998-1999, when 
nearly a million Kosovan Albanians and other non-Serbs are forcefully displaced from Kosovo during the conflict. 
This trend is reversed immediately after the conflict, when a massive return of most of the displaced population 
occurs; 4. Post-1999: As political stability is established in Kosovo, the immigration policies in (especially) 
Western European countries are tightened towards Kosovans. The emigration wave mainly consists of a) migration 
for family reunification purposes; b) illegal migration of unskilled and undereducated youth and c) (temporary) 
legal migration of highly skilled and highly educated individuals through study or work arrangements. Source of 
information; KOSOVO REMITTANCE STUDY 2012, July 2012, available at; 
http://www.ks.undp.org/content/dam/kosovo/docs/Remitances/KRS2012_English_858929.pdf  [Last accessed on 
07/02/2019] 
67  After several unsuccessful attempts at a diplomatic solution, followed by the final failed peace talks in 
Rambouillet/France, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a military operation against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The bombings, which lasted from March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999, were 
justified by NATO allies as a necessary tool to stop the bloodshed and ethnic cleansing of Albanians as well as 
prevent further destabilization of the region. The air strikes were only halted after the agreement which led to the 
withdrawal of Yugoslav armed forces from Kosovo, and the establishment of the international peacekeeping 
mission in Kosovo (see, NATO & Kosovo: Index Page, available at: https://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm#pb 
[Last accessed on 27/05/2019].  
68 Broader details about Ibrahim Rugova's role in Kosovo's contemporary history will be provided in the fifth 
chapter of this dissertation.    
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to gain the sympathy of the Western powers and direct their attention to the plight of 
Albanians living in Yugoslavia. The West's commitment to stabilizing the Albanian 
situation ended with a NATO military intervention. These radical measures were justified 
by the argument that peaceful efforts to stabilize the situation in Kosovo had not had any 
results. 
However, even now, 20 years after Kosovo's de facto separation from 
Yugoslavia/Serbia, negative stereotypes among these two communities continue to exist, 
though the figures below show that the perceptions of both communities have changed some 
over time. For example, while in 2005 about 95% of Kosovo Serbs believed that interethnic 
relations in Kosovo were tense and hadn’t improved, fourteen years later (2018) the 
percentage of those who indicated they believed this to be the case had decreased to about 
27.5%.  
Arguably, it is the political developments in the region that have impacted public 
opinion. When analyzing the perceptions of the Kosovo Albanians, one can observe that 
while in 2005 only 14% of them thought that relations with Kosovo-Serbs continued to be 
tense and had not improved, fourteen years later (2018) the percentage of Albanians who 
declared this to be the case had increased to about 32%. However, aside from the fact that 
Albanian perceptions about the rise of inter-ethnic tensions have increased as compared to 
the Serbs’ perceptions, during the last fourteen years the percentage of Serbs who believed 
that inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo are tense and not improving was consistently higher, 
and it remains constant at this level. During the last decade, there were also three points 
(2007, 2011, and 2014) where the perceptions of K-Serbs and those of K-Albanians were 








Figure 3: Trend of respondents who considered that interethnic relations continued to be 
tense and had not improved 
 
Source: UNPD-Kosovo Public Pulse Dataset  
 
Worrisome responses were also collected during a April 2018 survey. While a majority of 
Albanians (53%) consider that the relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo will 
normalize in the distant future, a majority of Serbs (38.5%) are of the opinion that they will 
never normalize. Only a small percentage of Kosovo Albanians (17%) consider that there 


























Figure 3: When do you think the relations between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians 
will normalize? 
 
Source: UNPD-Kosovo Public Pulse Dataset 
 
Similar to the data collected by Public Pulse Project and by combining the responses of 
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians expressing their respective attitudes towards living, working, 
or marrying one another, I have calculated the social acceptance trend for both of these 
ethnic groups for the fourteen years. The latest findings of the interethnic social acceptance 
trend indicate that a majority of Serbs (74%) and Albanians (79%) in Kosovo would not be 
willing to live on the same street, work in the same place or marry one another (figure 3). I 
therefore conclude that mutual stigmatization – with Serbs in power and possessing the 
ability to bolster said power – has caused hate, distrust and other negative stereotypes on 
both sides. While in the past such negative stereotypes were initiated directly through high 
institutional lines and did not arise from the society itself, nowadays the opposite seems to 







      Figure 4: Interethnic social acceptance trends 
 
Source: UNPD-Kosovo Public Pulse Dataset 
2.6. Historical disputes over education in Kosovo 
Given that the central focus of this dissertation is higher/university education in Kosovo, 
after having discussed the general state of relations between Albanians and Serbs, I would 
like to turn my attention to the disputes that these two ethnicities have had about education.  
As in many other places, in Kosovo, too, schools have historically stood for much 
more than just a place of learning. Traditionally, education in Kosovo has been tightly 
interlinked with the politics of language use and the right to education in the Albanian 
language. This issue was complicated, because Albanians found themselves living in areas 
where they were seldom recognized as a minority and seldom accorded the appropriate 
rights. To better understand Albanians' sensitivity regarding the right to education in their 
own language, this section will first examine the context underlying challenges to the 
establishment of education in Albanian.  
All Albanians (Sunni Muslims, members of the Bektashi Order, Orthodox and 
Catholic Christians alike) living within the borders of the Ottoman Empire spoke the same 
language. They, however, did not have the right to education in their language, because 
education was controlled by religious institutions. This remained unchanged even after the 












education to all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire.69 The Ottomans used religion as the 
defining criterion for nationality, calling groups of non-Muslim peoples living in their 
territories millet or confessional communities. The reforms affecting various sectors of state 
kept swinging uneasily between two models: traditional confessional communitarianism 
(i.e., millet system), and, on the other side, forced denationalization and Ottomanization in 
the mid-1860s, where the millet started to correspond closely to today's concept of ethnic 
minorities (Parolin 2009: 72, 73).  
Professor Stavro Skendi argues that classifying Albanian and other communities by 
religion served the interest of both the Porte and the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Skendi 
1967: 18). Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians, who had either gained or were well on their way 
to gaining full independence from the Ottoman Empire, were also against the establishment 
of schools in the Albanian language, because they saw it as an obstacle to the establishment 
of schools in their own languages in the areas inhabited by Albanians. Nevertheless, in the 
midst of educational reforms in the Ottoman Empire, including pressure from their 
neighbors, Albanian intelligentsia known as Revivalists (Albanian: Rilindas) attempted to 
establish Albanian schools in the Vilayet70 of Kosova from 1890 (KEC 2000: 51).71 Elsie 
also mentions that the first Albanian schools in Kosovo were probably opened in Prizren in 
May 1889 by Mati Logoreci and Lazër Lumezi. Another Albanian school was opened in 
1905 in Stublla, Municipality of Vitia. By 1909, several Albanian schools had been opened 
in Kosovo, but Muslim clerics opposed the new Latin alphabets approved at the Congress 
of Manastir in November 1908 (Elsie 2011: 91).  
It may be argued that this was because they wrote in the Ottoman script and the 
sudden use of the Latin script meant that an entire community using that script would 
become illiterate overnight. However, the connection of the Arabic-based Ottoman script 
to Islam was also an important factor. It is worth noting that during the second half of the 
19th century, the Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek religious and state authorities established 
 
69 Hatt-i humayun, also known as hatt-i sharif (hatt-ı şerîf), is the diplomatic term for a document or handwritten 
note of an official nature composed by an Ottoman sultan. 
70 Vilayet was a major administrative district or province with its own governor in the Ottoman Empire. The 
Vilayet of Kosova, which was created as such in 1877, included the current territory of Kosovo and the western 
part of the Republic of Macedonia. 
71 The first schools in the Vilayet of Kosovo were founded in Zym, Zllakuqan (1897), Siarinë (1899), Stubëll, School 
of Girls in Prizren, etc. (KEC 2000), whereas the first Albanian school was established on March 7, 1887 in Korça, 
in the Vilayet of Manastir. 
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their own schools in the region, but this seems to have been motivated purely by a desire 
for territorial expansion (Mayer 1995: 49)72.  
To wit, following the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), Serbia acquired Kosovo, present-
day southern Serbia, parts of the Sandžak73 of Novi Pazar and present-day North Macedonia 
(except for the Strumitsa valley). The Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913), which amended 
the previous Treaty of London (May 1913), put Serbia in charge of internal administration 
of the newly acquired regions. However, a state-organized school system was not 
established in any of these regions. Instead, education remained under the authority of 
religious institutions, just as it had been under the Ottoman Empire. The first task of the 
Serbian government after the Balkan Wars was to establish a Serbian national school 
network to offset the influence of the Ottoman, Bulgarian and Greek schools in the newly 
acquired areas. Serbian laws on education and schools were simply imposed on the region, 
and Albanian schools were banned. Afraid that participation in such a system of education 
would lead to their assimilation, Albanians refused to attend schools taught in the Serbian 
language (Troch 2012: 97). After the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Kosovo was 
divided by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. The opening of Albanian-language schools was 
allowed by Austria-Hungary in northwestern Kosovo, while Bulgaria obstructed both 
Albanian and Serbian language education in the rest of Kosovo and set up Bulgarian 
schools. It also closed the Turkish schools it had initially allowed (Kostovicova 2005: 53). 
As a result, the level of education in the region remained extremely low, particularly among 
Albanians and other non-Serbian speaking communities such as Turks. While the illiteracy 
rate for the Albanian ethnic group that lived in the region in 1921 was the highest (about 
97%), the statistics also show that 89% of the Turkish ethnic group, followed by 84% of the 
general population in Macedonia, were also illiterate (Troch 2012: 111). 
Challenges for education in the Albanian language continued in inter-war 
Yugoslavia as well. The 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain signed by the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes obliged the Kingdom to provide education in the native languages of 
minorities. Additionally, provisions concerning the education of minorities in their 
language was also assured in the Constitution of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from June 
 
72 Cited after Troch 2012. 
73 Sandžak or Sanjak is a historical geopolitical region, now divided by the border between Serbia and Montenegro. 
The name Sandžak derives from the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, a former Ottoman administrative district.  
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1921 (see Article 16).74 Nevertheless, despite the internationally binding treaty and the 
Constitution, the Kingdom closed all schools in the Albanian language. Officially, the 
Kingdom reasoned that "the majority of Albanians are illiterate… and there are no 
possibilities to find teachers for them" (Malcolm 2001: 278). However, scholars have 
asserted that this was blatantly wrong: in 1930, an Albanian Catholic Priest speaking before 
the League of Nations stated there were 27 Albanian teachers in Kosovo and that they had 
been forced by the regime to close their schools (Ibid.).  
Education in their own language became available to the Albanian citizens of 
Kosovo only during the Second World War, a period which was experienced as "liberation" 
by Albanians living in the Italian protectorate of Albania, which included most of what 
became Kosovo, the westernmost part of Macedonia, as well as adjacent bits of Montenegro 
and Serbia. Under Italian and then German occupation, hundreds of Albanian schools were 
opened in Kosovo and primary education (through the fifth grade) became obligatory, with 
Albanian replacing Serbian as the only language of instruction. Gymnasiums and 
professional schools teaching pedagogical courses were also established in Prishtina, 
Prizren, Pejë/Peć and Gjakovë/Đakovica (KEC 2000: 53, 54, 55). Robert Elsie, in his 
Historical Dictionary of Kosovo, notes that except for the years 1915-1918, when a part of 
Kosovo was under Austro-Hungarian rule, and for the years 1941-1944, under Italian and 
German occupation, schools in Albanian were prohibited (Elsie 2011: 91).  
In 1945, Yugoslavia was established as a socialist and federal republic, assuring the 
equal use of their language to all citizens. The first curricula for primary schools with 
Albanian as the language of instruction were adopted in 1945. The communist party leader 
in Kosovo, Fadil Hoxha,75 asked his counterpart in Albania, Enver Hoxha, for 200 Albanian 
teachers, and by the end of 1945 there were 392 schools in Kosovo: 357 offering classes in 
Serbian and 279 offering classes in Albanian. Yet the 1948 Yugoslavian Census showed 
that 74% of all Kosovo Albanians over the age of 10 were still illiterate (Elsie 2011: 93). 
Education in the Albanian language was, indeed, provided during the communist 
period, but, as perhaps was to be expected, this was ideological education which primarily 
served the "brotherhood and unity" ambitions that became the Leitmotif of pan-Yugoslav 
 
74 The Serbian version of the Constitution of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of June 1921 is available at the following 
link: http://projuris.org/RETROLEX/Ustav%20kraljevine%20SHS_Vidovdanski%20ustav%20(1921).pdf  
75 Fadil Hoxha (1916–2001) was an SFRY-era Kosovar-Albanian politician. Throughout his career, Hoxha held 
the positions of president of Kosovo, first prime minister of Kosovo, and vice president of the SFRY. 
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functioning. Dimova asserts that education in the Balkans was a requirement for nation-
building since before the end of WWI (Dimova 2013: 73). As mentioned earlier, this view 
echoes Anderson's (1991) argument that establishing a unified system of national education 
can effectively create a sense of horizontal comradeship crucial to the modern nation-state. 
Conversely, as in most countries in the region, education in Kosovo was inevitably seen as 
the means by which the state indoctrinated its citizens. While politicization of the system 
of education has been seen by some Albanians as a state-sponsored effort at their 
assimilation, scholars argue that this system of education emerged as a focal point of the 
Kosovo Albanians' national struggle and resistance in Communist Yugoslavia (Kostovicova 
2005: 29, 40). Often associated with the acquisition of power, the educational sector in 
Kosovo slowly but continuously became a symbol of nationhood and the existence of each 
ethnicity living in this region (especially Albanians and Serbs). At the same time, influential 
Albanian political figures and intellectuals promoted the need to increase the number of 
Albanian boys and girls in schools. Albanian intelligentsia – through internalizing an 
external discourse – persistently highlighted the notion that the "backwardness" of 
Albanians had its roots in their inability to establish and develop an educational sector in 
their language. 
2.7. Conclusions 
For historical and political reasons, Albanians were portrayed negatively within 
Yugoslavia, particularly by the Serbs. Negative perceptions of the Albanians by the Serbs  
– which also led to their continuous stigmatization – were particularly noticeable in the 
Serbian media/literature as well as among the intellectual and political elite, which 
presented Albanians as people with tails similar to animals, backward, unable to create and 
run a state, bloodthirsty, stunted, Muslim fundamentalists, and so ignorant that they could 
not distinguish between sugar and snow,  etc. Findings show that Serbs’ negative 
stereotypes about Albanians were promulgated mainly by academic and political/state-
controlled institutions. These stereotypes produced continual stigmatization of Albanians 
by the Serbs, which served to foment hate, distrust and other negative emotions toward each 
other. While earlier negative stereotypes were disseminated through institutional lines and 
did not arise from society itself, nowadays the opposite seems to be the case.  
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In this chapter, I have argued that the discourse of Orientalism and Balkanism in the 
context of Yugoslavia produced Western stereotypes. Thus, all of the people living in 
Yugoslavia constantly tried to distance themselves from "Orientalism" as well as 
"Balkanism," and did their best to be seen as European as possible. These tendencies 
produced tensions among the populations living within Yugoslavia, which were mainly 
provoked out of their competitiveness to present themselves as less Oriental and more 
Western. This included the Albanians, who submitted to the image others had of them as 
the price to be paid in order to be seen as a civilized and pro-Western nation that had nothing 
to do with the East. The identity they established for themselves was built on their pre-
Christian and figured Illyrian ancestry, ignoring the earliest historical sources and severing 
links with their Ottoman past.  
Politically, however, the Albanians’ Western orientation helped them gain the 
Western powers' attention and sympathy. They benefited a lot from this support, particularly 
during the last two decades, because it led to granting ethnic Albanians greater political 
rights and representation in the region and facilitated Kosovo Albanians’ gaining an 
independent state.  
Connections between politics and education were also obvious during every phase 
of the development of Kosova’s educational sector. For each ethnic community, education 
was tightly and inextricably connected to their objectives for political ascendancy. The 
findings reveal tight interlinkages between the politics of language and the right to 
education in the Albanian language. Depending on the period in question, "education" for 
Albanians was associated with fear of assimilation or seen as a tool for political and national 
mobilization. Historically, and as has occurred in many other places, schools symbolized 
much more than just a place of learning. 
To better understand Albanians’ sensitivity regarding the right to university-level education 
(1960-1999), this chapter examined the contexts underlying challenges to the establishment 
of the educational system in the Albanian language. This opens the door in the next chapter 
to focus the analysis only on higher education and the UP. The chapter concludes that for 
the last two centuries the Balkans has continued to be a region of political and ideological 
experiments and a place of memory of the failures of local and international attempts to 
build societies according to civic paradigms. This is so because the Balkans is a place that 
has yet to clarify its present-day relation to its Ottoman and Yugoslavian past and, unlike 
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the West, it has never been given the chance to develop its own definition of civility, 
neighborly relations and social acceptance, though one can also argue that the Balkans 
during the Ottoman period was more civil, neighborly, and socially accepting than the West. 
It was the importation of Western nationalism that destroyed these Ottoman values. 
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Chapter 3: Social movements between demands for social change, justice and nationalism 
(the 1960s)  
Historically, social movements manifest how a society bids farewell to its former self and 
transforms itself into a society that is better able to cope with modernity and the demands 
of its citizens. Thus, social movements have played an important role in influencing the 
policies and practices in a variety of fields. Depending on the period when a particular social 
movement occurs, diverse mechanisms are used to deploy the social movement’s 
instruments of violent or non-violent protest. This chapter examines the emergence and 
development of collective actions during the late 1960s in Belgrade and Kosovo. In that 
vein, I analyze the conceptual connections and differences between social movements in 
Belgrade and Kosovo during a highly significant historical period, looking more 
specifically at the interactions between regional/local policies, institutions of higher 
education and student movements in Kosovo (1968). Additionally, the impact of the 
movements on the establishment of the UP is elaborated. With this in mind, I employ 
insights gained from the literature, archival documents and numerous interviews to present 
the disciplinary roots that governed the goals of social movements during the 1960s, 
providing valuable insights and examples of these movements.  
3.1. The emergence of student movements in the 1960s 
The 1960s will be remembered as a time when great changes occurred both locally and 
globally. The movements of the 1960s were revolutionary, aiming to create a better world. 
Numerous changes that many people take for granted nowadays took place precisely 
because of the movements of the sixties. Many scholars argue that this long decade can be 
considered as a cultural revolution, something that was most clearly visible in the United 
States, Great Britain, France, and Italy (Marwic 1998, Klimke and Scharlott 2008). In these 
countries, social movements led to major accomplishments, an example of which was the 
United States’ Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, 
national origin, and gender, and leading to the creation of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to handle discrimination.76 For Great Britain, France, 
 
76 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Federal Laws Prohibiting Discrimination and Federal Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) Laws, available at: http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm  
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Italy, and some other European countries, the 1960s were a decade of unique historical 
significance which witnessed a transformation in personal relationships, attitudes towards 
authority, modes of self-presentation, material standards, customs, and behavior (Marwic 
1998). Moreover, while this decade shaped civilization as we know today, it also left deep 
divisions among different groups, some of which are still felt today. The year 1968 in 
particular is seen as a moment in time when diverse histories converged and then diverged 
again (Bodnár 2018). These divergences particularly inspired students to begin organizing 
to fight against injustice and in support of equal rights for all.  
Klemencic (2014), for instance, notes that:  
"studentship", i.e., the state of being a student, can be highly 
conducive to "acting collectively in a public sphere," to express 
interests, ideas, make demands on some authority, or hold that 
authority accountable. The propensity to collective student political 
engagement lies in the characteristics of studentship as a life stage, 
which is that of "being free and becoming." Developmentally, 
studentship (as emerging adulthood) has been associated with higher 
levels of cognitive, emotional and practical maturity and also with 
nurturing idealist (and abstract) ideas… Unburdened by care for 
family or full-time work, the "typical" student has the leisure of time 
and peace of mind to engage in political action if so inclined 
(Klemenčič 2014, 399).  
That is why some of the most important movements were initiated at universities or 
by students, because students were inspired by knowledge, and the universities where the 
students gathered served as locations for bringing together people of diverse backgrounds. 
As Klemenčič underscores, "academic institutions as distinct intellectual and social 
environments provide space for students to freely and critically exchange and develop their 
ideas and articulate political aspirations. The multiple and overlapping social networks that 
constitute university environments are fertile grounds for the cultivation and organization 
of student interests" (Klemenčič, 2014: 399). Loader et al. (2014) also regards university 
campuses as important sites for the politicization of young people, offering spaces for 
"creative development and performance of the political self, affiliations to particular fields 
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and access to cultural and social capital" (Loader et al, 2014: 1-3). Thus, university 
campuses have historically favored political and social engagement. They have often served 
as training grounds for those who aspired to political careers, but they have also exposed 
non-political people to political ideas (ibid.). Even nowadays, university campuses are 
environments where cliques are formed around ideological positions (Ibrahim and Crossley, 
2016). Depending on their geographical location, universities and student life have also 
served as centers or places to develop a sense of nationalism and the need for social change. 
University campuses, student unions, dormitories, and classes produce networks by 
"drawing like-minded actors to the same locations, at the same times, and thereby increasing 
the likelihood that they will meet and form ties" (Crossley, 2003: 45).  
Similar to the rest of the world during the 1960s, large student demonstrations also 
took place in Eastern Europe and SFRY. Cornell argues that student political activity in 
Eastern Europe has usually taken the form of opposition to an old-fashioned system, to 
outside political domination, to oppressive political regimes, or attempts to organize, 
regulate, direct, and control student life and activity (Cornell, 1968: 166). Unlike in the 
United States and Western Europe, where youth aspired to move away from capitalism, 
their counterparts in SFRY lived under a very different social order, namely communism. 
Thus, while Westerners mobilized for countercultural reasons, their counterparts in SFRY 
were demanding better implementation of communism at all levels of the state, an end to 
growing unemployment, economic emigration, social inequalities, corruption, and 
privileges for selected state officials, etc. 
3.1.1. Student chaos in Belgrade (June 1968) 
This next section focuses on how the worldwide wave of revolt of the 1960s inspired the 
students in Belgrade and also on the character of their 1968 student movements.  While 
delving into this subject, I referred to a wide range of newspaper articles, documentaries, 
academic papers, and books published on the subject of the student protests. The demands 
of students in Belgrade were mostly social and centered on a critique of the 
bureaucratization of the Party, but they did not necessarily threaten the SFRY political 
system. Kanzleiter highlighted the following characteristics which, according to him, made 
the student movements in Belgrade exceptional. Unlike protests in most other European 
countries, the Belgrade protest was not directed against the fundamental values and 
62 
 
ideologies of the ruling political system. Indeed, students in Belgrade protested in the name 
of the principles of the communist system against its hypocritical and frustrating reality. 
Another characteristic was the integration of different ideas from student movements in 
both capitalist and socialist countries. Thus, the Belgrade student protests of 1968 were a 
protest between East and West. They were a hybrid that shook the Iron Curtain of the Cold 
War. Given that the political system in SFRY was neither entirely Stalinist nor completely 
capitalist, students in Belgrade were protesting against both. They called for 
"Democratization" and "Freedom of Demonstration," but they also protested against 
"capitalist restoration" or the program of the "Liberals" in the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY). This particular orientation was summarized in the popular slogan: 
"Down with the red bourgeoisie!" (Kanzleiter, 2008: 231).  
3.1.2. In search of a better communism 
Even though the student movements in Belgrade did not have the countercultural character 
of those in western countries, they are still important because they represent the first public 
criticism of self-management socialism. According to some of the organizers of and 
participants in these protests, students who demonstrated in Belgrade had their own unique 
justifications. On the 47th anniversary of the 1968 student protests in Belgrade, 
International Radio Serbia 77  reported that at the time of the showdown with political 
opponents, differences within society had come to be increasingly manifest, the 
unemployment rate was increasing, and, as dissatisfaction began to mount, many citizens 
migrated abroad. Migration was indeed allowed by the government, which saw this 
phenomenon as temporary (Dimova 2013: 31). 
An interesting scholarly opinion about the reasons which influenced student 
movements in Belgrade is given by Croatian philosopher Branko Despot. He argued that 
the 1968 student movement was also triggered by an increased interest in philosophy, which 
was reflected in the high number of students enrolled in philosophy courses and studies. 
This argument should not be dismissed, particularly taking into consideration the fact that 
in Belgrade, as the main center of resistance, the largest meetings were held at the Faculty 
 
77 Accessible at; http://voiceofserbia.org/ru/  [Last accessed on 10/02/2019] 
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of Philosophy. Eight professors who were later punished were from this faculty.78 In Zagreb 
and Sarajevo, as well as in Prishtina, the movement began at the Faculty of Philosophy and 
continued to spread to other places around the country.79 Popov, in contrast, claims that the 
SFRY student movements were triggered by the protests in the United States and Europe. 
The protests were not only a result of political and social emancipation but were also shaped 
by a quest for human universal emancipation from all types of dependencies: technology, 
economy, governance, and ideologies. According to him, different social movements can 
collide depending on the type of emancipation that is sought (youth, workers, women, etc.). 
The main reason behind the 1968 student movements in SFRY, however, was the political 
monopolization which excluded "others" from participation in the political scene, thereby 
producing a lack of democracy (Popov 2008). Arguably, the student protests in SFRY also 
marked the end of the economic reforms begun between 1964 and 1967, with the 
Assembly's focus on reducing the role of the state in economic management and creating 
the legislative foundation of market socialism. Reforms also included external trade 
measures: SFRY devalued its currency, obtained foreign loans, and joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.80 However, this view may be only partially true. Even 
when discussing the Belgrade movements in isolation, undoubtedly, the central motivation 
of the protests was to make a difference. The student demands, which were later framed 
into a long and definitive document, were mostly social and centered on a critique of the 
bureaucratization of the Party. The students’ main demands were the following: an end to 
growing unemployment, economic emigration, social inequalities, privileges for selected 
state officials, and corruption, and implementation of the students' demands for the 
democratization of political life, especially in the Party, as well as the application of self-
 
78 Eight professors of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade (Dragoljub Mićunović, Mihajlo Marković, Ljuba 
Tadić, Zagorka Golubović, Dragan Životić, Svetozar Stojanović, Nebojša Popov and Trivo Inđić) paid a high price 
for the 1968 student demonstrations. The sentence came seven years later – excluding them from the University. 
Also as a result, Aleksander Kron, assistant professor of philosophy, was expelled from the Party, and Jadran 
Ferlugai, professor of history, and Alija Hodžić, a sociology student, were seriously censured. Notwithstanding 
the "price paid," during one of the anniversaries of the student protests organized in Belgrade, academician Mihajlo 
Marković, a key participant in the 1968 student protests, stated that he was “proud of events that took place in 
1968.” 
79 Hrvoje Klasić’s interview about the book he authored, “Jugoslavija i svijet 1968: Šezdeset i osma najbolji je 
Titov spin or (Yugoslavia and the world 1968": ‘68 is Tito's best spin)." Published by Novo list, available at; 
http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Hrvoje-Klasic-autor-knjige-Jugoslavija-i-svijet-1968-Sezdeset-i-osma-
najbolji-je-Titov-spin [Last accessed on 10/02/2019]  
80 See Yugoslavia” s Country Data for Reforms of the 1960s, available at: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-
bin/query/r-14789.html [Last accessed on 10/02/2019] 
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management (which was already official policy) at all levels, etc.81 While talking about the 
student demonstrations in Belgrade, Azem Vllasi mentioned one of the slogans which he 
found very contradictory: "The University of Belgrade to be named ‘Karl Marx'" (Vllasi: 
October 2015). However, it is debatable whether the final version of the student demands 
was in line with the original motivation for the protests, which, according to some authors, 
was for "better communism."  
Differences between the student movements in the West and the East were 
significant. Unlike their counterparts in Western Europe, the students in SFRY were 
concerned with their problems as students. Student discontent and protest were directed 
against the negative effects of the system, and even though the students' demands differed 
in their nature, student protests in this part of Europe were influenced by the wave of 
demonstrations that swept many countries in 1968 (Jandrić, 2002), and yet, in the SFRY 
demonstrations, there was a clear distinction that in none of them was criticism directed at 
Tito. Radoja insists that student demonstrations in Belgrade were primarily affected by the 
economic situation in the country, inter-republican and international relations, as well as 
the role of Josip Broz Tito, whom Radoja considers to have been a very skilled manipulator 
and the main "winner" in this process (Radoja, 2008). While agreeing with Radoja's 
arguments about Tito’s being the main "winner," Popović also maintains that while in the 
West students rebelled against the existing state of things, seeking liberation of the 
individual, more personal and sexual freedom, students in Belgrade were fighting for "better 
communism." He even claims that the students took to the streets chanting "We are Tito, 
Tito is Ours" and singing "Comrade Tito, we swear never to stray away from your path" 
right after Tito's statement on June 8, 1968. The next day, major global publications 
proclaimed that Tito was the only politician in the world who gave rights to youth (Popović, 
2008).  
The situation was strictly controlled by the SFRY government. The regime 
prevented reaction, and repression limited the power and the effect of the students' rebellion. 
Besides punishing the professors, the police also used violence against students, however, 
they either denied it or the use of force by the police was not publicly discussed. Želimir 
 
81 This list of demands is detached from the International Socialism Survey. November/December 1970. Yugoslav 
Student Struggles. From International Socialism, No.45, November/December 1970, pp.8-11. Transcribed & 
marked up by Einde O” Callaghan for ETOL. Available at; 
https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj/1970/no045/survey4.htm [Last accessed on 10/02/2019] 
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Žilnik's documentary on the 1968 student demonstrations in Belgrade, entitled "Lipanjska 
Gibanja" (June Turmoil), 82  reaffirms that the police resorted to violence to stop the 
demonstrations. In this documentary, students talk about the agreements they reached with 
the police. Further, they discuss the requests of the regime for the students to return to the 
university and drop their demands. This video clearly shows that student protests in 
Belgrade were considered to be pro-Yugoslav, inasmuch as the Belgrade students 
articulated demands within the framework of the official ideology, indicating unequaled 
ideals of freedom and emancipation in SFRY society. However, some of the protestors' 
slogans, such as: "Workers and Students," "We want Jobs," "Down with the Socialist 
Bourgeoisie," "They were shooting at us," "We are the Children of the Working people," 
etc., uniformly pointed at police violence, growing unemployment, social inequalities, 
privileges bestowed upon selected state officials, etc. Nebojša Popov, a Serbian sociologist 
who approached this topic both as a researcher and a participant and wrote about this field,83 
confirms that violence was used and argues that both students rushing to join the protests 
and fights with the police started soon after the protests began. 
3.1.3. The Belgrade demonstrations' influence on other regions 
While the banners hoisted in the United States and Europe mainly targeted general respect 
for human rights, transformations in attitudes towards authority, modes of self-presentation 
and behavior, the student movements in Belgrade were rather concerned with their student 
problems and slightly with some of the negative aspects of the system headed by Tito. This 
might also be one of the key reasons why the student movements in Belgrade did not enjoy 
significant support and sympathy from a majority of citizens. Indeed, Mitrović argues that 
"the demonstrations were comprehensive, open and friendly, but also a futile attempt to 
establish a bridge between generations" (Mitrović, 2011). Accusing the movement of not 
being willing to make sacrifices for the revolution, he argues that the students sought to 
change a way of life but without seizing power. Furthermore, despite a touch of Leninism, 
 
82 Želimir Žilnik’s documentary film, “Lipanjska Gibanja (June Turmoil),” speaks of student demonstrations in 
Belgrade, 1969 and of the critical quality, enthusiasm, and discipline of this form of protest. It was the most 
powerful public criticism of "red bourgeoisie" - members of the communist apparatus who suppressed creativity 
and affirmation of new generations throughout the Eastern bloc, and is available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npI_jKXWwCY. 
83 “Tesno za Studente i Brigadiste” (Pressing for Students and Contingents), “Omladinski Pokreti u Jugoslaviji, 
Juče, Danas i Sutra” (Youth Movements in Yugoslavia Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow), “Režim Uzvraća 
Udarac” (The Regime Strikes Back, etc.) 
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Maoism, Trotskyism and other political orientations, Mitrović considers the 1968 student 
movement to have essentially been an "exaltation of individualism" (ibid.). However, due 
to the existence of conflicting ideals and realities throughout the university centers, where 
both students and professors rebelled, the "greatest tragedy" of the 1968 protests in SFRY 
could be that it gave rise to the nationalism that in the 1990s led to bloody conflict (Ivanović, 
2008). Here Ivanović is referring to the protests which spread from Belgrade to other major 
SFRY cities: Zagreb, Sarajevo, and particularly Prishtina and some cities in Macedonia.  
While students in Belgrade called for "better implementation of communism," their 
counterparts in Prishtina for the first time publically expressed their political aspirations for 
"Republic" status for Kosovo. Thus, even within the SFRY events did not have the same 
character: in Belgrade, student protest was primarily socially motivated, whereas the 
protests in Prishtina also had a nationalist slant. Due to their most unfavored position within 
SFRY, the most important nationalist claims and threats came from Albanian students in 
Prishtina and, later, from Albanians in towns across Macedonia.  
3.2. Student protest in Kosovo (1968) and the establishment of the University of Prishtina 
In Kosovo, similar to other places in SFRY, the Communist League of Yugoslavia 
(hereinafter LCY) built an entire political and social system based on the "brotherhood and 
unity" platform, where loyalty to Josip Broz Tito was especially important. The socialist 
political and intellectual elite that started to emerge in Kosovo fully embraced these 
principles. Kosovo too had its branch of the League of Communists (LoC), the country's 
only political party. The main Kosovo Albanian political figures at that time were Fadil 
Hoxha, Ali Shukria, Veli Deva, Xhavit Nimani, Xhevdet Hamza, Rrahman Morina, 
Mahmut Bakalli, Azem Vllasi, Kaçusha Jashari, and others. Parallel to the establishment of 
political structures, the system was also involved in developing intellectual elites. By the 
1960s, Kosovo already possessed a few intellectuals whose loyalty to the regime's doctrine 
had been tested on several occasions.84 These experts in different fields were in charge of 
leading and working at Kosovo's newly established institutions and institutes of higher 
learning. Both the political and intellectual elites had a tendency to view themselves as the 
 
84 Some of the intellectuals that belonged to these elites include Mark Krasniqi, Dervish Rozaja, Syrja Pupovci, 
Gazmend Zajmi, Rexhep Qosja, Pajazit Nushi, and others. 
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most progressive segment of Kosovo's society. The fact is, however, that Kosovo's LoC 
acted strictly under the directives of the LCY.  
Another aspect of this picture were the "illegal groups," i.e. the national Albanian 
movements in Kosovo formed after World War II, which were outlawed in the SFRY and 
functioned until the establishment of political pluralism in SFRY (1990). Until 1966, the 
political programs of these illegal groups were mainly rightist, and they directly called for 
the unification of Kosovo with Albania. However, when relations between Albania and 
SFRY improved, the political programs of the illegal organizations tilted leftward. Support 
for Marxism, Leninism, and Enverism was obvious in the groups’ names and political 
programs. Keçmezi-Basha (March 2017)85 explains that throughout this time the political 
programs of illegal groups shifted from calls to unify with Albania [Organizata Marksiste-
Leniniste e Kosovës (The Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosovo), Lidhja Nacional 
Çlirimtare e Kosovës (The Kosovo National Liberation League), etc. to the unification of 
Albanian-inhabited territories within one Republic in SFRY, and finally the establishment 
of the Republic of Kosovo [Partia Marksiste Leniniste Shqiptare e Kosovës (Albanian 
Marxist Leninist Party of Kosovo)]. However, no matter which political ideology they 
espoused, the "Republic of Kosovo" and other nationalist demands were the backbone of 
all of the political programs of the illegal groups, and they managed to merge two opposing 
concepts: Marxism-Leninism and nationalism. Later in this dissertation, I will provide more 
details about these groups and their members. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that 
Albanians demands for republic status for Kosovo pre-dated 1968. Yugoslav leaders during 
the interwar period verbally supported numerous Albanian movements in Kosovo that 
sought national recognition. In 1923, the Communist Party also released a statement in 
which it confirmed the Party's duty to "help the movements of oppressed nations in their 
goals of creating independent states: Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, as well as 
the liberation of the Albanians” (Rajović, 1985: 85). Similarly, in 1942, Tito declared that 
the Party would "never depart from the principles stated by Lenin and Stalin, which is the 
right of every nation to self-determination." This included Albanians in Yugoslavia as well 
(Lee, 1983: 77), although they did not have the status of a nation. Albanians were a 
nacionalna manjina (national minority) until the introduction of the term narodnost 
 
85 Keçmezi-Basha has provided broader details on this topic, published in numerous reviews of the Institute of 
History ‘Ali Hadri’ Prishtine, including the “Kosova 40” (2015). 
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(nationality) in 1974. From December 31, 1943 until January 2, 1944, as can be seen from 
the signatures of the participants in the written protocol of a meeting in Bujan, both 
Albanian communists and non-communists joined in the conference of the National 
Liberation Committee of Kosovo. Here, among other points, they also adopted a resolution 
ratifying Kosovo's unification with Albania (AK ONO/1945-46/1 86 ). However, the 
conclusions of the Bujan Resolution – so named because the meeting took place in Bujan 
(northern Albania) – were strongly rejected by the LCY leadership. After the war (1945), 
Albanian communists were included in a newly constituted Assembly of the People's 
District Council. This assembly was dominated by Serbs, and they managed to adopt 
another resolution which stated that the "wish of the entire population of the region is to 
join a federated Serbia as its constituent part." The same resolution was accepted by the 
Anti-Fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), serving as the country's postwar 
government. Soon afterward the National Assembly of Serbia passed a law regulating the 
status of the autonomous district (oblast) of Kosovo and setting its boundaries (Horvat, 
1989: 92; Lee, 1983: 85-86). The boundaries were reportedly set based on "ethnic and 
historic" criteria. However, the criteria in the case of Kosovo were more or less the principle 
of keeping the territory of the first Yugoslavia as part of the second Yugoslavia. Albanian-
inhabited parts of Montenegro and western Macedonia were left outside its borders, just as 
the Macedonian villages of Lower Prespa remained in post-War Albania. These critical 
events during World War II would establish Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia 
whose constitutional status would undergo several changes until Yugoslavia's eventual 
break-up in 1991 (Pula, 2004). As already highlighted in the previous chapter, during the 
mid-1940s and 1950s Albanians in Yugoslavia were subjected to institutional repression. 
Various published materials estimate that between only 1944 and 1946, thousands of 
Albanians were the victims of torture, systematic mass executions by communist police, 
and typhoid fever epidemics that affected military units.87 This situation changed only when 
the influence of Albanian politicians in the Yugoslav Communist Party grew during the 
1960s. The end of the ‘60s marked the beginning of substantial improvement favoring 
Kosovo Albanians.  
 
86 Referencing of the archival materials for the Archive of Kosovo is done as per the following order: AK refers 
to the Archive of Kosovo, the ONO refers to the name of the fond, the number 1945-1946 refers to the year, the 
number the number 1 refers to the box. 
87 These sources include S. Repishti (1986), Rusinow (1948-1974), etc. 
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This improvement started with the Brioni Plenum (July 1966), which was a war 
between two concepts. The "unitarist concept" was more reflective of the Soviet (Russian) 
ideology, and Tito's concept favored federalism and the West. Tito won this battle in 1966 
by eliminating "Serbian unitarism" (Jović, 2008: 137), and, according to Buxhovi, Tito's 
first step toward "western values" was his proposal for the advancement of Kosovo at the 
federative level (Buxhovi: Jan 2016). The decisions of the Brioni Plenum regarding the 
SFRY's future political orientation were the turning point for the "Albanian issue," which 
had remained a major unresolved issue for SFRY. After the Brioni Plenum and the fall of 
Aleksandar Ranković (1966),88 higher education became a top priority for Kosovo Albanian 
communist authorities and a means to catch up with others in the Yugoslavia of that time. 
Due to the criticism of discrimination against Albanians, which became widespread after 
1966, and to the political calls for means to address this discrimination, the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia (SRS) in 1967 began to delegate limited educational authority to the 
provincial bodies. Nevertheless, the involvement of political ideologies and interest in 
institutions of higher education played a significant role in the subsequent mobilization of 
Kosovo Albanian students to protest for more political and national rights. The interaction 
between these regional/local political interests with institutions of higher education and 
students resulted in the demonstrations of Kosovo Albanian students (1968). 
3.2.1. The genealogy of the University of Prishtina 
Institutions of higher education in Kosovo have a relatively recent history. The Pedagogical 
School of Prishtina was founded in the academic year 1958/1959, which is the year that 
marks the beginnings of higher education in Kosovo. The Higher Administration School 
and the Higher Agricultural School were opened in Prishtina one year later. Other cities in 
Kosovo followed. 89  In October 1960, the Faculty of Philosophy was established in 
 
88 Aleksandar Ranković (1909-1983) was a Yugoslav communist of Serb origin, considered by some as the third 
most powerful man in SFRY. He ran Kosovo as a police state and supported a hardline approach towards Albanians 
in Kosovo until his fall from grace in 1966. 
89 Higher Pedagogical School in Prizren (1960), Higher Economic-Commercial School in Peja/Peć (1960), Higher 
Engineering School in Mitrovica (1961), Higher Pedagogical School “Xhevdet Doda” in Prizren (1962), Higher 
Pedagogical School “Bajram Curri” in Gjakova/Đakovica (1967), etc. (UP 2005: 12). 
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Prishtina.90 In 1961, the Faculty of Economics and Law91 and an additional two Higher 
Engineering Schools92 were also founded in Prishtina. The trend of trade-oriented schools 
continued with the founding of the Faculty of Engineering in 1965. These four faculties and 
eight schools of higher education were the first institutions of higher education in Kosovo, 
and they all functioned as extensions of the University of Belgrade. About 3,320 students 
(1,046 full-time and 2,274 part-time) attended four high/secondary schools, and two 
faculties opened by 1961. The majority of them – 2,010 – were Serbs, followed by 928 
Albanians, and 382 others. In 1964, 31 graduating students became the first generation of 
the Faculty of Philosophy: 16 Albanians and 15 others (UP, 2005: 11-15). Kosovo 
authorities were in charge of students’ board and lodging.93 Lectures were delivered in the 
Serbian language (UP, 2005: 10-13). Professors whom I interviewed for this dissertation 
explained that the first generations of students were very ambitious. The actual students of 
these institutions at the time clarified that the first semester classes were held in the 
gymnasium, but that they soon moved to military barracks. The quarters where soldiers had 
previously been billeted were repurposed as classrooms, and students later moved to the 
current premises of the Economic and Law Faculty in Prishtina. Even though they still 
lagged behind others in the SFRY, the process of Kosovo Albanians’ transformation into 
an emancipated society steadily burgeoned starting from the mid-1960s. Intentions to 
establish university-level education were regularly presented at all levels of Communist 
Party meetings. On October 24, 1968, a delegation from Kosovo met with SFRY leader 
Josip Broz Tito. Veli Deva, chairman of the Provincial Committee in Kosovo and a member 
of the SFRY Presidency, stressed that around 40% of Kosovo inhabitants were illiterate, 
only 5-6% of Kosovo inhabitants had completed primary school education (six grades), and 
that the percentage of qualified workers in Kosovo was three times lower than in the rest of 
 
90  Initially, this faculty offered Albanological Studies, Serbo-Croatian Language, Mathematics, Physics, 
Chemistry, and Biology. Soon after, additional departments were opened, offering Russian Language and 
Literature and English Language and Literature. In the first academic year, 1960/61, 97 full-time students (60 
Albanians, 32 Serbs, and 5 others) and 141 part-time students were registered. Lectures were conducted by 7 
teachers (2 Albanians and 5 Serbs) and 7 associates (2 Albanians and 5 Serbs), four of whom were in possession 
of a doctorate and one of whom had a master’s degree (UP 2005: 16).  
91 In the first year, there were 586 students registered: 185 in Law (43 full-time and 142 part-time) and 401 students 
in Economics (120 full-time and 281 part-time), namely 323 Serbs, 134 Albanians, and 129 others (UP 2005: 14). 
The first professors at the Economic and Law faculties were Rifat Osmani, Abedin Ferovic, Mark Krasniqi, Nuri 
Bashota, Abdulla Zajmi, Zejnulla Gruda, and Fuad Rizvanolli (KTV: April 2017). 
92 There were 364 students registered (87 full-time, 277 part-time) (UP 2005: 12). 
93 Initially, several existing facilities were adapted, and student dormitory No. 1 was built in 1961. Other student 
facilities were built thereafter, providing 750 beds for about 1,000 students (UP 2005: 12). 
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Yugoslavia. Accordingly, Deva invited the entire SFRY to contribute toward the resolution 
of education-related problems in Kosovo. "Given that (Albanian language) is a native 
language of 70% of Kosovo's inhabitants" (AJ 837/II-2-364),94 the need to use the Albanian 
language in schools in Kosovo was also spelled out to Tito. In that sense, Albanian 
communist leaders made every connection between the lack of "qualified workers" and the 
hampering of the overall development in all sectors in Kosovo, and used every opportunity 
to promote prioritization of education in Kosovo at the federal level and in the Albanian 
language. Indeed, the country was in desperate need of qualified cadres to take public 
positions in Kosovo's promising economy during the late 1960s. A steady increase in the 
number of Albanian primary and secondary schools95 in Kosovo served as a stimulus for 
further development of tertiary education as well. Political leaders used this space to 
establish institutions of higher learning (Kostovicova, 2005: 40). On the other hand, SRS 
opposed the creation of a university-level institution for Kosovo; indeed, they even 
discriminated against existing institutions of higher education in the province. The report 
of a commission for material issues of students in SFRY highlighted the difficult conditions 
for students in Prishtina. The rooms in the dormitories had 10-20 beds, while the capacity 
of student dormitories in other SFRY republics was as follows: Belgrade 10,057, Zagreb 
5,383, Ljubljana 2,950, Sarajevo 2,160, Skopje 2,140, Novi Sad 1,166 and Nis 480. As for 
the material position of teachers, a document from the archive of Yugoslavia shows that in 
SFRY republics, as well as in the province of Vojvodina, teachers received stipends during 
the 1960s. Kosovo, however, was not mentioned in those parts of the document addressing 
credits and houses for teachers during the 1960s (AJ 145/60-258). When it came to student 
stipends, they were mainly given to the children of communist officials, whereas the 
children of villagers received much less (AJ, 145/86-377). The modest number of Albanian 
intellectuals of that time also supported an initiative for overall progress in the field of 
education. Developments in the sphere of higher education during the sixties also showed 
 
94 Referencing of archival materials from the Archives of Yugoslavia is done as per the following order: AJ refers 
to the Archive of Jugoslavija, 837 refers to the number of the fond, and the next number refers to the box. 
95 During the school year 1945/1946, there were 388 primary schools in Kosovo; all were four-grade schools. In 
1956/1957, the number rose to 711, including six-grade and eight-grade schools, while in 1974/1975 there were 
862 primary schools in Kosovo, of which 397 were eight-grade schools. The expansion of schools was 
accompanied by a change in the proportion of Serbian and Albanian students, approximating although not quite 
reflecting the ethnic make-up of the province. In the school year 1945/1946, 23,536 pupils attended primary school 
in Albanian and 27,211 in the Serbian language. In 1974/1975, 279,475 pupils were taught in Albanian and 60,188 
in the Serbian language in Kosovo's primary schools (cited after Kostovicova 2005: 40). 
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the first signs of influencing the rising awareness of national issues among Kosovo 
Albanians. Kosovo students and members of the younger generation started to mature 
politically and to reflect on Albanian–Serb relations through a critical lens. For example, 
when it came to the student demonstrations of November 1968, Fadil Hoxha and his 
communist allies "identified" the (mis)use of historical memory as one of the tools which 
led to student mobilization or demonstrations in Prishtina. Specifically, they highlighted the 
manifestations of the 500th anniversary of Skenderbeg's96 death (1968) in Prishtina, as a 
(mis)used memory for spurring student mobilization (AK LoCPC/1981/797). 
3.2.2. Before the demonstrations in Kosovo; preparations, slogans, and other details  
The 1960s saw a wave of student demonstrations worldwide, including SFRY. 
Under these circumstances, but also exacerbated by an already elevated level of citizen 
dissatisfaction with the overall social, political, economic, and cultural position of 
Albanians when compared with that of others in SFRY, preparations for student 
demonstrations began in Kosovo as well. The province of Kosovo was the least developed 
region in Yugoslavia. The total number of inhabitants in the province had risen from 
733,000 in 1948 to 1,088,420 in 1965, but differences in the treatment of Albanians and 
Serbs were significant. Even though Albanians were the majority, the leading positions 
were mainly granted to Serbs and Montenegrins (AMFA 615/1967).98 In the Provincial 
Council organs, Albanians were represented by only 18.5% of the members. In the state 
security service (known as UDBA) only 13.3% were Albanians; in the prosecutorial offices 
12.5%; and in the judiciary, out of 122 judges, only 26 were Albanians. The names of streets 
were mainly in the Serbian language, and most of the monuments were of Serbian heroes. 
No Albanian was an ambassador abroad or held the rank of general in the army, whereas 
the soldiers were mainly sent for duty in other republics and not allowed to complete their 
 
96 George Castriot, known as Skanderbeg [Gjergj Kastrioti – Skënderbeu (1405–1468]), was an Albanian hero. He 
is considered as a symbol of the unification of the Albanians. Additionally, Skanderbeg has been the subject and 
inspiration for many arts, literature, poetry, prose and music performances. His reputation in Western Europe 
spread mainly during the 16th and 17th centuries. For more info, see Oliver Jens Schmitt’s book on the subject: 
Skanderbeg. Der neue Alexander auf dem Balkan. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet 2009. 432 S., zahlr. Abb. 
0.  
97 Referencing of the archival materials for the Archive of Prishtina is done as per the following order; the first 
initials AK, refers to the Archive of Kosovo, the LoCPC refers to the name of the fond, the number 1981 refers to 
the year, the number 81 refers to the box/session 
98 Referencing of the archival materials from the Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Republic of Albania is 
done as per the following order: AMFA refers to the Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first number refers 
to the number of the dossier, 1967 refers to the year. 
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service in the province. When it came to cultural institutions, Albanian language TV 
broadcasts were offered only once a week for 25 minutes. Of the Museum of Kosovo’s nine 
employees, only one was Albanian. The province did not have an orchestra, a gallery, or, 
as indicated above, an Albanian-language TV station (AMFA 415/1967).  
In the 1966-1967 academic year, the proportion of Albanian students in the schools 
was as follows: in technical and professional schools 34%, in agricultural schools 25%, and 
in medical schools 30% (Zëri i Rinisë, July 1967). Archival documents also reveal the 
gloomy conditions in the schools of Kosovo, as well as a large number of children who 
remained unregistered due to a lack of spaces and schools. Many difficulties were also 
created by the necessity to study in the Serbian language. It is worth highlighting that the 
same discriminatory situation found among Albanians was also reported for Macedonia. 
For example, even though in the towns of Tetovo or Struga, where a majority of the citizens 
were Albanians, the administration was significantly dominated by Macedonians. In the 
libraries, most of the books were in the Serbian or Macedonian languages. In the library of 
Gostivar, for example, newspapers in the Albanian language were not to be found, even 
though – according to archival documents – a majority of the city’s inhabitants were 
Albanian. The documents show that discrimination among women was even higher in 
Kosovo. From a conference held on January 26, 1967, Dritare Dugagjini highlighted that in 
the municipal councils women were not represented at all in some municipalities. In 
Dragash, for example, there were no women at all on any of the 115 elected municipal 
councils. Ms. Dugagjini mentioned that Kosovo Province had the highest illiteracy rates 
(42%), and of these 70% were women, of whom 99% were Albanian women (AMFA 
415/1967).  
At the same time, the Republic of Albania's actions for propagandistic work through 
their legate in Belgrade increased. Lik Seiti informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that – 
as requested by the Party – a lot of propagandistic work was being done regarding the 
"achievements of the Republic of Albania in all fields of life." Ideological literature was 
distributed mainly among Albanian students and citizens in SFRY. In the meantime, the 
Republic of Albania's legate in Belgrade was visited by numerous Kosovars seeking visas 
to visit Albania. Archival sources also show that during this period many letters from 
Albanians living in SFRY were directed to Enver Hoxha, begging for permission to 
repatriate or to visit their families, who either had remained in Albania during World War 
74 
 
II or who had migrated there afterward. From these letters, it is evident that people had no 
clue about the fate of their loved ones living in isolated Albania. Besides other explanations 
provided to their "clients," the officials of the Republic of Albania's legate in Belgrade used 
the opportunity to propagandize about "Albania's good governance, the developed health, 
education, culture, and economic sectors." In this correspondence, the legate's mission from 
Belgrade reported to their Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they were "raising Kosovars’ 
love for our country and our leadership" (CAA 14/1968/502).99 However, only in 1981 did 
the Albanian regime decide to increase the number of visas for Kosovo citizens to visit 
Albania, to allow more telegrams to be sent by Albanians in Albania to their families in 
Kosovo, and to invite family members (under the regime's control) in the matters of deaths, 
births or marriages (AMFA 1155/1981).  
Discriminatory policies by the SFRY regime on the one hand and nationalist 
propaganda from the legate of the Republic of Albania on the other created a tense 
atmosphere among Albanians in Kosovo. Albanian communist elites voiced their concerns 
at the federal level, highlighting that Albanians were not satisfied with the system. As one 
of the biggest reasons for their dissatisfaction, they mentioned the inability to receive 
education in the Albanian language. In 1963, the Serbian language became the official 
language, although the ethnic proportion of the population in the province was well known. 
Albanian political figures’ lobbying maintained that while people might be united as 
socialists, their languages and their cultures were not the same. Compelled at the central or 
federal level, during the joint Presidency session held October 22, 1968, the SKS 
commission for work on the development of relations between the republics, peoples and 
nationalities drafted a resolution highlighting the duties of the LoC of Serbia toward further 
development of national equality and of the brotherhood and unity of peoples and 
nationalities. SRS was required to assure "rapid development of their highly underdeveloped 
region (Kosovo), consistent implementation of socio-economic and political reform, the 
practicing of cultural activities of each ethnicity should be assured and promoted in TV, 
Radio, etc.; Intra-country (within SFRY) cooperation should be stimulated in activities such 
 
99 Referencing of the archival materials for the Central Archive of Republic of Albania is done as per the following 
order: CAA refers to the Central Archive of Albania, 14 refers to the number of the fond, 1968 refers to the year, 
and 502 refers to the number of the dossier. 
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as: science, culture, schools. Each national culture must be open to other national cultures in 
SFRY" (AS Đ-2/12/1968).100  
After the plenum of Brione, the federal level of the SFRY allowed the Albanian 
press in Kosovo to publicly condemn some of the crimes committed against Albanians. The 
practice of allowing the Albanian press to make public condemnations was short-lived and 
remained at the local level, whereas some interpretations appeared to try to claim that 
“everything was done by Ranković, and he is the one to be blamed." The Titoists promoted 
the slogan that "now on everything will be regulated" (AMFA 415/1967). Changes at the 
federal level reflected the institutions in Prishtina. Some of the Ranković representatives, 
including Ibra Hasko, a well-known figure in the mistreatment of Albanians in Kosovo, 
were dismissed from state security institutions in Kosovo (Shema: March 2017).  
Overall, political developments at the regional and local level created new 
opportunities for Kosovo Albanian elites. During the joint session of the Presidency of 
Committees of the LoC of Serbia for Kosovo, held on June 8, 1968, Mahmut Bakalli101 
stated that "from the moment we understood about the student movements in Belgrade, we 
assumed that Prishtina students might try to take similar actions…especially because they 
feel like the same students given that they are part of the University of Belgrade." The 
Presidency Committees were also informed about the meetings which had taken place with 
the students, professors and deans…explaining to them, that – in case of demonstrations – 
the complexity of the situation in Prishtina would have other implications and would give 
opportunities to “our enemies” (referring to the Republic of Albania) to misuse the situation 
(AK LoCPC/1968/7). Simultaneously, the propagandistic activities of the Albanian legate 
in Belgrade were ongoing, and they were already being criticized by SFRY officials. On 
June 24, 1968 the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Director Lipkovski, invited their 
representatives for a meeting highlighting that "Yugoslav organs found out you are 
distributing ideological materials…this is forbidden and might harm our relations as 
countries" (AMFA 322/1968).  
However, the demands for rights for Albanians during this period had also been 
raised by Kosovo Albanian communist leaders. Buxhovi specifically pointed out that during 
 
100 Referencing of the archival materials from the Archives Serbia is done as per the following order: AS refers to 
the Archive of Serbia, the Đ-2 refers to the number of the fond, the number 12 refers to the box, and the number 
1968 refers to the year.  




an open debate with citizens which took place in Gjakova/Đakovica on August 16, 1968, 
Fadil Hoxha, the first prime minister (1945–1963) and president (1945-1953) of post-war 
Kosovo and vice president of the SFRY (1978–1979), decisively called for the 
establishment of the Republic of Kosovo within the SFRY for the very first time. On August 
18, 1968, the newspaper Rilindja 102  published a front page article entitled "No Self-
determination – No Equality," referring to Fadil Hoxha's discussions in Gjakova/Đakovica 
(AK Rilindja/1968). After these developments, intellectuals such as Gazmend Zajmi, Fehmi 
Agani, and Rrezak Shala started discussing constitutional changes. It can be also said that 
the political and academic elites entertained the notion of a "Republic of Kosovo" at the 
local but also at the federal level. Thus, it was initiated by the communist political elites of 
Prishtina and later embraced by university professors. When this idea was rejected, 
apparently without any significant consequences for the elites that had requested it, this 
vision was passed on to the students (Buxhovi: Jan 2016). Azem Vllasi, one of the major 
communist leaders in Kosovo, also claimed that the demands for "Republic" status for 
Kosovo in the late ‘60s were first initiated by Kosovo Albanian communist elites and 
intellectuals (Vllasi: October 2015). However, as the findings below will show, Kosovo 
Albanian communist leaders managed to state their visions for Kosovo's republic status 
within the SFRY but were not able to further promote their ideas. 
Stimulated by the overall student movements of the sixties, and affected by the 
Republic of Albania's propaganda as well as by the demands of Kosovo's political and 
academic elites, Albanian students in Prishtina founded the "Committee of Students," which 
later served as the main body for the organization of the 1968 student demonstrations. Some 
members of this committee included Osman Dumoshi from Prishtina (Technical Faculty), 
Adil Pireva from Podujeva/Podujevo (Philosophical Faculty), Selatin Novosella from 
Vushtrria/Vučitrn (Albanian language and literature), and others. This group was 
established in June 1964, some days after the arrests of the activists of the "Revolutionary 
Movement for the Unification of Albania," along with the leader of this movement, Adem 
Demaçi. 103  In the beginning this student group focused its activities on disseminating 
 
102  "Rilindja" (established in 1945) was the first Albanian language newspaper in SFRY. In 1945, Rilindja 
published only 60 issues in the area of Prizren but became a daily newspaper and moved its layout and printing 
activities to Prishtina on November 29, 1958.  
103 Adem Demaçi was a chairman of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms of the People of 
Kosovo. He was also a founder and activist of “illegal political groups” in Kosovo and a longtime political prisoner 
who spent a total of 29 years in prison for speaking out against the treatment of ethnic Albanians in SFRY. 
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nationalist political ideology through reading and sharing historiographical books from 
Albania. This political group (which was unnamed in the beginning) based its program on 
the statute from the "Revolutionary Movement for the Unification of Albania" (Sh. Berisha, 
2008: 3). The Kosovo LoC analyzed the actions of "foreign propaganda" which – according 
to them – by utilizing disinformation tried to ruin "our socialist values." Written materials 
(books, newspapers, etc.) and radio programs were considered to be the main propagandistic 
tools of "the enemy" (referring to the Republic of Albania) (AK LoCPC/1968/7).  
Nevertheless, the members of the Committee of Students emphasized that they were 
affected by the waves of global and regional (Belgrade) protests, although this influence 
was mainly formal. Given that these were the Kosovo students’ first protests, they looked 
to their peers in Belgrade for the technical aspects on how to act, when to withdraw or 
attack, etc. Otherwise, "we didn't have absolutely anything else in common with the protests 
in Belgrade," says Novosella (Novosella: October 2015). But while denying any connection 
with Belgrade, Novosella also confirmed the links of the organizers of the 1968 student 
protests with the illegal groups104 as well as with the Republic of Albania. It is important to 
mention that some of the main activists of illegal groups, such as Adem Demaçi, were 
imprisoned on June 8, 1964. During the same summer, other members of these groups were 
also arrested in Prishtina, Pejë/Peć, Gjakova/Đakovica, etc., and the arrests of those 
affiliated with illegal groups lasted until September 1964 (Shema: March 2017).  
However, interviews with the organizers of the demonstrations of 1968 reveal that 
it was the students’ duty to consult with veterans of the illegal groups and ex-political 
prisoners. Hasan Dermaku, one of the organizers, was in contact with Metush Krasniqi. 
Selatin Novosella reported to Hyrie Hana, an ex-partisan and actress connected with Bije 
Vokshi, who was a friend of Enver Hoxha. Novosella says that he got instructions from 
Hyrie Hana not to clamor for "Republic of Kosovo" or "Unification with Albania" during 
these demonstrations. Instead, the organizers were advised to chant for "Self-
 
104 Here, "illegal groups" is understood to mean national Albanian movements in Kosovo formed after the Second 
World War. Until 1966, the political programs of illegal groups were mainly rightist and directly called for the 
unification of Kosovo with Albania. However, once the relationship between the Republic of Albania and the 
SFRY improved, reflecting the new political circumstances in the SFRY, the political programs of illegal 
organizations became increasingly leftist. Support for Marxism, Leninism and Enverism can be seen in almost 
every name and political program of these organizations, such as Organizata Marksiste-Leniniste e Kosovës 
(OMLK) (Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosova), Partia Marksiste Leniniste Shqiptare e Kosovës (PMLSK) 
(Albanian Marxist Leninist Party of Kosova), Lidhja Nacional Çlirimtare e Kosovës (LNÇK) (Kosova" s National 
Liberation League), etc. They remained operational until the establishment of political pluralism in SFRY (1990).  
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determination." This came as a surprise to the students, who did not expect that the Republic 
of Albania would not support slogans calling for a "Republic." However, given that they 
were affiliated with the illegal groups, which were influenced by the Republic of Albania, 
at the beginning Osman Dumoshi also suggested starting the demonstrations without 
placards to see whether the students or protestors would chant for the "Republic." Later, 
according to Novosella, it was the students and the citizens who clamored for a "Republic," 
but not necessarily the organizers (Novosella: October 2015).  
The student organizers declared that Enver Hoxha was not pro "Republic" in 1968, 
and archival documents also support that assertion. In correspondence with their legation in 
Belgrade, the Republic of Albania instructed them as following : "we do not distinguish the 
solution to the Kosovo problem from the solution to the general problem of Yugoslavia" 
(AMFA 360/1968). According to Albania's communist regime, only the replacement of the 
Titoist clique with a Marxist-Leninist leadership could solve the national question in 
Yugoslavia and assure the right to self-determination for the Albanian population in SFRY. 
This case illustrates Enver Hoxha's political game. On the one hand, he supported and kept 
in contact with the representatives of illegal groups whose main mission – according to their 
political programs – was  "unification with Albania" and "Republic" status for Kosovo. On 
the other hand, he gave the following instructions to their representatives in Belgrade "…as 
far as the question of whether we are for a republic or an autonomous province, you have 
our guidelines. We do not agree on the creation of a republic, because it would not solve 
the problem." The final point of this document, sent by Albania's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to their legate in Belgrade, was the following: "when people ask you about this 
(Republic) do not tell them our position, just mention that Kosovo needs to gain as much as 
possible" (AMFA 360/1968). This situation requires us to ask: For whom did the "illegal 
groups" work? They claimed to be working for a "national cause," and they mythicized the 
figure of Enver Hoxha and the Republic of Albania, and, according to their programs, their 
mission was "Kosovo's unification with Albania" and later the "Republic of Kosovo." Yet 
the Republic of Albania did not want to unite with Albanian-inhabited territories in SFRY, 
nor did they support a "Republic of Kosovo."  
Taking into consideration these complexities, as well as the Yugoslav political 
regime and the position of Albanians in this federation, the circumstances under which these 
demonstrations were organized are unimaginable from today's perspective. The students 
79 
 
held their preparatory meetings in their houses. Justifications such as gathering for coffee, 
tea, or listening to the music had to be made constantly so that they did not appear suspicious 
to the regime and their own families. This lasted for a while, until the initial plan as well as 
the speeches were drafted and finalized. Then, after these preparations, for about three 
weeks the organizers started to mobilize the students to join demonstrations. Given that they 
were being organized "secretly," one of the methods was to meet with people and say, "I 
heard that some demonstrations will be organized, they will take place on this day, and in 
this location at this hour…" “We were nine (9) organizers,” declared Novosella, “and each 
of us had to do the same.” After a few days, people in the faculties and streets also started 
to circulate the same words, adding that "…I heard that the Republic of Kosovo will be 
demanded…" This process shows that the 1968 protests in Prishtina had a classical 
development which included idea, organization, preparations, speeches, etc. 
Opinions voiced by direct participants in the demonstrations reveal interesting 
details. Mejreme Shema was arrested on June 1964 for being an activist in one of the illegal 
groups. She says that "there were no gender barriers in our group - aside from the fact that 
the number of females was smaller." Shema stressed that illusions about the Republic of 
Albania and amazement at Albania's music, theatre, and national songs were the main 
reasons that prompted her to join Adem Demaçi’s group. Even though she was not one of 
the organizers of the protests of 1968, Shema participated and was wounded and also 
imprisoned in the aftermath of the 1968 protests. People believed that the 1968 
demonstrations in Kosovo were supported by members of the illegal groups, but according 
to her the real organizers were the Kosovo Albanian communist elites, alluding specifically 
to the university professors and a group of people who were members of the commission 
for changes to the constitution of Kosovo, Gazmend Zajmi, Fehmi Agani, and Rrezak Shala.  
These "real organizers," however, should have had the green light from the Kosovo 
Albanian political elites for such actions. The Kosovo political and intellectual elites could 
have organized these demonstrations, mainly to test the pulse and reactions of other 
republics in the SFRY regarding Albanian demands for "the Republic." Findings show clear 
interactions between political representatives of both the Republic of Albania and the 
province of Kosovo, with the institutions of higher education in Prishtina and with the 
students. However, it is also obvious that each of the political groups followed rather 
separate political agendas. 
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The assumptions that the demonstrations of 1968 suited the Kosovo Albanian 
political elites at that time are also supported by others who observed these demonstrations. 
Ilmi Hetemi, for example, chief of police in Ferizaj/Uroševac (1962-1981), confirmed that 
politicians were aware of and tacitly allowed the organization of the 1968 student 
demonstrations, explaining that the demonstrations might have been provoked by the 
regime itself. Hetemi claims that: 
We were ordered to treat arrested organizers politely. Considering the 
political context of that period, such student reactions suited the 
Albanian political elites. We, however, all wanted what the students 
chanted for: "Kosovo Republic," "We want a University," etc. Of 
course, we could not have joined the demonstrators, but we were with 
them in spirit (Hetemi: April 2017). 
Neither the archival documents nor the interviewees indicate any reason for 
assuming the SRS's involvement in the incitement of the Kosovo student demonstrations in 
1968. Indeed, highlighting Kosovo's "unsolved problems" at that time did not suit SRS at 
all. In his writings archived in Prishtina, Professor Skënder Rizaj even emphasized that Tito 
favored Albanians during the late 1960s in order "to punish pan-Slavism." According to 
Rizaj, Tito personally allowed Fadil Hoxha to organize the demonstrations of 1968 "through 
some Albanian professors, such as Fehmi Agani, Gazmend Zajmi, Ali Hadri, and other 
senior state officials, such as Rrezak Shala" (AK SR/1945-1999). It must be noted that prior 
to these demonstrations Ali Hadri had stressed to his Party colleagues that "by using the 
rights for self-determination, Kosovo can become a creative element for a ‘new 
Yugoslavia.'" Supporting the idea of self-determination, Zajmi mentioned as well that "this 
right belongs to the ‘narodnost' as well, the same as it belongs to nations." Agani suggested 
that these demands should be presented to the federation as "the requests of the majority of 
the population in Kosovo," whereas Rrezak Shala insisted that "the Republic of Kosovo is 
the imperative of time and we will not back down from it" (Mišović, 1987).  
Based on his discussions with political and academic personalities, Buxhovi also 
confirmed that Tito personally "allowed these demonstrations as a test," willing to see the 
reactions of Serbia. However, given that Serbian feedback was vehemently opposed to 
republic status for Kosovo, Tito then went for another compromise: "it will not be called a 
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republic – but, it will a part of the Federation." Soon thereafter the constitution was amended 
(Buxhovi: Jan 2016). Azem Vllasi also had a discussion with Tito in his capacity as SFRY's 
President for Youth in 1978. This meeting took place in Brione, when, while having a coffee 
under a nice shade tree, Tito asked him: "do you often go down there…I know there were 
problems, but since 1974 you have had decision making powers." Indeed, there were 
improvements, but Vllasi did not hesitate to mention that it would have been much better 
to have the name "Republic" as well. Here Tito confirmed that this issue had already been 
discussed with Mahmut Bakalli and Fadil Hoxha, and it was agreed that Kosovo would have 
everything that the Republics have, but when it came to the name, "do not touch it right 
now." Vllasi ended this story, warning that "when Tito said about something ‘do not touch 
it,' it was never a good idea to talk about it again" (Vllasi: October 2015).  
Apart from the existence of complex relations between Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, and 
the Yugoslav Federation during the end of the sixties, it is obvious that both "Enverists" and 
"Titoists" demanded that the Albanians’ rights be advanced and that they be recompensed 
for the SFRY's previous mistakes vis-à-vis Albanians. Thus, this period marks a 
harmonization of objectives with the Albanian community living in the Yugoslav 
federation. A political, intellectual and social consensus had been achieved for proceeding 
with demands for RK.  
3.2.3. During the demonstrations 
Before the demonstrations of 1968, people had already started talking about them in 
Prishtina. Activists such as Shema were surprised, wondering how the demonstrations could 
be considered illegal when at the same time everyone knew about them. Looking at the 
timing as well as at the locations where the demonstrations took place (market days, among 
youth and in the schools, etc.), one can argue that these uprisings were orchestrated by the 
Kosovo Albanian political/intellectual elites, rather than only by "amateur" students. 
Additionally, the content of the slogans used at these locations shows that the events were 
well-organized, had the same intentions, and were linked to one another (AK 
LoCPC/1968/7).  
The first protests took place on October 16, 1968, in Prizren, the second largest city 
of Kosovo, and were organized by Neriman Braha. Reports collected from the archive of 
Prishtina, which were sent from Kosovo to the SRS, highlighted that "these events were 
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organized by the ‘nepriatel,’ meaning ‘enemy' (referring to the Republic of 
Albania)…protestors chanted ‘we want a republic, we want a constitution.'" Neriman Braha 
was known to the police, because his brother lived in Albania and worked for "Albanian 
State Security" (AK LoCPC/1968/7). To measure society's pulse and see how a small city 
would react, the second demonstrations were organized in Suhareka and followed in 
Gjilan/Gnjilane and Podujeva/Podujevo. On November 17, 1968, demonstrations were held 
in the morning in Ferizaj/Uroševac and in the afternoon in Prishtina. The participants, 
according to documents found in the Archives of Serbia, were mainly high school students 
and teachers of Albanian nationality (AS Đ-2/51/1968).  
Sahit Berisha, who was a contact point for one school in Prishtina, confirmed 
receiving instructions from Osman Dumoshi for the mobilization of high school students. 
Discussions were held at school, and professors saw to the laying of groundwork. No 
specific plans or agendas were prepared; the idea was simple: Students were to meet in front 
of the faculty at 15:55 and announce their slogans. Skender Kastrati and Osman Dumoshi 
were supposed to hold their speeches, while others were left on their own (S. Berisha: March 
2017). Dumoshi's speech, which was read in the name of the Organizing Committee, 
demanded the following: realization of national rights, assurances that Albanians would 
enjoy the same equal rights as the other nations in the SFRY, improvement in employment 
– particularly in leadership positions, and improvement of students’ living conditions 
(Novosella: October 2015). When analyzing the archival sources, it is obvious that the 
demands of the students corresponded with those that the Kosovo communist elites used 
during different meetings organized on a local as well as on a federal level. However, as 
will be seen below, after Dumoshi's speech, the protestors burst out with other slogans, 
including one calling for "Kosovo Republic." When the students first went out into the 
streets, they started chanting "bashkohuni me ne" (unite with us), calling out to passersby 
who hadn’t joined them.  
The creation of an Albanian language university in Prishtina, the establishment of 
Albanian as the official language of government in Kosovo, self-determination for Kosovo 
and the Albanian areas of Macedonia and Montenegro, and granting Kosovo the status of a 
republic within SFRY with its own constitution were the main demands in these 
demonstrations. There were also people shouting other slogans as well, such as "free our 
friends from prisons" and "long live Enver Hoxha." While the names of other politicians 
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were mentioned by the protestors, these did not dominate the movements. Berisha 
remembers that soon thereafter people with ‘long coats – from which we knew that they 
were from the state security services' – entered the lines of the demonstrations and led the 
demonstration according to their agendas (S. Berisha: March 2017).  
While Berisha claims that "afterward the demonstrations were not in the hands of 
the ‘organizers' anymore," I would rather argue that – perhaps – that is exactly when they 
fell directly into the hands of the real organizers. The crowd headed toward the building of 
the Provincial Council, placing Albanian flags in the building's garden and threatening the 
security forces that "today, we"ll put them here – tomorrow on the building's roof." 
Participants interviewed about these demonstrations revealed that the police did use 
violence when the demonstrators responded by destroying street signs which were in the 
Serbian language. After these "actions," people with long coats managed to convince the 
crowd to go to the TV station. News spread that the police had arrested some professors and 
organizers.  
At around 7 p.m. some of the professors asked the students to go home and leave the 
streets, but the masses of mainly high school and university students continued to march 
and chant "Kosovo Republic," "Self-determination," "We want a constitution,” “Long live 
Enver Hoxha,” “Long live Tito,” “We want a university." During the demonstrations, 
windows were broken, cars in the streets were damaged, and public property was 
demolished. In an archival document entitled "Information on the demonstrations in Kosovo 
and Metohija," there was also a report stating that the demonstrators tried to enter the 
municipality, the provincial committee, and some other public buildings, but they were not 
allowed to do so by state security troops (AS Đ-2/51/1968).  
While the demonstrators were blocked by a police cordon, someone from the 
technical school (Murat Mehmeti) left the line and turned to face the demonstrators, waving 
with his hand and calling to the protestors "come forward, come forward." At this moment 
Mejreme Shema, one of the wounded demonstrators, explained that Murat Mehmeti had 
been shot in the chest from the buildings, with the police cordon behind him. No one knows 
whether he was killed by the police or by Serbian inhabitants living in the apartments of 
that building. This participant was killed, while Mejreme Shema, Sulejman Kastrati and 
three or four other demonstrators were also wounded. The demonstrators started to run, 
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trying to escape. In the midst of this chaos, Murat Mehmeti was put in a car and taken to a 
hospital, but he could not be saved and did not survive his wound. 
A number of the police officers were injured, too, although the official state 
institutions admitted that the number of injured protestors was much higher. Shootings were 
reported from both sides, but only one person was killed (AS Đ-2/51/1968). These 
demonstrations affected the other SFRY areas inhabited by Albanians. Less than a month 
later, on the 22nd and 23rd of December, Albanian youth rebelled in Tetovo, Macedonia. 
Macedonian authorities labelled these demonstrations as "nationalist." Hundreds of people 
demonstrated, including workers, doctors, teachers, and other young Albanian intellectuals.  
These demonstrations were precipitated by the placing of an Albanian flag on the shop of 
an Albanian owner, which was violently removed by a Macedonian man. During the 
demonstrations, the main slogans were "Tito-partija (Tito-party)" and "Tito-Fadil Hoxha." 
There were also speeches such as "If there are two Germanies and two Koreas, why can't 
there be two Albanian states" (AJ, 837/II-4-b-34). 
3.2.4. After the demonstrations in Kosovo 
The Central Committee of the Union of Communists of Serbia accused Kosovo's 
intelligence services and, especially, Albanian communist elites, of allowing these "forces" 
to organize protests. The SRS communist elite’s take on the protests was: Now, when the 
Albanian "narodnost" is marking new achievements, the reactionary forces are even wilder 
and becoming ever more chauvinist (AJ, 837/II-4-b-35). Kosovo authorities assured the 
federal authorities that the SFRY's laws would be respected and that necessary measures 
would be taken against the "betrayers of the nation" and the initiators of inter-ethnic hatred 
that tended to destabilize the SFRY (ibid). The highest ranks of the communist elites in 
Kosovo raised their voices against the protests. The daily newspaper "Rilindja" was also 
criticized for offering its congratulations to the Kosovars on the 28th of November (the 
anniversary of the Republic of Albania's gaining independence). The student protests were 
categorized as "not spontaneous, but organized by the enemy." Protestors were reported to 
have been armed, even though state officials reported that the demonstrations mainly 
involved high school students. The committee decided to take measures against all who had 
organized and participated in the movements (AK LoCPC/1968/7). After the protests, 
political leaders calmed the situation by taking measures against those labeled as "the 
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organizers" and a few participants, while at the same time assuring citizens that "good things 
were in the making." In the period following the demonstrations, not more than two or at 
most three people were allowed to walk together in the streets. It is worth noting that on 
November 28, 1968 both Fehmi Agani and Rrezak Shala escaped to Turkey, returning only 
when the situation had returned to normal. Certain voices – particularly those of Serbs – 
within the LCY continued to blame the Albanian communist leadership for allowing, or 
even inciting, the organization of these protests in Kosovo. Albanian communists rejected 
these "insults" in a letter sent to Tito saying that "you might have been misinformed… but 
there have been also some demands that we cannot consider chauvinist, such as "Long Live 
Tito," "Long Live Fadil," " We Want a University" (AJ 837/II-4-b-35). 
In a closed meeting with the LCY political structures, Veli Deva criticized his 
Serbian communist colleagues, saying that Serbian propaganda was "very high, while 
Kosovo leadership is very surprised that there are no reactions from the central level. Fadil 
Hoxha was attacked and none of you reacted." Hearing the voices of "brotherhood and 
support" from Serbs and Montenegrins would have been very important for "us," accused 
Deva (AS Đ-2/71/1968).  
Two days after the demonstrations, Tito held a press conference with local and 
international journalists. From his statement published in Rilindja on December 2, one can 
observe Tito's tendency to minimize the effects of these events. In addition, he also managed 
to "attack" both of his targets, SRS and Republic of Albania. Of course, Tito did not "attack" 
them openly, but he said: "I think that these events are being dramatized enormously – they 
were not like some (alluding to Serbs) tend to think." He also claimed: "the enemy (alluding 
to the Republic of Albania) is still present there and they had a finger in these events." 
Meanwhile, in a manner similar to the case of the demonstrations in Belgrade, he somehow 
"justified" the students with the words "some shelves and windows were broken as happens 
every day in the West" (AK Rilindja/1968). Enver Hoxha sent his response to the events 
immediately, claiming: "Albania had no part in these demonstrations…the Titoists know 
this, and still, they made it up." Even with regard to the slogans that concerned him, Enver 
Hoxha claimed that they came from "SFRY agent provocateurs that were embedded in the 
protests" (CAA 10/1968/238).  
Archival documents also show that Serbs and Albanian members of the LoC argued 
about suspicions that even the children of political leaders participated in the 
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demonstrations and how the rise of Serbian nationalism had provoked or forced the 
Albanian student movement. Archival materials show that during this period each group 
began spreading different propaganda to justify their actions. Serbian and Albanian political 
leaders did not hesitate to report these cases even during the highest level meetings of the 
LCY. For example, in a meeting of the Presidency of the LoC, Xhavit Nimani105 reported 
how police had caught a Serbian student in the middle of the night shouting "Long live 
Enver Hoxha," then "Long live Fadil and Veli Deva." The Serbian elites blamed the 
Albanian provincial leadership for organizing the demonstrations. After the demonstrations, 
accusations such as "someone is playing dangerous political games, but they won’t suit 
anyone" were also heard among Albanian and Serbian communists. During December 
1968, Serbian newspapers were full of articles and headlines such as "the organizers of the 
demonstrations are provocateurs that tried to stab us in the back," "direct threat to 
brotherhood and unity," "chauvinist attacks in Tetovo" (Borba; December 1968), "the 
enemy has shown his face," "investigations of all those that organized protests" (Politika; 
December 1968), "nationalism is anti-communism" or "illusions about Albania" (Večernje 
Novosti; December 1968). These propagandistic media actions provoked a nationalistic 
response, particularly among those Serbs and Montenegrins living in Kosovo. As a result, 
in January 1969 the information service of Serbia started receiving anonymous letters from 
Serbian people living in villages in Kosovo (such as the one from the village of Bustranja). 
Kosovo Serbs were asking for help from their "Serbian brothers...we are not 
safe…Albanians are burning our houses…" (AJ, 837/II-4-b-35). However, no burned 
houses were reported by any other source during this period. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions 
grew after 1968, and Kosovo Serbs reported feeling insecure. The Kosovo political elites 
took this into account and tried to control the situation by preventing its escalation, at least 
for a while.  
It was obvious that the demonstrations of that time were at least allowed to be 
organized by the political elites of Kosovo. The political situation of that specific time 
needed these movements to justify or push forward the Kosovo Albanians’ demands for a 
"Republic," as something that people were asking for. However, when the demands for 
"Republic" status were presented to Tito by a delegation of the LoC of Kosovo, he rejected 
 
105 Xhavit Nimani was a chairman of the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosova. 
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them by claiming that "Republic is not the only factor which solves problems" (AK Rilindja 
04 November 1968).  
Even if the students were just actors, they cannot be considered as manipulated 
puppets, given that ultimately the situation can be described as win-win, both for the 
students who were successful in having their demands heard and for the political elites, who 
got the attention of Tito as well as a new constitution. These protests in the context of 
Kosovo created a sense of unity among students, intellectuals, and political elites. As a 
result, the unresolved problems of Kosovo Albanians were brought up and, what was most 
important, these demands (a university, language, cultural freedom, etc) were accepted as 
legitimate by the LCY. The 1968 student demonstrations were the first contributions of 
institutions of higher learning to the political independence of Albanians in Kosovo. This 
was the first time the students‘ slogan cum demand "Duam universitet (We Want a 
University)" appeared (AJ 837/II-4-b-35).  
At the ninth congress of the Party in 1969, Tito included two requests for national 
equality: the first was the use of national symbols and the second was the University of 
Prishtina. The biggest historical achievement of these protests was the creation of the UP in 
1970 (Buxhovi: Jan 2016). These demonstrations also led to the 1968 and 1971 amendments 
to the SFRY Constitution allowing autonomous provinces more local control and input. In 
practice, this meant that Kosovo's leadership functioned without almost any interference 
from the SRS or the SFRY federal government (Vickers 1998: 169-170). The Albanian 
language became official, and this was an enormous advantage for Kosovo Albanians. The 
governmental administration of the province primarily functioned in the Albanian language. 
This left Serbs and other Slavic-speaking populations in Kosovo uninformed about 
important issues going on in the province. Compared to the past, Albanian literature and 
culture flourished as never before in Kosovo, paving the way for deeper Albanian cultural 
growth. 
3.3. Internal political challenges for the establishment of the UP 
Albanians’ profound marginalization and isolation made the value of education very 
significant. Thus, when someone from the educational sector would stand up for something, 
society's support was unconditional. When Albanians mobilized for the establishment of a 
university-level institution in Kosovo, Serbian political and academic elites mainly opposed 
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it, citing a lack of qualified personnel to staff such an institution. Indeed, education played 
a crucial role in the fragmentation of large socialist multinational federations such as 
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. Serbian elites knew that allowing minorities to formalize 
education in their native languages would enable them to reject the dominance of groups 
that spoke Serbo-Croatian (Dimova 2013: 74). The 1968 demonstrations, which were 
intended to challenge Serbia's dominance in the province, showed the role that higher 
education in a native language could play in fostering movements for equal rights in a 
multiethnic federation such as the SFRY. In a documentary about the establishment of the 
UP made by Kohavision (KTV), the first generation of professors and students explained 
the challenges Albanian political leaders, professors, and students faced in establishing and 
maintaining institutions of higher learning. They were greatly sabotaged at all levels. 
Professors from the University of Niš were invited to teach some courses for which the UP 
lacked academic staff, but there were instances when they did not come. Professor Pajazit 
Nushi (1933-2015), a member of the Kosovo Academy of Sciences, known for his 
contribution to the social and scientific development of Kosovo, said meetings regarding 
the establishment of each department of the future UP were followed by extremely heated 
debates: 
This one time we were debating the establishment of the Faculty of 
Medicine, and because of all the undue tensions created by the Serbian 
participants, who opposed the establishment of additional faculties in 
Prishtina, Fadil Hoxha left the meeting, urging me "Get up, Pajazit, 
we have nothing to do here!" 
The amendments to the SFRY Constitution (1963) were used by Albanian 
communists and the Provincial Assembly of Kosovo as the basis for establishing the Faculty 
of Medicine. 106  Serbian was the language of instruction regardless of the national 
background of the lecturers and students. Sveta Canović, Dean of the UP Philosophical 
Faculty in the 1960s, strictly opposed the use of the Albanian language at the UP as a whole. 
However, due to the efforts of Albanian members of the Communist Party, in 1967 a 
decision was taken to organize classes in Albanian. The date of October 17, 1967 was 
 
106 The Faculty of Medicine opened during academic year 1969/1970. The first dean of the Faculty of Medicine 
was Osman Imami, who was followed by Talat Pallaska and Izjedin Osani (KTV: April 2017). 
89 
 
considered a historical one for the Economic and Law Faculties: the Academic Council 
recruited 32 teaching assistants whose job description read "teaching in the Albanian 
language" (KTV: April 2017).107  
Students welcomed this move, hoping it would enable them to achieve better 
academic results, as they would be finally able to take exams in their native language. Once 
language barriers were removed, students started filing complaints about discrimination, 
because available scholarships were mainly distributed to the "deca komunizma" (children 
of communism), an expression used to refer to children of those serving in public functions 
(AJ 145-86-337). Amidst the ongoing challenges, on November 18, 1969, Albanian 
intelligentsia managed to deliver a decision to establish the UP. Once established, existing 
departments were merged into the new university, enacted into the Law on the 
Establishment of the UP adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist Autonomous Province 
of Kosovo (Official Gazette 1969 and AK Rilindja November 19, 1969). On February 13, 
1970 — considered as the day of the establishment of the UP (AK Rilindja, February 16, 
1970) — Professor Dervish Rozhaja opened the founding conference of the UP. However, 
tensions over the UP continued. Belgrade proposed Stanoje Aksić as the UP rector, but 
Albanians strongly rejected him. Albanian communist leaders insisted on an Albanian 
rector, especially because the UP was the only university in the SFRY which offered 
education in Albanian. This was accepted by acclamation, and Dervish Rozhaja became the 
first rector of the UP (KTV: April 2017). Nowadays, most people interviewed for purposes 
of the present study give credit for the establishment of the UP to the Albanian communist 
elites. However, archival documents show that right from the onset the UP was meant for 
the political emancipation of the masses to implement political agendas, but not necessarily 
for the type of "political emancipation" conceived by Karl Marx. Marx divided 
emancipation into two forms: political and human. According to Marx, one can become 
politically emancipated once one is free in relation to the state. In other words, once the 
laws of the state treat people equally, political emancipation of the masses can be achieved. 
However, Marx considered human emancipation to be a better solution. Even though this 
concept was never defined by Marx, the way it is contrasted with political emancipation 
 
107 Fatmir Lama, Rrëfime për Kosovën – Universiteti i Prishtinës (Stories about Kosovo – The University of 
Prishtina), Documentary, directed by Koha Vision (April 2017; Prishtinë: Koha Vision). Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmIw1p-NczE [Last accessed on 15/02/2019]. 
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leads social scientists to suggest that human emancipation means the "actual emancipation 
of humans, not the state, from oppression" (Marx 1843).  
In the case of Kosovo, higher education as such was intended as an instrument that 
would lead toward the education of as many Albanians as possible, but mainly to strengthen 
the "brotherhood and unity" concept advocated within the SFRY. The 1968 student 
demonstrations, calling for the "equal treatment" of Kosovo mirroring all other SFRY 
republics, in a way proved that there was a potential for reaching the "foreseen 
emancipation" of Albanian society in the SFRY by (mis)using higher and university level 
education. Bexhet Shala, head of Kosovo's Council for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Freedoms, claims that it was the politicians who came out with the demand for the 
establishment of the UP. In the end, the SFRY, with the SRS's blessing, allowed the 
establishment of the UP, not because it wanted Albanians to progress, but because it served 
to prevent future political demands for republic status or unification with Albania. The 
SFRY leadership planned on governing Kosovo by controlling the UP and, by extension, 
controlling the wider public (Shala: January 2016). 
3.4. Conclusions  
The findings in this chapter corroborate the fact that most transformations throughout 
history, particularly those that occurred during the 20th century, and especially in the 
Western world, happened due to decades of work and effort invested by different activists 
and thinkers who organized and participated in social movements. Several conclusions can 
be drawn from analysis of the development of collective actions with the emergence of 
global student movements and those in SFRY and Kosovo in the 1960s. The first part of 
this chapter shows the critical importance of social movements for societies that have 
undergone rapid political, economic, or cultural transformations, particularly during the 
second part of the 20th century. The section which presents the wave of youth mobilization 
in the SFRY demonstrates how tensions over the political future of the existing regime 
spilled over into the streets. Also, this wave proved that the new generation which emerged 
from the debris of communist rule aspired to live in a society free from the mechanisms of 
social control employed under the same rule. Students or civic activists delivered their 
message, legitimized their action, and achieved social and national benefits through 
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mobilizing supporters, occupying the streets, spray painting political slogans, and creating 
different ideological and cultural tools (public speeches, slogans, etc.).  
The social movements of the sixties were influenced by one another, but the 
demands of the protestors varied between social change, justice, and nationalism, depending 
on the geographical, political, historical and social contexts in which they took place. 
However, by comparing and contrasting the main goals and approaches of specific social 
movements in the West, SFRY, and Kosovo, this chapter showed the inter-linkages of these 
movements as well as the differences in their nature. In addition, through exploring the 
influence of these movements at the global, regional and local levels, this chapter 
highlighted what motivated the organizers and individuals who participated in these social 
movements as well as the approaches and strategies these actors employed to develop the 
movements, reach their goals, and how the global wave of revolt passed through the SFRY. 
Unlike the United States and Western Europe, where youth aspired to move away from 
capitalism, their counterparts in the SFRY lived in a different social order. While 
Westerners mobilized for countercultural reasons, their counterparts in the SFRY were 
demanding "better implementation of communism" at all levels of the state. In contrast, 
students in Prishtina expressed their political aspirations for "Republic" status for Kosovo. 
Yet, in addition to banners calling for a "Republic" and "Self-Determination," the slogan 
"We Want a University" was the main one revealing that student protests even within the 
SFRY did not have the same character. This chapter documents that even though the 
students embraced and publicly demanded it, the idea of a "Republic of Kosovo" came from 
the political and academic elites. Kosovo Albanian elites channeled this idea for a Republic 
of Kosovo into society at the federal level as well. When this was rejected, apparently 
without any significant consequences for the elites that requested it, this vision of a 
"Republic of Kosovo" was passed on to the students. However, the research I conducted 
reveals that standing behind the student demonstrations in Kosovo were the "real" 
organizers, who were the Albanian communist elite and university professors. Despite the 
complex relations between Kosovo and Albania or between the "progressivists" and "illegal 
groups" during the end of the sixties, even without specific coordination, both Kosovo 
"Enverists" and "Titoists" demanded the advancement of the rights of Albanians and 
recompense for the SFRY's previous mistakes vis-à-vis Albanians.  
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The Republic of Albania, even though it interacted with the illegal groups, members 
of which were also the students or organizers of the demonstrations, still prioritized its 
political interests and held the view that the problem of Albanians in the SFRY was solvable 
only by removing Tito's clique from power. The interaction between the state political 
representatives of Kosovo and professors and students managed to unify the interests and 
claims of the Albanian communities living in the Yugoslav federation. As a result, a 
political, intellectual and social consensus was achieved for proceeding with the demands 
for RK. Even though the founding of the UP – one of the students’ main demands – was 
realized after the demonstrations, both political and academic Kosovo Albanian elites 
backed down from what was initially a joint request for a RK. These demonstrations also 
showed that Albanians in the SFRY did not insist on unification with the Republic of 
Albania, although they aspired to Republic status for Kosovo. Indeed, the communist elites 
of Kosovo did not support unification with Albania, or at least I did not manage to discover 
any such support in my research. However, the option of unification with Albania remained 
a widely held position among a majority of Albanians in the SFRY, given that such ideas – 
mainly promoted by illegal groups – had spread into the society.  
Political developments at the regional and local levels influenced students as well as 
the institutions of higher learning in Kosovo, meaning professors and official policies. 
Therefore, it was not academic values but the intention of fostering political ideologies that 
seems to have been the main interest of multiple parties involved in the struggle for the 
"establishment and development" of higher education and UP. The SFRY leadership 
proclaimed the political emancipation of Albanians in Kosovo to reinforce the "brotherhood 
and unity" platform or "Titoism," whereas the Republic of Albania supported national 
"emancipation" amongst Albanians in the SFRY, while promoting nationalist ideas about a 
"perfect" Albania and "Enverism." While political interference in the system of education 
in the communist and socialist federations/countries was usual, the battle between "Enverist 
national-communism" ideologies and "brotherhood and unity" challenged political borders 
and raised the ambitions of students and, later on, society in general to mobilize and 
strengthen Albanian identity in the SFRY. I have argued in this chapter that the students 
played a crucial role in the political and national mobilization of Albanians in Kosovo and 
the SFRY. However, while they provided energy and some logistics, the political and 
intellectual elites created the general political and judicial climate and played a significant 
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role in the organization of the 1968 protests in Kosovo. The interaction of political and 
academic actors from the SFRY, the Republic of Albania and Kosovo, including students 
and other actors, made the UP a critical venue for imagining and articulating national ideals 
rather than academic values, and, as Anderson maintains, "once imagined, they are 




Chapter 4. The University of Prishtina (UP) – between politics and academia  
4.1. Introduction 
Despite the fact that Albanians as a community in the SFRY, and in Kosovo as a region, 
remained highly discriminated against, between the late-1960s and early 1980s Albanians 
in Kosovo enjoyed numerous rights. Indeed, the Brioni Plenum (July 1966) marked the 
beginning of a substantial improvement in their circumstances. In March 1967, Tito visited 
Kosovo, and in 1969 the term Albanian (Shqiptar in Albanian and Albanac in Serbian) 
officially replaced Šiptar, which by then was regarded as a slur used by a majority of the 
Slavic population to put down Albanians living in the SFRY and ergo very derogatory and 
demeaning.108 Furthermore, the UP was founded as an Albanian language institution (Elsie 
2011: 6).  
Other concessions were also introduced as a result of the 1968 student 
demonstrations, especially in the field of education. The 1968 student demonstrations are 
one of the events and developments that led to the 1974 SFRY Constitution, which assured 
that Kosovo's communist leadership would function without almost any interference from 
the SRS or the SFRY. The Albanian language became a co-official language of the 
province, which was enormously advantageous for Kosovo Albanians. In one of his 
valuable comments about this chapter, Besmir Fidahić109 shared the results of his legal 
review of languages as defined in the 1974 SFRY Constitution: it proclaimed the equality 
of all regardless of language (Article 154), free use of one’s own language and script for all 
(Article 170), the right of nationalities to use their language and script before official organs 
of the state and the right to education in that language (Article 171), and the right of all to 
use their own language in court (Article 214), etc. (Fidahić: March 2016). This naturally led 
to a true renaissance for the non-Slavic population of Kosovo. During the 1970s, 
governmental administration of the province started to function mainly in Albanian, and 
Kosovo Albanians experienced enormous and rapid educational development. By the late 
 
108 Professor Friedman viewed the term Šiptar as a bit more complicated, claiming that it became demeaning as a 
result of Tito’s attempt to differentiate between the Albanians of the SFRY and those in Albania by creating a 
separate identity (Friedman: December 2015).  
109  Besmir Fidahić is a professional translator and interpreter of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and English. His 
doctoral dissertation, “Linguistic Justice: Translation and Interpretation at the International CriminalTribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavi, Maastricht University, 2018,” focuses on legal and linguistic issues during the Yugoslav 
and post-Yugoslav period.  
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1970s, around 95% of children in Kosovo received elementary education (Pipa and 
Repishti, 1984: 133). Following the establishment of the UP, other scholarly institutions 
such as the Institute of History and Institute of Albanian Studies were re-established. The 
Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts was founded in 1975. These milestones also fueled 
Albanian ambitions to promote further their national identity in the SFRY. Simultaneously, 
they triggered wider cultural developments, offering Albanians a sense of pride and 
confidence.  
From a society that had previously had the highest illiteracy rate in SFRY, within a 
relatively short period, Kosovo Albanians established cultural and higher education 
institutions. The SFRY played a supportive role in the establishment and development of 
these academic and cultural institutions. However, all of the academic personnel engaged 
at the UP (and other academic/cultural institutions) were usually screened and appointed by 
the Party. Their job was to implement the "brotherhood and unity" platform and to integrate 
Kosovo into the SFRY framework. As in other territorial units within the SFRY, political 
elites intended to channel their "ideological power" through the system of higher education. 
Hence, as Althusser explains, "state power is disseminated through the ideological state 
apparatuses that rely on school and education" (Althusser, 1971). In the meantime, though 
the political character of the UP was obvious from its founding onward, unsurprisingly and 
behind the scenes, this academic institution became an arena for power struggles among 
different political factions.  
4.2. Influences of the SFRY and the Republic of Albania at the UP 
Relations between the SFRY and the Republic of Albania were tense from 1948 until around 
1968. Blaming "Belgrade's tendencies for supremacy," inter alia, Albania's communist 
leader Enver Hoxha (1944-1985) cut all ties with the Yugoslavs in 1948. As positive 
developments started to take place in Kosovo after the Brioni Plenum (1966), relations 
between Albania and the SFRY also began to improve. On October 4, 1969, while speaking 
in Tropojë, Hoxha mentioned the importance of good neighborly relations. That same year 
Josip Broz Tito did the same while speaking in Ulqin/Ulcinj. These speeches produced 
positive effects: in a meeting between state representatives of both countries, Bujar Hoxha 
and Ilija Vakić highlighted the necessity for cooperation. Vakić also emphasized that "The 
Republic of Albania should not forget that there are around one million Albanians in the 
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SFRY" (CAA 511/1968/30). Other senior-level representatives110 also gave a green light 
for the SFRY to expand bilateral relations with the Republic of Albania (AK Rilindja, May 
27, 1970). In April 1970, Tito personally stated that "these relations mean a lot for stability 
in the Balkans…and further improvement of relations with the Republic of Albania was a 
long-term policy for the SFRY" (AK Rilindja, May 25, 1970). Similarly, the Albanian 
newspaper "Zëri i popullit" wrote in April 1970 that despite ideological differences, the 
Republic of Albania wanted the best for the nations of the SFRY. Readiness to help each 
other if the imperialists threatened "our" freedom was also highlighted (Zëri i Popullit, April 
3, 1970). Thus, relations between the Republic of Albania and the SFRY were based on 
elements of security, regional stability, economy, etc., but were also influenced by the 
presence of the Albanian population in the SFRY (AK PSoER/1979-88/36/3). In 1970, the 
Republic of Albania and the SFRY re-established diplomatic relations. One year later these 
two countries exchanged ambassadors in Tirana and Belgrade (AK Rilindja, February 6, 
1971). Soon after these developments, in July 1970, a delegation from the University of 
Tirana (hereinafter UT) visited Prishtina at the invitation of the UP. Three months later the 
UP leadership, professors Idriz Ajeti, Božidar Jovanovic, ́ and others visited Tirana (AJ 
319/1/1). Subsequently, on October 27, 1970, the UP and UT rectors, Agim Mero and 
Dervish Rozhaja, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (AMFA 661/1971). 
However, this move was met with skepticism by the Serbs, who argued that the UT did not 
have the qualified academic staff to help the UP, and the Republic of Albania would not 
allow so many teaching staff to visit Kosovo (AMFA 639/1971). Other SFRY republics 
(Macedonia and Montenegro) verbally expressed their readiness to cooperate with the 
Republic of Albania in the field of archives, libraries, academic staff exchange and 
collaboration between the national institutes of history (AJ 319/50/66). 
4.2.1. Implementation of the agreement between the UP and the UT 
The management of both universities evinced high expectations for the implementation of 
the 1970 MoU. They exchanged academic staff, texts, manuals, publications and study 
visits for students (AMFA 511/1976). Over 50 professors from UT were immediately 
 
110 During one of his visits to Kosovo, Miko Tripalo, a member of the Executive Bureau at the Presidency of 
Communist League of Yugoslavia, said: "despite ideological differences, there is a willingness among the SFRY 
leadership to expand bilateral relations with Albania…” 
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brought to Prishtina, while teachers and professors from UP were sent to Tirana for 
specialization and qualification in certain subjects that were to be taught in Prishtina. Other 
institutions also began cooperating, the Academies of Sciences from Kosovo and Albania 
exchanged literature, funds, and other materials from their archives and libraries, and also 
offered thematic lectures, especially in the fields of linguistics and human sciences (AK 
PSoER/1972-84/1-97/4).  
Through Prishtina's Academy of Sciences, Albania's Academy of Sciences also 
helped educational and cultural institutions in other parts of the SFRY (CAA 
490/1978/582). Kosovo's cooperation with the Republic of Albania was also initiated in 
other cultural and educational fields, including music, theater (CAA 511/1971/182), and 
cinematography (AK PSoER/1979-88/36/3). One cultural activity that brought many 
visitors and was a direct product of this cooperation was "Java e Filmit Shqiptar" (Week of 
Albanian Film), which took place in Prishtina (CAA 511/1971/182). Associations of writers 
(CAA 490/1976/411) and associations of figurative and applicative arts (CAA 
511/1976/241) of both countries also cooperated. One of the most important events during 
this period was a congress for the unification of the Albanian language held in Tirana in 
November 1972. This event resulted in the expansion of patriotic feelings among Albanians 
in the SFRY 111  (CAA 511/1972/48). Additionally, there were many cultural activities 
outside the framework of the provincial administration. All of these events and activities 
undoubtedly contributed to the "national emancipation" of students in Prishtina and 
throughout Kosovo. 
The Republic of Albania had two main objectives for engaging in cooperation with 
Kosovo academic and cultural institutions: First, to help prepare Albanian cadres and 
specialists in Kosovo and the SFRY; and second, to contribute towards the "empowerment 
of patriotic feelings, the deepening of love for Albania, and the preservation of Albanian 
traditions, pride and nationhood" (CAA 511/1973/203). While it is clear that cooperation 
between these two universities did not have purely academic objectives, the "normalization" 
of relations between Belgrade and Tirana in 1970 allowed Kosovo Albanians to reconnect 
with their "homeland" and made the UP a channel through which political and national 
messages from the Republic of Albania were disseminated to Kosovo and the SFRY. As 
 
111 This conference was also the result of the resolutions taken by Albanian intellectuals in the SFRY in 1968. See 
now Elliott (2017) for a detailed discussion of the significance of these decisions. 
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Clark notes, "teachers and books from Albania" were essential in the expansion of Kosovo's 
political emancipation (Clark 2000: 58). Indeed, the UP was transformed into a tool for the 
national emancipation of Albanians throughout the SFRY. Professors from the UT came to 
the UP, the academic home of SFRY Albanians (Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Presheva/Preshevo, Bujanoc/Bujanovac, and Medvegjë/Medveđa), which in a way 
reflected a sort of "unification." Ideas generated in this academic laboratory were distributed 
to other parts of the SFRY. It was expected that generations completing their studies at the 
UP would return to their respective places to continue to disseminate ideas learned at the 
UP.  
With the improvement of relations between the Republic of Albania and the SFRY, 
Albanians in Kosovo were empowered politically (Malcolm 2001: 339). Indeed, they 
played a key role in the intensification of these relations for a decade. The empowerment of 
Albanians and tangible results in the field of education made the Serbs from Kosovo and 
Serbia uncomfortable. Professor Victor Friedman, whose multidisciplinary research has 
involved fieldwork in the Balkans for over 40 years, in his first visit to Kosovo in 1972 
noticed many tensions between Albanians and Serbs. He also noted that he did not observe 
such tensions between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia. When he returned to 
Kosovo in 1974, tensions were even higher. Professor Friedman explained how he saw 
some Albanian students standing around in the hall of a UP building while he was looking 
for Prishtina's Academy of Sciences. He approached them, and "because my Albanian was 
very poor at that time, I spoke to them in Macedonian. They just looked at me and ignored 
me… Then I told them in Albanian, "No, no, I'm American. Of course, everything was fine 
then" (Friedman: December 2015). During the 1970s, Serbian professors and politicians in 
Kosovo observed these developments and warned professors from Tirana, such as historian 
Kristaç Prifti, to be careful especially when lecturing on sensitive topics about the region's 
past. Professors from Tirana were advised by their republic to be careful around the Serbs, 
"who are only looking for a reason to destroy cooperation between the two Albanian 
universities" (CAA 511/1972/237).  
The political character of the UP was conspicuous in every phase of its development. 
From the beginning, both sides were aware that cooperation between the UP and the UT 
might be viewed as a political threat. SFRY was worried that Albanians in Kosovo might 
be influenced by Tirana's national leftist ideas, whereas the Republic of Albania was afraid 
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that their professors and others visiting Kosovo might be "infected" with social-democratic 
ideas. During the 65th session of the SFRY Presidency held on December 14, 1976, while 
reporting on "political achievements," it was highlighted that there were many illusions 
about the Republic of Albania, but Kosovo visitors who used to be nationalists returned 
extremely disappointed from their visits of the Republic of Albania (AJ 803/498). Indeed, 
some of them were disappointed, but some blindly stuck to their illusions and kept 
promoting the image of a "perfect" Albania and "Enverism." For example, while 
interviewing Hydajet Hyseni, an ex-political prisoner and a founder and famous member of 
the illegal group known as "Revolutionary Group," I noticed that even now he continued to 
speak about how "perfect" and even militarily strong the Republic of Albania was during 
the 1970s (Hyseni: December 2015). In contrast, Albanian linguist Rexhep Ismajli, a UP 
professor and a member of Kosovo's Academy of Sciences since 1993, whose main aim in 
the 1970s was to continue with postgraduate studies at the Institut de linguistique générale 
et appliqué René Descartes, Sorbonne, said that when he and his friend Ibrahim Rugova 
visited the Republic of Albania for the first time in 1972, 
"We did not like their system. We were there as visiting scholars and 
stayed there for about two weeks, but we spent most of the time 
arguing about literature and art with our colleagues from Albania. 
Mehmet Elezi accompanied us and, for example, he always rejected 
Franz Kafka or any other ‘foreign' writer, even though he did not have 
a chance to read them at that time! However, Mehmet admitted he 
was brainwashed by the system only when I met him again in 1992" 
(R. Ismajli: March 2017). 
Thus, the situation in the Republic of Albania was perceived according to the actual 
level of political awareness of those who visited it. Indeed, it was common in communist 
Albania to suspect each Kosovan tourist and keep him/her under surveillance, considering 
them as potential agents of the SFRY. Those who accompanied visitors from Kosovo were 
obliged to write detailed reports (relacion) with impressions, including profiles of writers, 
researchers or other institutional visitors who came to Albania during the 1970s. The 
relacion had to be delivered also by professors or visitors from Albania who came to the 
SFRY during this period. These reports included information about political, cultural and 
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social issues. They even mentioned jokes that Kosovans told about Tito. I came upon most 
of these relacions in the Albanian Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some of 
them have already been published and disseminated through local portals in Kosovo or 
Albania.112  
Political interference in the educational sector of communist and socialist 
federations/countries was "normal." However, the battle between "Enverist national-
communism" ideologies and the "brotherhood and unity" platforms promoted at the UP 
challenged political borders and raised students' ambitions – and later those of the wider 
public – to forge and strengthen the Albanian identity in the SFRY. 
4.2.2. The UP; between dissemination of knowledge and ideology 
Knowing that an emancipated society consciously becomes the guardian of the "rights and 
freedoms" in whose traditions they have been educated, the UP became a target for 
domination by two different interest groups. The SFRY leadership proclaimed the political 
emancipation of Albanians in Kosovo to coincide with the "brotherhood and unity" platform 
or "Titoism." On the other hand, the Republic of Albania proclaimed national emancipation 
amongst Albanians in the SFRY, trying to expand nationalist ideas about a "perfect" 
Albania and "Enverism." Both groups used the UP to disseminate their ideological 
positions. Due to great difficulties in the provision of high school and university textbooks 
in Albanian, in November 1969 a representative of the Rilindja Publishing House, Ismail 
Bajra, met "Art eksport" representatives in Tirana. An agreement was reached according to 
which Kosovo would be supplied with literature in Albanian from Albania. The parties were 
also obliged to create a joint committee of specialists to review books to ensure that they 
were suitable for Albanian students in Kosovo and the SFRY. Under this contract, the 
Rilindja Publishing House started ordering literature from the Republic of Albania (AJ-319-
1-1).113 Given that Albanian schools in Macedonia and Montenegro also lacked literature 
 
112  See the news portal Telegrafi (http://telegrafi.com/viti-1973-si-u-survejuan-pese-shkrimtaret-e-kosoves-ne-
shqiperi/), Viti 1973: Si u survejuan pesë shkrimtarët e Kosovës në Shqipëri? (Year 1973: the surveillance of five 
Kosovo writers in Albania),  
(http://telegrafi.com/viti-1973-miqte-spiunonin-koleget-shkrimtare-nga-Kosovo-2/) Viti 1973: Miqtë spiunonin 
kolegët shkrimtarë nga Kosova! (Friends were spying on their writer colleagues from Kosovo), and 
(http://telegrafi.com/viti-1973-cfare-barsoletash-tregoheshin-per-titon-4/) Viti 1973: Çfarë barsoletash 
tregoheshin për Titon!? (Year 1973: What kind of anecdotes were told for Tito). 
113 During the period between 1969 and 1971 alone, 42,266 books of Albanian literature and other translated 
material, including 3,031 textbooks on 46 subjects, were delivered to different schools in Kosovo. Textbooks were 
also sent to the faculties of economics, natural sciences, law, history, languages, electrical engineering, mechanical 
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in Albanian, books and school texts were also sent to these republics via Kosovo (CAA 
511/1971/182). The literature exchange took place mostly between the UP and the UT: the 
UT regularly provided the UP with copies of each publication published by the UT at that 
time, including textbooks. Additionally, the national libraries of Prishtina and Tirana 
exchanged all publications, leading to approximately 430 scientific and 20 periodical titles 
being exchanged every year (AK PSoER/1979-88/36/3). Even though both parties agreed 
that only material that did not contradict the official ideology of the Communist League of 
Yugoslavia could be sent and disseminated in Kosovo/SFRY, this agreement was not 
always respected (AK PSoER/1972-84/1-97/4).  
In a document delivered by Albania's National Library to the Ministry of Education 
and Culture, for example, it was stated that the libraries of Mitrovica and Ferizaj/Uroševac, 
as well as the House of Culture in Vushtrria/Vučitrn, had to return books "which were not 
ordered" (AMFA 1112/1980). However, Albania's Ministry of Education instructed the 
National Library to stop sending books to those libraries that returned them, but also asked 
for the same materials to be sent to libraries in Kumanovo, Pejë/Peć and Gostivar (ibid.). 
The first generation of UP students stated that to vouchsafe against the confiscation of books 
coming from the Republic of Albania, there were cases when the first several pages of a 
book, which usually contained the speeches of Enver Hoxha, would be removed, after 
which the book would be distributed to the students. Novosella also confirms that books 
which came from Tirana "inspired us to patriotic acts" (Novosella: October 2015).  
Given that hitherto writers and artists from Kosovo had mainly been influenced by 
the creativity of their colleagues in the SFRY, when "confronted" with Albanian literature 
and art, most of them found themselves caught between "two sides" (AMFA 639/1971). In 
communist countries nothing could be published without the state’s initial approval. Indeed, 
the state also attempted to control all other forms of dissemination, but, as attested in this 
specific case, it did not always succeed. These materials contained ideological resources, 
hence, different sources claim that the UP promoted populist education, including 
nationalism, during the 1970s. Findings also show that once the agreement with the UT was 
reached, the most fruitful cooperation was with the Faculty of Philosophy, especially the 
 
engineering, medicine. As far as other teaching tools are concerned, during the period between 1969 and 1971, 
108,970 pieces were sent, mainly maps, geographical and historical tables, newspapers, journals etc., including 
60,000 gramophone records with Albanian songs (CCA 511/1972/48). 
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Department of Albanian Language and Literature,114  but also with the Department of 
History (AK PSoER/1972-84/1-97/4). Lectures by the UT professors from these 
departments attracted a large number of people, most of whom were not necessarily 
students. Audiences were often composed of people from different cities and towns of 
Kosovo, but also from other SFRY republics such as Montenegro and Macedonia (AMFA 
661/1971).  
This shows that after the Second World War Albanians living in the SFRY idealized 
the Republic of Albania: everything that came from Albania was considered good and 
worthy of attention, including "Enverism." However, taking into consideration the historical 
circumstances and the fact that Albanians in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
and Yugoslavia, including the SFRY, were discriminated against and usually treated as 
second class citizens, it is to be expected that due to their shared nationality Kosovo 
Albanians would idealize the Republic of Albania. While the SFRY, by translating Serbian 
textbooks into Albanian, aimed to "strengthen the sense of belonging to the socialist 
community of Yugoslav nations and love towards it" (Kostovicova 2005, 40), the Republic 
of Albania, on the other hand, by focusing on the two most sensitive UP departments, aimed 
to preserve the national spirit and/or undermine any sense of identification with the SFRY.  
During meetings held in June and September 1979, the Presidency of the Kosovo 
Provincial Committee discussed the large number of people attending the lectures and their 
applause for a specific professor from the Republic of Albania who spoke about the "heroic 
character of the Albanian nation, thanks to the work of the Party and Enver Hoxha." The 
issues of "secret meetings of Albanian youth," mainly to listen to speeches by Enver Hoxha 
and songs containing nationalist elements, were also discussed (Mišović 1987: 436). 
However, by the late 1970s, the UP already had 26,000 students. In the 1981-1982 academic 
year, the UP had more students than any other university in SFRY (Horvat 1988: 137). 70% 
of the UP students studied linguistics and human sciences, and only around 23% were in 
other disciplines and technology. These statistics were used by Dušan Čurebić when 
proclaiming the UP as the center for massive nationalistic teaching (AS Đ-2/327/1981).  
Serbian authors, including SFRY political leaders, acknowledged their failure to 
monitor the implementation of the agreement between the UP and the UT and confirmed 
 
114 Professor Idriz Ajeti received his degree from the Albanian studies department at the University of Belgrade 
and founded the UP Albanian department jointly with Latif Mulaku, Gani Luboteni, Enver Gjergjeku, Anton Ceta, 
Mehdi Bardhi, and others. 
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that "the enemy was much more prepared and organized than us in the expansion of their 
nationalist ideologies among youth in Kosovo" (Mišović 1987: 425). Kostovicova points 
out that the historical pattern of domination of one national group over the other in Kosovo 
was also reflected in education (Kostovicova 2005: 29). Thus, each ethnicity intricately 
linked the educational sector with its own political domination objectives. Thus, it was not 
academic prosperity but the possibility for domination that seems to have been the main 
focus of multiple parties involved in the struggle for the "establishment and development" 
of the UP. Located in the midst of different state actors – the Republic of Albania, the SFRY, 
and Kosovo authorities – the UP was a forum in which groups with varying political 
motivations struggled for control. However, it must be also noted that aside from these 
challenges, the UP managed to produce cadres of engineers, architects, doctors, and 
professionals in other necessary fields which did not previously exist in Kosovo prior to the 
UP's establishment. 
4.3. Political trajectories and the ethnonational awareness of Albanians in SFRY  
Developments in the sphere of higher and university education enabled a rapid increase of 
awareness about national issues among Kosovo Albanians. Between 1966 and 1981 in 
Kosovo one-third of the country's population was enrolled in a school or university 
(Rusinow 2008: 255). During the 1970s, the UP became a training ground for students in 
the position of Albanians in the SFRY. Students started developing political positions and 
evaluating Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo through a critical lens. Intellectuals – 
particularly those persecuted during the Ranković era – were eager to learn about their 
history and culture, and, consequently, started playing a vital part in encouraging Kosovo 
Albanians to examine their national identity by studying their history, literature, and 
traditions at the UP. Petrit Imami observed that at that time increasing numbers of Albanians 
echoed the historical injustices against Albanians from the Congress of Berlin (1878)115 and 
Conference of Versailles (1919)116. Albanian communist elites were also blamed, because 
at the Assembly of the National Liberation Council of Prizren (July 1945) they had accepted 
 
115 Albanians blamed the Berlin Congress of 1878 for the partition of some Albanian-inhabited territories which 
"unjustly [gave] Serbia the eastern part of Kosovo, and Bar, Podgorica, and Gusinje to Montenegro. (citation)”  
116 Albanians also blamed the Peace Conference in Paris, because it decided that the area around Prizren would be 
given to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia), that the southern Albanian areas (southern 
Eprius/Çamëri, which had a mixed Albanian and Greek population), were given to Greece, and Italy was made the 
defender of Albania’s territorial integrity. Albania was not represented at the conference. 
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Kosovo’s joining the SRS. Imami also points out that the books and newspapers that were 
distributed in Kosovo told Albanians they were the direct descendants of the Illyrians, 
autochthonous inhabitants of all the Balkans (Imami: March 2016). The results of 
population censuses (1981) in Kosovo and Macedonia were openly contested by some of 
the Albanian students and young intellectuals. The embassy of the Republic of Albania in 
Belgrade also reported on Macedonia's attempts to reduce the number of Albanians (AMFA 
1205/1980), and that around 10-15,000 Greek migrants had been brought in and placed in 
Macedonia prior to the census (AMFA 1161/1980). It is worth noting that the refugees from 
Aegean Macedonia arrived in the 1940s, thus they probably meant Aegean Macedonian 
refugees living in other parts of the SFRY.   
These new post-Ranković elites also started expressing opinions that the 
development of Kosovo was purposely not allowed due to the SRS’s using their profits from 
the Trepça/Trepča mines. Indeed, economically Kosovo lagged behind the rest of Serbia 
and all of the other SFRY republics, but Albania at the time was lagging behind even 
Kosovo! Nevertheless, the Republic of Albania was presented as a utopia of a country 
without unemployment and social injustice, without foreign credits that regular citizens had 
to pay off, and good living standards, etc. (Imami: March 2016). The intensification of 
cultural cooperation between Kosovo and Albania contributed to the strengthening of 
populism among students during the 1970s, culminating in 1978 during the commemoration 
of the League of Prizren.117 Kosovars’ self-perception changed as they reaffirmed their 
cultural heritage and discovered the role their forefathers had played in the struggle for 
Albanian independence from the Ottoman Empire (Biserko: November 2015). Fidahić also 
emphasized the impact the findings of the Ottoman records (defters) had when they were 
found in the SFRY. These defters revealed that the Ottomans had tried to suppress Albanian 
identity and banned the use of Albanian language and Albanian-language schools. 118 
 
117 The League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation (Lidhja për mbrojtjen e të drejtave te kombit 
Shqiptar), commonly known as the League of Prizren (Lidhja e Prizrenit), was a political organization whose 
official foundation in the Kosovo Vilayet of the Ottoman Empire on June 10, 1878 is regarded as the first step in 
creating an Albanian state.  
118 See especially Skendi (1967:366-404). The Young Turks lifted the ban in 1908, but after the Balkan wars and 
World War One, the territory of Kosovo was divided between Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes. The constitution of the Kingdom recognized only three “tribes, ’Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenians, of "one single Yugoslav people" and their languages. In 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia issued a 
Law on People's Schools (Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije - Official Gazette of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia), December 5, 1929, CXIX/289 (The Law on People’s Schools)) which, in practice, gave rights for the 
use of language and education in those languages only to German, Hungarian and Romanian minorities. 
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Initially, the SFRY did not do much for the Albanians either, as it only offered rights to 
nations (in Serbian, narodi), not minorities (manjine), a term later replaced by nationalities 
(narodnosti) as a euphemism for minorities (Fidahić: March 2016).  
Albanians started re-examining their role in the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia. With their increased political awareness, Albanians regularly started 
referring to their old wounds, which were, according to them, inflicted by the Ottoman and 
South Slav occupiers. Therefore, developments in the sphere of university education during 
the seventies facilitated a rapid increase of awareness about national issues among Kosovo 
Albanians. During this decade the UP became a hotbed, where demands for reconsideration 
of the position of Albanians in the SFRY were articulated. This made the UP a major pillar 
in the national emancipation of Albanians in the SFRY. James Pettifer also considers the 
UP to have been an essential element in the process of forming a national elite in Kosovo, 
"…after the sixties Kosovo was equipped with many teachers of a nationalist orientation…" 
(Pettifer 2002: 7). Professors, literature, and the study visits of Albanians from the SFRY 
to the Republic of Albania had a tremendous effect on the political orientation of students 
and the wider public in Kosovo. As Anderson (1991) points out, a unified system of 
education is central for the emergence of nation-states and the accompanying process of 
nation-building. The interaction between political and academic actors from the SFRY, the 
Republic of Albania, and Kosovo, including students and other actors, made the UP a 
critical venue for imagining and articulating national ideals.  
4.4. Tito's death and the political circumstances that influenced the 1981 uprisings in 
Kosovo  
Even before Tito's death, numerous frictions between “progressivists” and “illegal groups” 
contributed to the instability of the political situation in Kosovo. After marking the 100th 
anniversary of the League of Prizren, the illegal groups’ aspirations for unification with 
Albania intensified, as did their propaganda, with the slogan "one language, one nation, one 
state" (J. Krasniqi; December 2015). The proceedings of the conference that was held in 
Prishtina marking the 100th anniversary of the League of Prizren – which was attended by 
Professor Friedman in June 1978 – was supposed to be published within a year of the 
conference, but the volume was not allowed to go forward until 1990 (Friedman: December 
2015). During Tito's visit to Kosovo in October 1979, on his way to Brezovica, he had to 
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pass through Ferizaj/Uroševac. In this city, members of illegal groups organized a symbolic 
protest. Among others, a sign saying "you are not welcome" was hung on a stray dog’s neck, 
which was then released to run around in the city center (H. Ismajli; February 2018). This 
action terrified the local Kosovo authorities, and after Tito's visit several arrests were made 
and numerous people were sentenced in Yugoslav courts by Albanian speaking judges.  
At the Federal Assembly meeting which took place on December 10, 1980, the 
President of the LoC of Kosovo, Mahmut Bakalli (1971-1981), presented statistics on the 
deepening of the economic and social crisis of Kosovo. The President's report for Kosovo 
submitted to LCY also highlighted that "...despite the fact that Kosovo participates in energy 
production and metallurgy in the economy of Yugoslavia with over 60% of the SFRY’s 
overall production, still, compared to the SFRY's average, Kosovo's economic 
backwardness has deepened from 28% in 1948 to 48% in 1980... " Abdulla Prapashtica, an 
investigator in the Kosovo intelligence services and founder of an illegal group, "Partia 
Komuniste Marksiste Leniniste e Shqiptarëve në Jugosllavi (PKMLSHJ; The Communist 
Marxist-Leninist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia)," noted that Bakalli's statements served 
as a sign to proceed with the organization of demonstrations and request republic status for 
Kosovo. In January 1981, PKMLSHJ sent a final letter to Fadil Hoxha, threatening that 
"either you (the progressivists) raise the request for the Republic of Kosovo at the federative 
level, or we will organize the demonstrations" (Prapashtica: February 2018). On the one 
hand, "the progressivists" were not undertaking any concrete steps forward in this regard; 
on the other hand, the Republic of Albania increased its "pressure" on SFRY authorities to 
guarantee the rights of Kosovo Albanians with the constitution. This empowered illegal 
groups, and they mobilized around the idea of demonstrations even more. When Tito died 
in 1980, an economic decline was affecting the entire SFRY, but it can be argued that the 
effect was disproportionately felt in Kosovo owing to the already poor economic conditions. 
Differences in the economic development of Kosovo, compared with that of the other SFRY 
republics, were deepening further. In October 1980, the Embassy of the Republic of Albania 
in Belgrade reported that the economic difficulties had brought on an unpleasant situation 
in the province, which was the reason that "institutions there are predicting a repetition of 
1968" (AMFA 1205/1980).  
Thus, the early 1980s found Albanians in Kosovo in complicated social, political 
and psychological circumstances. At this time tensions between the "illegal groups" and 
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"progressivists" had reached their highest peak. Both groups claimed to be working for the 
good of Kosovo, and each of them chose an opposing political and ideological orientation. 
The progressivists carried out their agenda through the state apparatus, whereas the illegal 
groups tried to do the same through disobedience. Regrettably, they allowed their different 
political and ideological orientations to keep them from working in concert toward their 
ultimate mutual goal. Although the SFRY constitutional reforms of the 1970s allowed the 
autonomous provinces more local control and input, this decade also led to the deepening 
of the inter-ethnic rifts between Albanians and Serbs.  
In messages labeled "decodings" that the Albanian embassy in Belgrade sent to their 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs from April to December 1980, it was confirmed that the police 
had made some arrests in Kosovo because of the distribution of anti-Titoist and nationalist 
brochures. There were also a few Serbs and Montenegrins who were tried for conducting 
anti-Albanian actions. Rilindja journalists were ordered not to publish any more articles 
from the Republic of Albania's newspaper "Zëri i Popullit," as they had done earlier. 
Representatives of the Republic of Albania in Belgrade were informed about the discussions 
of the organization "Ylli i Kuq (Red Star)" to organize a demonstration on November 28, 
1980. Before the "November holidays” (the 28th of November was Albania’s Independence 
Day), authorities in Kosovo arrested many university and high school students, questioned 
them, and released them only four days after the holidays (AMFA 1151/1980). The overall 
situation in Kosovo frightened other SFRY republics. Azem Vllasi, a communist leader, 
pointed out that during this period other republics in the SFRY criticized Kosovo authorities 
for showing tolerance vis-à-vis those who used every opportunity to express Albanian 
nationalist sentiments. All of these developments contributed to increased tension between 
"illegal groups" and "progressivists" and also deepened inter-ethnic segregation in Kosovo 
(Vllasi: October 2015).  
Professor Victor Friedman points out that even during the 1970s it was clear that 
there were many tensions between Albanians and Serbs from Kosovo. He stated that similar 
tensions could not be felt between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia. When one 
went for a stroll in "korzo" (promenade) in Skopje, one could meet all kinds of people there: 
Albanians, Macedonians, Roma, Turks, etc. In Prishtina, however, even a "korzo" was 
segregated: Serbs and Albanians strolled on opposite sides of the main street (Friedman: 
December 2015). The revolt among the Kosovo Albanian population and the tensions 
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among Kosovo Serbs after Tito's death on May 1980 increased the political uncertainty in 
the SFRY. Kosovo Albanians I interviewed who were students at the time stated that after 
Tito's death they became fearful that the course of SFRY policies would change to their 
disadvantage. They believed that the 1974 Constitution left open the doors to the SRS and 
the SFRY to deny Albanians the autonomous rights guaranteed by the 1974 SFRY 
Constitution. Illegal groups justified their fears with the fact that the SRS had greatly 
resisted the 1974 constitutional amendments, and these were reasonable concerns. 
Dragoslav Marković119 formed a working group of professors to prepare a study known as 
the "Blue Book" (cited after Biserko 2012: 209). The Blue Book complained that provinces 
considered themselves equal to the republics, which consequently led them to disrespect the 
authority of the SRS, even in those spheres in which the republic (as a sovereign body of 
the state) had authority. The SRS politicians and authorities listed dozens of examples of 
such autarchy: in foreign relations, defense, economics, and educational policies (Jović, 
2008: 173).  
Dušan Janjić120 describes this book as evidence of the SRS’s proclivity to try to gain 
more power at the federal level of the SFRY, rather than a genuine appetite for the 
"colonization" of Kosovo (Janjić: February 2016). Still, Albanians viewed this book as a 
denial of Kosovo's autonomy and considered Serbs to be neighbors who could not be 
trusted. Already in June 1977, after a long session of all the political leaders in the SRS 
(including those from Kosovo and Vojvodina), even the "progressivist" Kosovo leaders 
declared that the Blue Book was a "Bible of Serbian nationalism" (Jović, 2008:175), thereby 
accusing the Serbs of attempting to undermine the autonomy of the provinces, which was – 
in their view – unconstitutional. Thus, it was obvious that the SRS, the only SFRY republic 
with provinces, felt "unequal" to the others and continuously searched for opportunities to 
make constitutional changes. Moreover, Jović argues that in these circumstances an even 
more paradoxical situation ensued: Albanian students were calling for constitutional 
changes out of the same motivations and feelings as the SRS leaders in Belgrade: they both 
felt unequal vis-à-vis the relevant "others." Just as the SRS leaders felt that Serbia was 
unequal to the other SFRY republics and that it was lagging behind them economically and 
 
119 Dragoslav Marković (1920) was the president of the Assembly of the Federal SRS and chairman of the SRS 
and SFRY Presidency (1969-1984). 
120 Dušan Janjić (1950) was a member of the SRS LoC (1968-1988), as well as founder and a vice president of 
Social Democracy (1997-1999). 
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politically, many Kosovo Albanians felt the same way about their own status and the status 
of Kosovo (Jović 2008: 178). Bajram Kosumi, one of the organizers of the 1981 
demonstrations, notes that in addition to feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis the SRS, the 
economic pressures and backwardness which had left Kosovo the poorest part of the SFRY 
also served as crucial factors impelling students towards open rebellion. 
Indeed, economically Kosovo was the least developed area of the SFRY. The gap 
between Kosovo and the most-developed SFRY Republic, Slovenia, was widening. 
Although in 1952 Slovenia had a GDP per capita 4.1 times larger than Kosovo, in 1981 the 
ratio was 5.4 times higher, with a tendency to increase even further. Other economic data 
show an even greater difference, approaching an 8:1 ratio. Kosovo lagged behind not only 
Slovenia but also all of the other SFRY regions. Although in 1955 its GDP per capita was 
43% of the SFRY average, in the early eighties this had fallen to 26%. With a ratio of 6.1:1 
and a projected annual growth rate of 2%, Kosovo would need 91 years to reach the 1981 
Slovenian levels, concluded a leading SFRY (Croatian) economist, Branko Horvat (Horvat 
1988, 136, 137). 
The unemployment rate in Kosovo was the highest in the country. For one available 
job, 43 unemployed persons were available. In Kosovo, Albanians constituted 74% of the 
active population but made up 65% of the work force. Serbs were 17% of the active 
population, and 26% of the active work force (cited after Jović, 2008: 190). However, 
during the 72nd joint session of the Presidencies of the League of Communists (LoC) of 
Serbia and the SRS held April 23, 1981, Serbian communist leaders stated that they did not 
want to talk about economic problems in Kosovo. Beside the fact that the economic 
situation was considered to be the main reason for the student revolts, they still maintained 
that "when it comes to economic development we are on a good path" and that the answer 
for the "student rebellion cannot be found in any economic, social and development 
problems in Kosovo" (AS Đ-2/327/1981). Kosumi confirms that national concerns, such as 
"the isolation of Albanians…the tendencies to separate the national identity of Albanians, 
the alleged split between Albanians in Albania and Šiptari in the SFRY," also served as 
important factors for the organization of demonstrations (Kosumi 2001). However, the 
demands for "egalitarianism" from both Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians served as the 
main driver for the 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo and subsequent heavy-handed reactions 
of the SRS authorities. 
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4.4.1. Before the demonstrations: preparations and genesis 
Economic, political and ethnic divisions inspired students to organize social movements. 
Everything began at the UP, which, as an educational institution, brought together people 
of all different backgrounds. The beginning of the 1980-1981 academic year found UP 
students extremely annoyed about the conditions of the student dormitories and dining hall. 
These conditions had not been satisfactory in previous years either, but nobody seemed to 
be keen on improving them. Professor Friedman, who was visiting UP in the seventies for 
a seminar, conveyed his firsthand experiences with student life in Prishtina. The organizers 
put the seminar participants in the UP dormitories, but "both the food and the dormitory 
were terrible, the sinks in the bathroom drained onto the floor, and there was no way to take 
a proper shower in the dorm, so we had to go shower at Bozhur – the only hotel at that time 
in Prishtina" (Friedman: December 2015). Moreover, seminar participants were told they 
were staying in a dormitory for women and that this was the reason the dormitory appeared 
somewhat clean. The dormitory for men was much worse. Consequently, if this was the 
best the seminar organizers could offer foreign visitors to Prishtina, one can only imagine 
the ordinary living conditions of students at that time.  
Gani Koci reveals that because of all these conditions, in November 1980 a group 
of students demolished the office of the Director of Dormitory. As a result, an urgent 
meeting was organized among the students, the dormitory administration, and 
representatives of the Kosovo Secretariat for Education. Students voiced their concerns and 
warned that they would take other action should conditions not improve (Koci: Dec 2015). 
When several months passed and nothing had really improved, at around 8 p.m. on March 
10, 1981, Koci invited Januz Januzi, Kadri Kryeziu, Ramadan Dobra, Murat Musliu, Selim 
Geci, and Bedri Dobra to meet him in dormitory number 3, room 310 (Demonstrations 
Judgment of Supreme Court, AP-KZH, nr.437/81). The participants of this meeting planned 
and set March 11, 1981 as the date to start with "concrete actions." During this meeting, 
they concluded that students were angry about the terrible conditions in the dormitories and 
dining hall and that students would support any action to address these issues. "Each of us," 
says Koci, "was supposed to talk with as many students as possible and, normally, the 
number of those having the information increased. It was agreed to meet in the dining hall 
at 7 p.m. on March 11, 1981. Students started to gather sometime before 7 p.m. When all 
had gathered, someone came into room 310 to inform us that another line for food had been 
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set up, so that students wouldn't have to wait for so long anymore. This was a clear sign that 
someone had found out about the students’ plan and that there were attempts to abort it." 
Soon Koci and Kadri Kryeziu entered the food lines, stopping the incoming food, saying 
"No food today." Other people in the dining hall knew about the activity, and that's when it 
all started, confirms Koci. Some witnesses say that Salih Salihu was the first one who started 
it all by breaking a plate, whereas Koci says that it was not Salihu who started it, but 
somehow everyone started shattering plates and protesting at the same moment.  
In this vein, Petrit Imami claims the demonstrations were first provoked by Osman 
Osmani, a nephew of Abdullah Prapashtica, who was a strong figure in the state intelligence 
services in Kosovo in 1981: Osmani flipped a table over as a protest against just how bad 
the food was – which indeed it was – and many students then joined him (Imami: March 
2016). As was mentioned above in §4.4, Abdulla Prapashtica, who was also described by 
the arrested students as violent, was a founder of an “illegal group” (PKMLSHJ) while at 
the same time serving as an investigator for the intelligence services.  
During our interview, Prapashtica confirmed that the decision to organize the 
demonstrations of 1981 was made by the PKMLSHJ leadership on December 10, 1980. 
Initially, the PKMLSHJ invited – in writing – the existing illegal groups as well as the 
Albanian political structures of Kosovo and the federation to unite around one platform: 
Republic of Kosovo (Prapashtica: February 2018). However, it must be noted that I asked 
Prapashtica how it was possible for him to be simultaneously an organizer (as a part of the 
PKMLSHJ) and an investigator responsible for keeping order and reporting to the LoC for 
1981 demonstrations. He did not respond to this nor to some other questions. He mentioned, 
however, that some answers would be provided in a book that he plans to write about these 
events. Be that as it may, the events in the dining hall were the starting point of the 1981 
demonstrations. Organizers also considered this to be a very difficult process, because after 
the dining hall events, the situation spread to the dormitory and got out of control. The 
organizers planned to articulate political demands with the leitmotiv of "bad student 
conditions," because there was also a fear that by immediately focus on the political 
message rather than the social message – i.e., the bad conditions – would cause students to 
hesitate to join the cause. Thus, it was decided to follow the mood of the students, rather 
than shift demands from the academic to the socio-economic and political and 
patriotic/nationalist. Koci confirms that students read a lot of illegal literature (Stalinist, 
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Enverist) and had connections with illegal group activists (Bajrush Xhemajli, Hamdi 
Zymberi, Bajram Kosumi, etc.). However, Koci claims that no one single group or 
affiliation, "progressivists" or "illegal groups" alike, gave a particular green light to start the 
demonstrations, but that mostly the unaffiliated student body itself was responsible for the 
spontaneous start of the demonstrations. Shattering plates, turning over tables, demolishing 
the student center, and protesting against "the conditions" (understood as the students’ 
living conditions) was just the flash point. 
4.4.2. During demonstrations: actions and reactions  
Soon after breaking plates in the student dining hall, the organizers and a group of students 
went out to the streets where they chanted: "Kushte" (Conditions), "Disa në karriga të buta 
e disa pa bukë" (Some on soft chairs and some without bread), "Poshtë borgjezia e kuqe" 
(Down with red bourgeoisie), and "Lironi shokët tone" (Release our friends -- referring to 
the imprisoned illegal group activists). Once on the main street, students headed downtown, 
and some citizens joined them along the way as well. The student organizers explained that 
seeing long lines of people shouting "Conditions, conditions, conditions" encouraged 
students, who started acting irresponsibly. Koci mentions that he shouted "Kosovo 
Republic," but that Kadri Kryeziu put a hand over his mouth saying "It's still early for that, 
don't rush."  
Once the crowd reached downtown, a group of students took down SFRY flags 
hanging from light poles. At this time there were no slogans, only commotion by the 
students. Koci claims that the entire episode would have remained at the level of mere 
commotion, but then the police showed up. They intervened brutally near the Faculty of 
Philosophy, and the demonstrators struggled to rescue a student from their hands. This 
student was severely beaten by the police. Another student named Ali Lajqi climbed up a 
light pole and started giving a speech, saying: "What is all this force, energy and spilling of 
the blood of youth about? What is this vurmak (a loanword from Turkish meaning 
"hitting")?! You are giving vurmak… (cited after Demonstrations Judgment of Supreme 
Court, AP-KZH, nr. 437/81). Organizers claim Mehmet Bislimi also gave a short speech. 
These speeches excited the masses and inspired them to stand up to the security forces even 
more defiantly.  
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Demonstrators started smashing store windows with stones and blocked the road. 
This lasted until 5 or 6 a.m. Police reported that about 2,000 students and citizens protested 
that night. The chanting was in Albanian. Many UP students of Albanian nationality from 
Macedonia and Montenegro also participated in these demonstrations. The Kosovo 
Provincial Committee (PC) reported that police were attacked: around 19 policemen were 
hurt and hospitalized. Seven cars, two buses, and one private coffee bar were destroyed, and 
there was damage to the dormitory. On March 12, 1981, the Presidency of the LoC of 
Kosovo and the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province (SAP) of Kosovo held a 
joint session. Mahmut Bakalli, President of the LoC of Kosovo, emphasized that despite 
many attempts by socio-political organizations, as well as the infiltration of activists among 
the students who demonstrated, the authorities had not managed to convince the students to 
calm down and to discuss their concerns. Here it was confirmed that the situation in other 
municipalities was calm and that these demonstrations impacted only Prishtina. Mustafa 
Sefedini, in charge of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, confirmed that "our intelligence 
service did not have any information or indication about the student rebellious actions of 
March 11. This happened in a moment and spontaneously" (AK LoCPC/1981/81).  
According to the declarations of double-agent Abdulla Prapashtica, this was not true. 
Prapashtica claims that the leadership of both Kosovo and the SFRY Federation knew that 
demonstrations in support of the idea of a Republic of Kosovo would take place. The 
PKMLSHJ, whom Prapashtica considers to have been the organizers of the demonstrations 
of 1981, notified Fadil Hoxha, Mahmut Bakalli, Ali Shukriu, Xhevdet Hamza in writing, 
and they also sent letters to the address of Josip Broz Tito (Prapashtica: February 2018). 
However, after the demonstrations of March 11, 1981, Sefedini's ministry took measures 
and mobilized additional reserve police units. Therefore, in the event of a repetition of the 
demonstrations, Sefedini stressed that the security organs of the SAP Kosovo were well 
equipped both in numbers and technically, even though it all depended on the situation. 
Especially given the fact that the students were also chanting against the "red bourgeoisie," 
the anxiety of political leaders regarding the frustrated masses was apparent in all of their 
meetings. Mehmet Maliqi, one of the senior communist officials and later Minister of 
Internal Affairs, stressed that the communists should not be naive and allow the students to 
demonstrate in the streets, because from one rebellion they might start demanding other 
things. In the meantime, Maliqi mentioned that during the meetings with the students, the 
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main issues raised included: "why do students in Serbia receive their scholarships on time 
– whereas we get them with three-month delays," "why we are still sleeping in garages," 
etc. (AK LoCPC/1981/81). It is obvious that the students really had become “radicalized” 
by their poor living conditions. Thus, they were not so much an ideological vanguard as 
they were a very influential segment of the population that was being mistreated. Moreover, 
it was the general mistreatment of Albanians in Kosovo that left them vulnerable to Enverist 
propaganda. Albania at that time was a giant concentration camp, and the persecutions 
taking place there were notorious. The Albanians of Kosovo were, in a sense, hoodwinked 
by Enver’s agents, but this process was made possible due to Serbian mistreatment and 
subsequent events. 
Kosovo political leaders reached an agreement on how to "categorize" the March 11 
protests. Upon Mahmut Bakalli's significant insistence, most of the communist leaders were 
in favor of ascribing "social" rather than "political" motives to the protests of March 11, 
1981. The communist elites were afraid that any other branding of these events would also 
foster Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism. Bakalli urged his colleagues to be very careful 
in their public speeches…"we do not want to give these demonstrations a political 
dimension." After the discussions that Bakalli had with Dušan Dragosavac 121  (federal 
level), he also warned his colleagues that there should be no press conferences, especially 
not with foreign journalists (AK LoCPC/1981/81). Afterward, Azem Vllasi and other 
political leaders invited the students, through the rector and some professors, to find out 
what they wanted. They had discussions and requested that the students refrain from 
vandalism (Vllasi: October 2015). However, the organizers of the demonstrations I 
interviewed remain adamant that all of the politicians and UP professors were opposed to 
demonstrations and that none of them offered to discuss student demands with them.  
It was evident that the students did not trust the politicians anymore, because they 
had raised their concerns for so long without any result. The politicians appeared for 
discussions only when students started protesting. Instead of finding solutions, the 
communist elites accused the illegal groups of (mis)using economic weaknesses and 
encouraging the students to demonstrate. The communist elite's behavior – appearing only 
minutes before the meetings – can also be considered as tragicomic. On the one hand, they 
 
121 Dušan Dragosavac was a Yugoslav politician and a chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia from 
October 20, 1981 until June 20, 1982.  
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admitted that the food in the dining hall was bad and nutritionally lacking, while at the same 
time they blamed "enemies" for (mis)using the students' rebellion against the poor quality 
of the food and organizing the demonstrations. Instead of looking into how the students 
were living and what kind of food was being served in the dining hall, the regime chose to 
blame "enemies." One could argue that no other options remained to the students to have 
their concerns addressed. Their basic demands had not been resolved in a timely manner. 
In such a situation, the students became a target for "attacks" from Albanian communist 
elites as well as Serbo-Montenegrian nationalism, which also increased at that time. The 
mistreatment of the students by the various interests as well as the abominable living 
conditions in the UP dormitories sparked the eruption of further student demonstrations.  
State reports did not mention any injuries caused by the police to the students or 
other citizens that night. After these events and meetings between the organizers and 
students, the students grew even more frustrated. The police started taking punitive action 
right away. The Kosovo media did not publish a single word about the demonstrations of 
March 11. This caused the students to bond with each other even more. During all this time, 
the Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo LoC remained in communication 
with the SFRY Presidency and with the leadership of the SRS LoC, as well as with the 
SFRY and the SRS intelligence services (AS, Đ-2/30/1981).  
Arguably, the protests of March 11 gave state institutions two messages. First, they 
caught them asleep, and the "element of surprise" was indeed discussed among the highest 
ranks of the LCY. Second, these events revealed the growth of a collective consciousness 
and a higher degree of political culture in Kosovo Albanian society. Serbian archival 
documents show that during the period of March 11-27 special police units (special forces, 
helicopters, and internal security services) of the SRS were prepared and mobilized at 
Zaječar, Kraljevo, Leskovac and Niš. The vehicles of the mobilized units, with all necessary 
equipment, were placed in Raška and Bujanovc/Bujanovac, towns in Serbia bordering 
Kosovo. The Secretariat of Internal Affairs of SAP Kosovo was informed about the location 
of these units. Additionally, the preparation of all special police units in the SUP Serbia was 





4.4.2.1. The March 26, 1981 demonstrations: a proper articulation of slogans  
The situation immediately following the March 11, 1981 demonstrations was calm, 
however, graffiti with "hostile content" began to appear on some private houses as well as 
on public buildings. They were erased by the authorities but served as evidence or a warning 
of further collective action. At the same time, the number of students imprisoned or injured 
in the streets was increasing (AK LoCPC/1981/81). After these developments, in a speech 
delivered during the session of the Provincial Presidency of the Executive Council, Mahmut 
Bakalli characterized the demonstrations of March 11 as being uprisings with "social 
elements." Stane Dolac as well – one of the most influential people in Yugoslav federal 
politics at that time – considered these demonstrations to be a student rebellion against 
social conditions, but he was mocked by the Serbian newspapers (these examples can be 
found in several newspapers, as well as in "Rilindja" published during March 1981). During 
that period "Štafeta mladosti” 122  (the Relay of Youth) was supposed to pass through 
Kosovo on March 26, 1981 for the first time since Tito's death. Students wanted to organize 
new demonstrations on that day. On the evening of March 25, 1981, Ali Lajci, Hamdi 
Hajdini, Riza Demaj, Sylë Mujaj, Ramë Demaj, Bajram Kosumi, and some other students 
met in rooms 402 and 403 of the Prishtina men's dormitory to plan for the March 26, 1981 
demonstrations. Most of these students were affiliated with operational illegal groups. 
Bajram and Musli Kosumi had even established and pledged allegiance to an illegal group 
that they named "Bardhi."123 They also established and adopted the group's statute, assigned 
code names to their members, and started implementing its program (Demonstrations 
Judgment of Supreme Court, AP-KZH, nr. 437/81).  
The active presence of illegal group members was unmistakable after the March 11 
demonstrations. Slogans and a speech listing demands ending with "otherwise, we're ready 
for anything" were prepared that night. During the 83rd session of Presidencies, Bakalli 
mentions that with respect to the March 26 demonstrations, the authorities were informed 
that in one of the rooms of the dormitory a group of people had gathered and were planning 
demonstrations. Police entered that room together with the dormitory guard and found only 
 
122 “Štafeta mladosti” was a symbolic relay race through the whole SFRY, ending with the awarding of the štafeta 
to President Tito at the end of the race on his birthday on May 25.  
123 “Bardh”, definite Bardhi, is an ordinary male proper name in Albanian, and it is associated with connotations 
of honor and success, as in Albanian faqebardhë ‘honorable, successful’ (literally face-white). 
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those students who were legally living there sound asleep (AK LoC/1981/83). This shows 
that a "spy" must have been within the group of organizers. The organizers wanted to make 
sure that the regime prepared for the demonstrations, given that higher levels of brutality 
inspired further resistance and the organization of further protests. This particular protest 
focused on an otherwise vague situation and opened the doors for the bloody demonstrations 
of April 1 and 2. On March 26, the dormitory was blocked, but when the rector, Gazmend 
Zajmi, as well as some professors and political representatives came, the doors were 
opened. Azem Vllasi was assigned to talk to the students, together with some professors 
and the rector. While the authorities urged the students to refrain from whatever they were 
doing, Riza Demaj read the students’ demands, then Ali Lajci, Hamdi Hajdini, et al. took 
the floor.  
In addition to their demands for better conditions, the students also highlighted their 
socio-economic and political concerns, such as unemployment, a fair census, (ab)uses of 
the Trepça/Trepča mines by others, demands for the removal of Slavic suffixes from 
Albanian surnames in Montenegro and Macedonia, etc. (Demonstrations Judgment of 
Supreme Court, AP-KZH, nr.437/81). The organizers I interviewed claimed that after 
finishing their speeches/discussions, the students did not listen to the advice of the rector 
and other representatives of public institutions. Instead, they started chanting slogans and 
hoisting placards that they had prepared earlier. During the meeting in the dormitory, 
someone came and told the political representatives to get out of there, and "Once we left, 
police attacked the students," says Vllasi (Vllasi: October 2015). The police acted very 
brutally in an effort to disperse the students. The situation got heated and out of control. 
Bakalli reported that due to the large number of students in the discussions prior to the 
demonstrations (around 400), once the police intervened, violence was used on over 400-
500 students. In ancitipation of Štafeta Day, the regime wanted to be sure that students could 
not make it out into the streets, so they decided there would be beatings again after that 
meeting. Bakalli's justification was that "the reason why we decided to block them that way 
was related to the Štafeta" (AK LoCPC/1981/83). As the situation spiraled out of control, 
additional forces were needed. In consultation with communist authorities from the 
federation, Bakalli confirmed the need for additional forces from the Federal Secretariat of 
Internal Affairs. These units came into Kosovo and jointly with "our security organs helped 
clean up the situation" says Bakalli (AK LoCPC/1981/83).  
119 
 
That day (March 26, 1981), the "Štafeta mladosti" passed through Prishtina with 
40,000 spectators. Brutal interventions against the students started the very same day. Elite 
police units were brought in by helicopter and directly occupied the dormitory. Hundreds 
of young men and women were beaten on the premises of the UP dormitory; injured 
students went back to their cities and homes. The news that some police forces had come 
from Belgrade to torture "our kids" spread throughout Kosovo. The repressive apparatus 
acted very badly, particularly because Kosovo local police were not the only ones present 
on the afternoon of March 26. Vllasi says that the police forces which came "from 
throughout the SFRY" acted very brutally, but Professor Imami stressed that the active 
police included only Serbs. The SFRY Minister of Internal Affairs, General Franjo 
Herljević, indicated that these special units were "SFRY forces." However, since Serbia did 
not have the right to directly intervene in the demonstration – because the 1979 
constitutional orders banning such actions were still in force – the SFRY decided to send 
"other" additional forces to manage the crisis. When the "other" additional forces arrived 
on March 26, it was noticed they were almost exclusively Serbs, not mixed SFRY units 
(Imami: March 2016). While there are arguments that the security forces sent to Kosovo on 
March 26, 1981 were mainly from the Serbian elite units, in the minutes of the meetings of 
the SRS and the LoC of Serbia, it was consistently claimed that " we sent the special police 
units of all the republics and Vojvodina to the territory of Kosovo " (AS, Đ-2/304/1981).  
However, those students that managed to leave the dormitory premises headed 
towards the downtown carrying the Albanian national flag. The flag was usually carried by 
a female student, such as Trëndëlinë Labinishti. This indicates the crucial role of women in 
the demonstrations, especially knowing that saving the flag at any price was an important 
obligation according to Albanian culture as well. The students’ aspirations for a "Kosovo 
Republic" appeared as one of the main slogans in these demonstrations as well. But on this 
occasion this slogan was being used in entirely different political and historical 
circumstances for Kosovo and the entire region. Some of the other slogans included: 
Trepça/Trepča works – Belgrade builds; We are Albanians - not Yugoslavs; Unification of 
Albanian territories; Republic, Constitution by agreement or by force; Long live Marxism-
Leninism, Down with Revisionism; and EHo, EHo (referring to the initials of Enver 
Hoxha). Demands for a Republic of Kosovo were equally loud and clear on March 26, 1981. 
Even though these demonstrations were characterized as nationalist, the dominant slogans 
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urged for the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist – that is Enverist – future of Kosovo. Due to this 
behavior, they were also viewed as, and indeed sounded, anti-Yugoslav as well. These 
slogans are evocative of the students' affiliation with illegal groups. The police intervention 
was extremely brutal. Vllasi confirms that the situation got out of control, and four or five 
municipalities declared a state of emergency (Vllasi: October 2015). Even though the March 
11 demonstrations were considered social in nature in the beginning, from March 26, 1981 
onward, the Presidency of the Headquarters of the Committee demanded a rigorous 
response to such "enemy" and "nationalistic" demands (AK LoC/1981/83). At the session 
of Presidency of the PC of the LoC of Kosovo, held on March 27, Bakalli immediately 
declared these demonstrations to be full of hostile elements and part of an offensive against 
the SFRY, exploiting current strained economic and social circumstances, the internal 
situation, and a vague international situation.  
The March 26, 1981 protests took place in Prishtina and Prizren. Veli Deva124  and 
Mahmut Bakalli were uncertain whether they should report to the SFRY bodies what had 
happened in Prizren as well or downplay the overall situation and not reveal it. While Deva 
was in favor of qualifying the Prizren demonstrations as political and also of reporting them 
to the higher SFRY structures, Bakalli wanted to avoid this. Other communist elites asked 
each other how it was possible to have this situation at the UP, taking into consideration 
that 4,000 members of the Yugoslav Communist Party worked there? (AK 
LoCPC/1981/83). Given that the information provided by the intelligence services was not 
clear about the nature of the demonstrations, the then Croatian member of the SFRY 
Presidency, Vladimir Bakarić, invited Miodrag Nikolić (adviser to Fadil Hoxha) to discuss 
the demonstrations. After the meeting, which took place at the end of March, the 
demonstrations were labeled as "counterrevolutionary" (this is according to Professor 
Imami's discussions with Vladimir Bakarić). Later on, the authorities, building on the 
conclusions of the 16th and 17th sessions of the PC of the LoC of Kosovo, the 14th session 
of the LoC of Serbia, and the 20th session of the SFRY, also categorized the student 
demonstrations in Prishtina as "hostile" and possessing "counterrevolutionary" intent. 
These demonstrations, according to the authorities, were organized by nationalist and 
irredentist Albanian elements, whose mission was to destroy brotherhood and unity and 
destroy the SFRY. Their aim was to destabilize Kosovo and to destroy the constitutional 
 
124 Veli Deva was the chairman of the Provincial Committee in Kosovo and a member of the SFRY Presidency. 
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order of the SFRY, putting at risk the territorial integrity of the SRS and the SFRY (AS, Đ-
2/28/1981).  
The labeling of the demonstrations as "counterrevolutionary" served as a green light 
for even harsher police interventions against protestors. Even though, as Julie Mertus 
argues, "calling the demonstrations counterrevolutionary served to hide the larger national, 
social and economic issues behind the unrest" (Mertus 1999; 32), Vllasi confirms that 
Kosovo leaders were constantly asked by the SFRY whether they had enough forces and if 
there were any need to send the SFRY’s elite police units (Vllasi: October 2015). The report 
of the SFRY Presidency's Federal Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order 
highlights Kosovo's inability to manage the situation (AJ 803/101). Previously, on January 
12, 1979, the SFRY leadership had prepared an order on what to do in the event of a crisis 
(AS, D-2/304/1981). 
During the April 1, 1981 Joint Meeting between the SFRY Presidency, the Central 
Committee (CC) Presidency, and the LoC, it was decided that security measures needed to 
be implemented in Prishtina and Kosovo. This effectively meant that these bodies were 
proclaiming a state of emergency in Prishtina and Kosovo. At the same meeting, the SFRY 
Presidency ordered additional special police units of the Federal Secretariat for Internal 
Affairs nicknamed "Rubin" (3,500 policemen) to be sent to Kosovo, as well as two divisions 
of the Yugoslav Army (AJ 803/101, AJ 837/364). This was in accordance with the 
Constitution of the SFRY Article 316 point 3 and Article 111, the law on national defense 
as well as the directive for the preparations and undertaking of measures and activities for 
the elimination of crises in the country. It was only on April 2 that the Presidency of the 
SFRY decided on the establishment of a measure of readiness at the first, second and tertiary 
level in the whole territory of the SFRY and, in particular, in certain republics and provinces 
(AS, Đ-2/304/1981).  
Given that the decision to send the special units and the army was taken on April 2, 
then who ordered the sending of "additional forces" on March 26, 1981? Even though Vllasi 
claims that Mahmut Bakalli and Xhavit Nimani125 said they did not request these troops and 
that the SFRY sent these forces on their own, the archives reveal the opposite to true. In his 
report to the 13th session of the CC and the SRS LoC, Bakalli reiterated that the Kosovo 
Provincial Committee had had to ask for help from the SRS because even if Kosovo wanted 
 
125 Xhavit Nimani was a Chairman of the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosova.  
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to mobilize their entire reserve police force to remedy the situation, they did not have 
enough uniforms to do so.  
Kosovo received uniforms from Bosnia and Vojvodina and managed to activate 
4,500 policemen, says Bakalli, but, still, "We were unable to complete the tasks. This was 
the reason we asked for assistance: first, we requested one special police force unit from the 
SRS and then the SFRY forces." In his speech, Bakalli also asked those present to keep 
these reports a secret from "our enemies," because "I am furnishing this information to 
prove that it is not true that these were unilateral actions of the SRS police as the popular 
story purports, but that the deployment of all these forces was requested by our side" (AS 
Đ-2/304/1981). Additionally, during the 72nd session of the Presidency of the SFRY held 
on April 28, 1981 in Belgrade, where members of the SFRY Presidency, as well as 
Presidents of all six SFRY republics  and the two provinces participated, Lazar Koliševski, 
a communist political leader from Macedonia, stated that the SFRY had stopped the 
counterrevolutionary escalation in Kosovo by means of  vigorous action; "the political 
leaders of Kosovo agreed not only to receive support, but they asked for it from us." He also 
demanded that the SFRY not remove its forces from Kosovo "until the illegal groups are 
dismantled" (AJ, 837/364).  
Dušan Janjić, at that time a member of the SRS committee for dealing with 
ethnicities (Kosovo), insisted that the Serbian leadership, especially Draža Marković (with 
whom he worked), was against military measures and interventions in Kosovo. This was 
because they knew that the presence of the military could damage relations between 
Albanians and Serbs even more. Instead, according to Janjić, it was the leadership of 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbian politicians, who were influenced by Russia, who 
insisted on military intervention against the students and "ovo je ljutilo demonstrante (this 
pissed off the demonstrators)" (Janjić: February 2016). In light of this situation, the 
document "Presidency of SFRY no. DT111/5 dated May 13, 1981," shows that the SFRY 
republics also agreed to develop a military and war plan for defense. These can be 
considered as signs presaging the dissolution of the SFRY, for already all was not well 
within the federation. Learning from their experience with the demonstrations of 1968, it 
should have been clear to the authorities that the greater the pressure from the state, the 
bigger the resistance from the students. 
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4.4.2.2. The bloody April of 1981  
On April 1, the demonstrations spread throughout Kosovo. Students kept adding ethnic and 
ideological dimensions to their social demands, while political structures considered these 
demands as a potential source of destabilization for the entire SFRY. During the Joint 
Session of the Presidency of the SRS, LoC, CC, and the Presidency of the Federal SRS, 
held on April 1, 1981, participants also included Petar Sepić, the commander of the First 
Army, Vinobran Stanojević, Secretary of the Internal Affairs of the SRS, and other officials 
responsible for national security. After reporting on the political situation and Kosovo's 
inability to stabilize it, the chairman urged activation of the plan and measures to stabilize 
the situation (AS Đ-2/304/1981). As a result, additional SFRY and SRS forces headed 
towards Kosovo. The police’s brutal intervention only served to further fuel the students' 
resistance. On March 28, 1981, some UP faculties boycotted the institution, accusing the 
system of returning to "Ranković's methods" of punishment. Prishtina was reported as 
"extraordinarily demolished," while the organizers had managed to get high school and 
university students, teachers, and several workers out into the streets. All reserve police 
units, as well as territorial defense headquarters, were mobilized. In addition to the decision 
of the SFRY to send more forces, an order was given to arm and to reinforce their units for 
the provision of vital facilities in the province. Bakalli declared that even though a large 
number of communists in Prishtina were engaged, Kosovo could not "organize properly to 
defeat the enemies." That is why the decision was made to demand support for strengthening 
the security situation.  
During this entire period Kosovo authorities were in close touch with the presidency 
of the SFRY, the Presidency of the SRS, and the Presidency of Kosovo, which was also 
fully mobilized. While chairing the session, Bakalli stressed how the authorities tried to 
avoid the use of guns and in some cases even the use of tear gas among the workers, hoping 
that they would be able to convince them through negotiations. During the discussions, 
however, "other solutions" were mentioned, which included preparation of JNA (Yugoslav 
Peoples Army) units. Bakalli urged his communist comrades to deploy these units 
immediately – together with wagons, tanks and other forces and equipment – to Prishtina 
to calm the situation. This was not due to the lack of police forces, since by then Kosovo 
had received the "SRS's support"; however, the regime’s tear gas and the police batons 
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could not restrain the masses. The joint session of both Presidencies in Kosovo, held on the 
April 2, 1981 was begun while the "hostile demonstrations were continuing from 
yesterday," said Bakalli. A general from the JNA, continued Bakalli, said that once we 
decided about this issue he was ready with his units for action. Military tanks were 
considered to be the only way to restrain the unarmed demonstrators. Another decision that 
was also made was to close the UP and high schools in Prishtina, by the order of the 
Provincial Secretary.  
As for the other municipalities, the most difficult situation was reported to be in 
Podujeva. Immediately after April 1, the authorities decided to declare "semi-administrative 
measures" in this municipality (AK LoCPC/1981/85). During this period, documents show 
massive mobilization of communist politicians in every municipality, not only of cadres 
from Kosovo but also of people from the SRS and the SFRY. As early as April 2, Mahmut 
Bakalli declared that he was already having problems with his throat and that he had lost 
his voice. This was due to his constantly having to speak and even shout while engaging 
with diverse groups and trying to calm the situation in the field.  
The hardest days of demonstrations were Thursday, April 2 and Friday, April 3. 
Ordinary citizens were angry and joined the students in the demonstrations. Workers126 also 
joined organized groups, claiming they were trying to defend their children. High school 
students also joined in demands for a republic. Active demonstrations started in Prizren, 
Ferizaj/Uroševac, Gjilan, Mitrovica, Podujeva, Gllogoc, Viti, etc. Since Prishtina was the 
only Kosovo city with a university, demonstrations in other cities were mainly supported 
by other social groups, such as workers, high school students, and ordinary citizens. The 
propaganda machine on the other side coordinated its actions accordingly. As a result of 
police brutality and propaganda launched by different parties involved in the movements, 
the situation escalated quickly. The police were shooting into the crowds, collectively 
beating men and women, and firing tear gas at people. Demonstrators responded by 
throwing stones. The police reported that the demonstrators were also shooting at the police. 
Bakalli's report to the joint session of the SFRY Presidency confirmed that one policeman 
 
126 The workers included those from the construction company “Ramiz Sadiku” of Prishtina, a factory producing 
shock absorbers, a part of the “Kombinat of Obiliq,” a part of the workers of the Trepça/Trepča Mines, and others. 
An eye witness of these events stated that messengers arrived from Prishtina to inform the miners in Trepça/Trepča 
that the special police were killing their children on the streets of Prishtina! These messages were emotional 
blackmail aimed at mobilizing the miners to join the demonstrators. Such a detail speaks about the level of 




of Albanian nationality was killed, three policemen were injured by fire, nine protestors 
were killed (eight with automatic guns) and one drowned. In his book "Martyrs of the 
Albanian Spring of 1981," Novosella states that Naser Hajrizi, Aslan Pireva, Xhalal Maliqi, 
and Salih Abazi were killed in Prishtina on April 2, 1981. These deaths were followed by 
additional killings: Rizah Matoshi and Sherif Frangu were killed in Ferizaj/Uroševac on 
April 3, 1981, and the deaths of Salih Zeka and Ruzhdi Hyseni occurred in Vushtrri on April 
3, 1981.  
During attempts to commemorate the first year after these events, Afrim Abazi from 
Ferizaj/Uroševac was arrested. The torture to which he was subjected in the police station 
made him jump from the fourth floor of the police building (Novosella 2011). People who 
lost their lives were between 17 and 71 years old; they included five who were high school 
students under the age of 18), one university student, two workers, and one retiree from 
different cities and regions of Kosovo. The ages of those killed attests to the fact that the 
students managed to mobilize the general population, but the majority of those killed were 
mainly innocent youngsters. The precise number of wounded is not known. According to 
data offered by academic Minir Nushi, former UP rector, around 80 students and pupils 
were wounded and around 700 students imprisoned (Dushi 2004). A report sent by Kosovo 
authorities to the SFRY Presidency after the demonstrations specifies nine killed (eight 
citizens and one police officer), 75 wounded, as calculated on the basis of those who 
requested medical assistance (55 from automatic guns), 127 police wounded (three 
seriously), one police car burned, four damaged by fire, and 12 with broken glass. Measures 
were taken against 28 people who were formally indicted by the court; police reports were 
filed against 193 people; 807 persons were arrested; 689 were officially warned; 544 guns 
were confiscated (66 people did not have permits to carry guns), and 1,485 bullets of 
different calibers were seized (AJ 803/498). The majority of wounded protestors did not 
seek medical assistance, knowing that their names would be registered. Thus, according to 
the student organizers/participants interviewed, the number of wounded protestors was 
much higher. It is also interesting to note that all of the individuals interviewed for this 
study declared that during the demonstrations Albanian protestors did not attack their 
Serbian colleagues (students, workers, etc.). The members of illegal groups and other 
organizers of the demonstrations explained that "we didn't have a problem with any 
community in Kosovo, not even with Serbs." Rather, they saw their problem as being with 
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the official politics of Belgrade. Additionally, the students and members of illegal groups 
who were interviewed declared that they wanted Kosovo Republic not to orient Albanian 
politics against any of the nations in the SFRY, but to be equal at the federative level with 
the other nations, being of the mindset that the "Serbs of Kosovo were not a problem for 
Albanians" (J. Krasniqi, Çeku, Novosella, Hyseni, Bytyqi, etc.).  
However, given that numerous reports indicate that inter-ethnic relations were tense 
during the early 1980s, I am more inclined to consider these declarations as an example of 
memories being biased in retrospect, consonant with the contemporary focus in Kosovo on 
multi-ethnic tolerance. This is particularly so in view of the fact that most of the individuals 
I interviewed who participated in the demonstrations later became politicians or prominent 
intellectuals. While on the one hand they tended to present themselves as "innocent or 
peaceful" demonstrators, on the other, some of them claimed to have been victims, accusing 
Kosovo Serbs who mainly lived in a more privileged area of the cities – such as the city 
center – of throwing boiling water, stones, flower pots, and other heavy or metal objects at 
the Albanian demonstrators. I am not saying that this is definitely not true, but most 
probably Serb witnesses – whom I unfortunately could not interview – would likely tell us 
something completely different. In addition to my intention to be critical of my sources, the 
medical doctor Agim Bytyqi recalled how a few days after the demonstrations, as a student 
at the Faculty of Medicine in his last year of study, he was asked by Professor Mustaf Cakaj 
(a neuropsychiatrist) to take one patient’s medical history. Bytyqi explained that she came 
into the office and started telling the doctors how from her shoe shop in the city center of 
Prishtina: "I was throwing stones and boiling water at the fucking Šiptari." In the clinic 
there were a few Albanian doctors and students of Medical Faculty in their last year of 
study, and they asked the patient why she was cursing. But the Serbian patient, stated Dr. 
Bytyqi, started yelling and swearing even more, saying that "all Albanian mothers are 
whores," etc. The young Albanian doctors started to react, yelling back at her, and Professor 
Cakaj intervened, saying to the woman, "Sweetheart, calm down," and he asked the nurse 
to send the patient to another room. The professor asked his students and younger colleagues 
to calm down as well, and in a private conversation with the Albanian students, he explained 
that this Serbian patient, for these actions, was to be sentenced to a month in prison on the 
basis of having a psychiatric examination for mental illness. An Albanian youth, however, 
for the same acts would have been sentenced to seven years. All of them were very young, 
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and Professor Cakaj warned that "if at this age they experience prisons and violence, they 
will never be afraid of wars" (Bytyqi; February 2018). Indeed, later developments proved 
Professor Cakaj to be right about everything he said.  
During the 85th joint session of the Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the 
LoC of Kosovo and the Presidency of the SAP Kosovo held on April 2, 1981, Serbian party 
members of the province stated that the country had come to the point where constitutional 
order and territorial integrity were being threatened. Dušan Ristić expressed his concerns 
that "we came to a point when the army had to appear" (AK LoCPC/1981/85). Ristić also 
expressed fears that it would soon come to the point when members of the party would lose 
trust in each other. And, indeed, by that time mistrust had already appeared among workers 
and ordinary citizens. Trust had been considerably shaken even among the political elites. 
For example, at a TV station in Serbia, on the evening of April 1, at a debate in which some 
of the communist cadres participated, a discussion about "who is more and who is less 
Yugoslavian" had already started. This meant that the "kitchen" in Belgrade had already 
started to cook the "lack of trust" issues for the Albanian communist leadership in the SFRY 
(AK LoCPC/1981/85). However, Veli Deva's main concern was propaganda that came from 
the Albanian side which – according to him – was against the Kosovo, SRS and SFRY 
political elites. Since the beginning of the 1981 demonstrations, the SFRY authorities had 
insisted on stopping the transmissions of Radio and TV Tirana to Kosovo as well as 
strengthening the network signal of Radio Prishtina, which unfortunately could not be heard 
at all in Tirana or elsewhere in Albania. However, they were unable to do so. It was clear 
that the Republic of Albania had invested much more than the SFRY in this type of 
technology. Owing to the lack of technological capability, Radio Prishtina could not 
transmit to Albania at all (AK LoCPC/1981/99).  
The Republic of Albania was also mobilized for propagandistic action, using its 
embassies in Europe, as well as TV, radio and the press to disseminate information about 
the events of 1981. While the illegal groups and the Republic of Albania labeled the 1981 
demonstrations as a peaceful uprising of the general population for the national rights of 
Albanians in the SFRY, the "progressivists" described these demonstrations as having 




During a meeting held on April 22, 1981, the SFRY Presidency decided to resume 
strong measures against Albanian irredentism; units of the Yugoslav Army and the police 
would remain in Kosovo as long as there was any risk. They also decided to create a special 
working group to monitor any future risk (AJ 803/101). The Joint Session of the Presidency 
of the SRS LoC CC and the Presidency of the Federal SRS held on April 23, 1981 came up 
with the following conclusions: Albanian nationalism exists in Kosovo; ideas of a Greater 
Albania exist; and the main motivation for Albanian nationalism is anti-Serb and anti-
Montenegrin, because these groups are not allowing Albanians to realize their idea of a 
Greater Albania (AS Đ-2/327/1981). The Presidency of the PC of the Kosovo LoC took 
very active security and political measures to – as they said – "stabilize the situation" in the 
province. Even the most senior members of the LoC were mobilized and very actively 
engaged in the field. In their reports127 presented at the 112th session of the Presidency of 
the Kosovo PC, chaired by Deva (Fadil Hoxha also participated), one notes very detailed 
information from discussions with the citizens of different towns and villages around 
Kosovo (AK LoCPC/1981/112). By June 10, 506 persons were reported as having been 
arrested by the police: 287 for participating in demonstrations, 38 for being in lines where 
demonstrations were being held, 31 for organizing demonstrations, 46 for writing slogans 
and distributing brochures, 104 for publicly appearing at "enemy" events, and 15 for 
organizing criminal acts against the state. In addition, the regime identified 137 people 
engaged in "illegal acts": 60 high school pupils, 29 students, 12 teachers, 16 professors, 4 
lawyers, 2 technicians, 2 workers, 1 farmer, 1 politician, 1 policeman, 1 instructor, 1 
dactylography officer and 1 journalist (AK LoCPC/1981/105). The SFRY Presidency 
concluded that 1,500 individuals had been arrested under suspicion of organizing enemy 
activities, including 37 Serbs, 1 Montenegrin and 1 Muslim (referring to Bosnians or 
Gorans), whereas the rest were Albanians (AS Đ-2/30/1981). The Supreme Court of 
Kosovo sentenced 21 students to jail terms 128  for a combined sentence of 223 years 
(Demonstrations Judgment of Supreme Court, AP-KZH, nr.437/81).  
 
127 In the 112th session of the Presidency of the Kosova Provincial Committee chaired by Veli Deva and held on 
September 5, 1981, Sveto Vuković reported for Lipjan and Glogovc, Jovan Bogičević for Podujeva, Predrag 
Cuckić for Mitrovica, Iljaz Kurteshi for Vushtrri and Leposavić, Sinan Hasani for Gjakova, Kaqanik and Deçan, 
Azem Vllasi for Peja and Istog, Xhevdet Hamza for Suhareke, Prizren and Rahovec, Mustafa Pljakić in 
Ferizaj/Uroševac and Gjilan, Petar Kostić for Kamenica and Vitia.  
128 Ramadan Dobra (6), Murat Musliu (13), Selim Geci (6), Gani Vllahna (6), Merxhan Avdyli (15), Gani Koci 
(15), Januz Januzi (10), Kadri Kryeziu (10), Bedri Deliu (6), Ali Lajci (15), Hamdi Hajdini (13), Riza Demaju 
129 
 
4.4.3. After the demonstrations: crime and punishment 
Arguably, the Kosovo leadership lost control of the situation and never regained it. During 
the 13th session of the LoC of Serbia, held on April 10, 1981, Serbian politician Tihomir 
Vlaškaljić confirms that the SRS ministry of internal affairs took charge of the security 
situation in Kosovo after the outbreak of the demonstrations. Even though, according to 
Vlaškaljić, the main intention was restoring normalcy in Kosovo, other hostile actions such 
as sabotage, diversion, strikes, etc., could be expected. Serbian leaders bragged about the 
measures that they were taking to prevent "counterrevolutionary actions," confirming that 
these actions were supported and embraced by the working people and citizens of the SRS. 
They also claimed to be offering "full support to the views of the leadership of the SFRY, 
SRS, and SAP Kosovo" (AS, Đ-2/304/1981).  
As far as the Yugoslav Army troops were concerned, they were mainly engaged in 
the protection of facilities and institutions. Bakalli reported that the military troops managed 
to establish good relationships with the citizens in whichever institution or municipality 
they were located. Indeed, no conflicts were reported between citizens and the Yugoslav 
Army troops. The demonstrators were faced in the streets and dormitory with the police 
forces. Bakalli claims that the biggest casualty of these demonstrations was inter-ethnic 
tensions and damage to relations between Kosovo and the SRS. As if they had not existed 
for over a century! In a document handed over to the Presidency of the SFRY (April 24, 
1981), Vidoje Žarković, a communist politician from Montenegro, stated that the Kosovo 
leadership had failed to accurately assess the situation in a timely manner. The Provincial 
Presidency was also accused of playing with numbers, as they had reported that only 3,000 
people had participated, whereas the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs understood 
from its sources that 10-12,000 people had demonstrated, whereas Tanjug – a state news 
agency based in Belgrade – reported the participation of 15,000 people. Based on these 
numbers, the SRS considered it realistic to expect that the enemy would not back down but 
would be back for more. Communist leaders from other republics as well – among them, 
Franjo Herljević/Bosnia, and Cvijetin Mijatović – blamed the Kosovo leadership for a lack 
of coordination, for not sharing important reports and documents related to the events with 
the secretariats of internal affairs of other republics, etc. Serbian diplomat Dobrivoje Vidić 
 
(13), Syle Mujaj (10), Rame Demaja (6), Bajram Kosumi (15), Musli Kosumi (10), Gani Maxhuni (8), Gani 
Vllahiu (8), Fahri Ymeri (6), Halil Osmani (10), Xun Ceta (13). 
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noted that everyone was already convinced that the center of what was happening in Kosovo 
was in Tirana. He also blamed the SFRY, Serbia, Tito, and Kardelj for making it easier for 
Tirana to conduct propaganda against the SFRY. While Kosovo communists Xhavit Nimani 
and Fadil Hoxha tried to justify their failure, Serbian politicians called on the SFRY to find 
out whether this was only a matter of coordination or whether something more sinister was 
afoot. Vidić volunteered to prepare his analysis and share it with those interested. The blame 
for these events lay with the Kosovo leadership, because it did not foresee potential crises 
but instead considered the situation as "nothing serious" (AJ, 837/364-II-2).  
These were the immediate signals that the Kosovo communist leadership was also 
suspected of involvement in the organization of the demonstrations and of being "traitors 
to the SFRY." The explanation that the party had been caught by surprise by these actions 
was not accepted as a justification. After the 1968 demonstrations, the first signals of 
another mobilization appeared in 1973 from an illegal group named "Revolutionary 
Movement of United Albanians," affiliated with Adem Demaçi. In 1974, this organization 
distributed pamphlets with nationalist content. SRS authorities had not noticed any enemy 
actions during the period 1974-1978, but there were some moves from "Albanian 
irredentists" in foreign countries. As a result, some nationalist pamphlets showed up again. 
In 1978, the centenary of the League of Prizren was used as an excuse to distribute 
nationalist propaganda. In 1978 alone, 600 people who participated in "irredentist 
groups/events" were identified; their political ideology matched Enver Hoxha's views. 
During 1979 three illegal groups in Prishtina, Gjilan and Suhareke, respectively, were 
apprehended, and 650 pamphlets and graffiti were confiscated in public spaces.  
During 1980, the Secretariat of Internal Affairs discovered that an emigré 
organization, "Fronti i Kuq (Red Front)," had printed around 60,000 pamphlets in Stuttgart. 
Communist elites of the SFRY angrily asked the provincial leadership if these signs were 
not sufficient justification for them to prepare for a political threat coming from illegal 
groups. The SFRY Presidency urged the political leadership to wage an intense fight against 
the irredentist groups. The only chance to prevent further demonstrations was considered to 
be the use of "vigorous violence." It was also decided that the SFRY police and military 
units would remain in Kosovo "as long as there is a potential risk of demonstrations." All 
ties with Albania were cut, and everything that might "harm the SFRY" needed to be 
eliminated. Professors from Albania were forbidden from visiting or engaging with the UP, 
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while the SFRY and other republics were urged to send a greater number of cadres "to 
support" internal affairs units in the province (AJ, 837/364-II-2).  
The SFRY authorities were recognized for the extremely violent methods that they 
employed against the arrested "enemies." Participants in or organizers of demonstrations 
whom I interviewed for this study were asked about the nature of the torture they endured 
while in jail. They all declared that they were treated inhumanely when being questioned 
by the police or investigative officers as well as in the prisons where they were incarcerated. 
Koci, for example, states that: 
"The system did not choose ways of getting information and used 
torture as their main tool. Because of physical torture, I started 
accepting all accusations, even though I didn't do it. Once, I was taken 
in the middle of the night by three inspectors, Lutfi Ajazi, "Ramqi" 
from Prizren and Asllan Sllamniku, who pushed me into their Lada 
car and started driving. We passed Suhareka and Prizren and then 
headed up towards the mountains. They kept on threatening me ‘We 
will kill you' throughout this time. At one point, they said ‘Here is the 
border with Albania. Get out there. If you survive the army troops 
securing the border, wolves and bears will eat you.' But, even though 
they tried hard, I didn't want to get out and leave the car. When they 
started hitting me with the gunstocks, I fainted. In the morning, I 
discovered they had brought me back to prison, where they arranged 
for me to be examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Skender Boshnjaku. He 
examined me in the presence of inspector Faik Nura (all men 
mentioned in this passage are of Albanian origin). Whenever Dr. 
Boshnjaku asked a question, I told him exactly what happened. 
Instead of diagnosing me medically, he said to Faik Nura ‘He is 
simulating and can handle even more' (Koci: December 2015)".  
However, each of the organizers interviewed emphasized that "others were treated 
even more brutally." I was not able to judge whether this claim was made due to their 
modesty or whether in fact each torture was worse than the other. The reported torture – 
especially during the investigation phase – included beatings until the loss of sensation or 
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fainting, pulling out fingernails, blows to the genitals, bastinado, etc. Hydajet Hyseni's case 
was the most sensitive one. Due to brutal torture and long periods of being kept in "darkness 
and loneliness," while being transported to a normal prison room, he stopped in front of a 
mirror and mistakenly greeted himself, because he did not recognize his own face or body! 
The most shocking part was hearing him say that "there were others that were treated even 
worse than me" (Hyseni: December 2015).  
Vllasi highlighted that even though all these measures were being taken, "still, Serbs 
did not allow us" to stabilize the situation properly. The SRS constantly insisted that 
nationalism and irredentism still presented a threat that could destroy the SFRY. However, 
non-Serbian SFRY representatives were also shocked to see what had happened. There was 
an impression all over the SFRY that Albanians were against the SFRY. Albanian 
"progressivists" tried to clear the "embarrassment" by asserting that Albanians were afraid 
of the the SRS, Tito was a guarantee of Kosovo's autonomy, and now that he had died, 
Albanians were afraid of the SRS's return. Thus, the students hoped to get rid of the SRS. 
The non-Serbian SFRY representatives responded with "Okay, but why call on Albania, 
why call on Enver Hoxha, then?" (Vllasi: October 2015). Political elites in the SFRY agreed 
that someone had a finger in stirring the pot, but even though the most suspicious "enemy" 
was Albania, they had no way of proving it. While politicians were arguing about these 
details, in Kosovo authorities reported that the Secretariat for Internal Affairs had "taken 
measures" against 1,500 persons. Misdemeanor procedures had been initiated, and 460 
persons were punished with prison sentences of just two months each. Criminal proceedings 
were initiated on various bases, including direct participation in demonstrations, affiliation 
with the organization of the demonstrations, writing graffiti, offensive public behavior in 
the demonstrations, etc. However, officers declared that they were still working on the 
matter and that their main aim was to find the key organizers of these hostile 
demonstrations. The provincial Secretariat of Internal Affairs also confirmed that these 
numbers did not include those against which “measures were taken" outside of "state 
security premises." Otherwise, at the student dormitories alone, there were around 20,000 
students. In each room there was at least one badly injured student (AK LoC/1981/99). By 
warning that there was a serious risk of new actions, the authorities legitimized any further 




4.4.4. Who stood behind the demonstrations of 1981 then? 
After Kosovo's liberation (1999), certain individuals or interest groups claimed to be "the 
organizers of the 1981 demonstrations." Most of the students who were involved in some 
way in the organization of the student movements of 1981 became active in politics during 
and after the 1990s. Thus, their claims of being "the organizers of a patriotic movement" 
helped them to reap political benefits. Meyer and Lupo would have analyzed these 
intentions from the perspective of "how collective actions might be shaped by political 
opportunities" (Meyer and Lupo 2010; 139). Findings indicate that when it comes to the 
organization of the 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo, students were not alone. Here various 
"power-hungry" actors, authorities and interests were involved. Soon after the April 
demonstrations, Stane Dolanc, 129  the head of the Council for the Protection of 
Constitutional Order, reported about the events. Inter alia, he also confirmed that as per the 
reports of the SFRY intelligence services, "someone had a hand in inciting these events, but 
we still do not know who." The most suspicious "enemy" was Albania, even though Dolanc 
declared that he had no information to prove that the leadership of the Republic of Albania 
had taken part in the organization of these demonstrations. Vllasi also confirms that "our 
analysis never proved the engagement of Albania" (Vllasi: October 2015).  
In an interview for a TV Klan documentary entitled "Çerek shekulli” (Quarter of a 
Century),130 Ramiz Alia131 stated that the Republic of Albania had received information 
about some problems in Kosovo, however, they had no idea what was going on. When 
Enver Hoxha, who was in Gjirokaster that day of April 1981, was informed, he ordered that 
the borders be blocked. This shows that Hoxha might have been afraid that, fleeing violence, 
Kosovars might try to enter Albania. In this interview, Alia also confirmed that the Republic 
of Albania had had contacts with illegal groups but was unaware of plans to organize 
demonstrations.  
Archival documents of the Republic of Albania also show that when representatives 
of the Sector on Kosovo and Yugoslavia (operating within Albania's Ministry of Internal 
 
129 Stane Dolanc was an SFRY communist politician from Slovenia, one of President Tito’s closest collaborators 
and one of the most influential people in SFRY politics in the 1970s and 1980s.  
130 Baton Haxhiu & Andi Bushati, in the documentary “Çerek shekulli (Quarter of a Century," treat the fall of 
communism, the birth of the LDK and the KLA, and the NATO intervention of 1999. Interpreted mainly by 
protagonists of the time. Available at: https://vimeo.com/25878406 [Last accessed on 15/02/2019] 
131 Ramiz Alia was the second and last communist leader of Albania, and the country’s head of state from 1982 to 
1992. He had been designated as successor by Enver Hoxha and took power after Hoxha died. 
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Affairs) met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, they accepted their "guilt" by reporting 
that "recent events in Kosovo happened unexpectedly, we did not foresee them, and we 
were unable to inform our leadership in advance!" (AMFA 1141/1981). Albania's regime 
requested further analysis: "Why did our sectors fail to evaluate this situation properly, and 
why are we not able even today to identify who the organizers are, and who is hidden behind 
them" (ibid.). Albania's Minister of Foreign Affairs urged the embassies to understand more 
about who the organizers were while warning that "with Kosovans, we should keep a well-
measured position" (AMFA 1141/1981). Another argument that might be used as evidence 
that these events really were not organized by the Republic of Albania is the fact that that 
government was basing its knowledge about the event on reports filed by truck drivers 
(transporters) coming from the SFRY (CAA 1681/1981/28). If the Albanian state had been 
involved in organizing these events, the declarations of the truck drivers would not have 
been used as one of the only sources of information concerning what was happening during 
the student demonstrations in Kosovo. Be that as it may, during the joint meeting between 
the headquarters of the LoC of Kosovo and the SAP of Kosovo, held April 15, 1981, 
numerous decisions were made. Kosovo communists were urged to develop ideological-
political and propagandistic work which took the offensive in dealings with the Republic of 
Albania's leadership and "their intentions in Kosovo," characterizing them as threatening 
the SFRY's territorial integrity. SFRY communists were urged to speak and write 
energetically and critically about these issues. Promoting the SFRY's ideology and 
increasing Yugoslav patriotism were also considered "musts," together with being critical 
of nationalist and irredentist systems and ideologies, such as those of the Workers Party of 
Albania. Enver Hoxha – concluded SFRY communists – did not consider himself merely 
the President of Albania, but he also glorified himself as a leader of all Albanians in the 
SFRY. The SFRY communists decreed a ban on every medium or transmission originating 
from the Republic of Albania. Measures against historiography were also to be taken, 
meaning that every nationalist and irredentist statement should be removed, and such 
discussions should be forbidden between students and professors or teachers. The 
Presidency of Kosovo was urged to ban all protocols or programs of cooperation (except 
trade relations) with the Republic of Albania.  
The links with the educational and cultural institutions which made it possible for 
the Republic of Albania to channel their "nationalist and irredentist ideologies" were cut. 
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Serbian representatives in these meetings highlighted that while “we” have been telling the 
Republic of Albania that this is a cooperation between states (SFRY and Albania), they had 
only been helping their "Albanian brothers in the SFRY." Meanwhile, Serbian communist 
politicians considered the Albanian leadership in Kosovo to be responsible for allowing the 
Republic of Albania to promulgate nationalist ideologies at the UP. According to Serbian 
politicians, the SAP of Kosovo tried to offer the Republic of Albania "warm acceptance and 
relations," and it had abused that offer by spreading ideologies that harmed the SFRY and 
its Albanians citizens. Furthermore, security institutions were urged to – as efficiently as 
possible – uncover all units or illegal groups that had promoted or organized hostile actions 
in Kosovo and destroy their activities and investigate their linkages with Albania and with 
the security services of great powers (AK LoCPC/1981/87). Now one thing was clear, after 
decades of struggle with one another, during the 1981 student demonstrations the ruling 
Kosovo political elites had to choose between "joining" the student demands for further 
advancement toward the status of a republic – including the demands of members of illegal 
groups – or sticking to the SFRY political platform, which treated the Albanian movements 
as counterrevolutionary and irredentist. The "progressivists" decided to follow the SFRY 
platform, which led them to engage in severe repressions against their own compatriots. At 
that time rumors persisted that the Russian KGB132 had their hand in this, but there was no 
official information to prove their engagement either. Živan Berisavljević (SFRY 
ambassador in London from 1976 to 1988) mentioned that he heard from NATO sources 
that the student demonstrations in Prishtina were prepared (Berisavljević, 2015). NATO 
General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, in his book "The Third World War," explicitly stated 
that the war would start in Kosovo and that the Russians would come in at the invitation of 
SRS units (Hackett, 1979). The book was almost certainly the result of NATO analysts' 
projections at that time.  
The Rand Corporation published a report on the situation in SFRY in 1982, 
indicating that "Moscow had somehow been involved in stirring up disturbances in 
Kosovo," while Albanian "complicity was generally assumed" (Biserko 2012: 209). During 
my interview with Sonja Biserko, she also claimed  Russian involvement and that these 
demonstrations were used to open the Serbian question in Kosovo as a way of mobilizing 
 
132 KGB is the acronym for “Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti,” known in English as the Committee for 
State Security, which was the name of the Soviet Union’s security agency from 1954 to 1991. 
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Serbs throughout the SFRY because of the Serbs’ strong emotional attachment to Kosovo 
(Biserko: November 2015). Janjić also insisted strongly on the involvement of the KGB in 
the organization of the student demonstrations in Prishtina. He made this claim and referred 
to documents that were shared with the SRS leadership and members of the party which 
were dealing with Kosovo (such as himself). However, during our interview, he told me 
"…but you will never find such information in the archives."  
Janjić's further argument is equally interesting. The Albanian ‘illegal groups' that 
organized the demonstrations were Marxist-Leninist. They were connected to the Russians 
as a legacy of the Stalinist idea for a Balkan federation. For example, Janjić insists that 
Demaçi was a Stalinist who proclaimed the idea of a Balkan federation idea even during the 
1990s. According to Janjić, the dispute between Hoxha and Tito over a Balkan federation 
concerned the issue of who would be president and who would be prime minister. 
Yugoslavia was a South Slavic union, but Russia wanted to put all Albanians into one 
"union" so that they could control both the Albanians and the South Slavs more easily. The 
SFRY ended up as “unaligned” and therefore with some ties to the West (Wilson doctrine), 
which, according to Janjić, insisted on a federation that was more democratic than ethnic. 
Finally, Janjić concluded that both the Albanian and Russian embassies used the ‘illegal 
groups' for the same reason, to destabilize the SFRY (Janjić, February 2016).  
Professor Skënder Rizaj, an Albanian scholar and historian who specialized in the 
Ottoman period of Balkan history, in his papers given to the Archives of Kosovo offers 
interesting insights about the organization of these movements. He believes that the moral, 
political and penal responsibility for the destabilization of Tito's Yugoslavia and Enverist 
Albania belongs exclusively to pan-Slavism133 as a philosophy, policy, and platform. These 
movements, according to Rizaj, were planned by the Academy of Sciences in Serbia in 
cooperation with the Academy of Sciences in Russia and were organized to achieve the 
goals of Pan-Slavism. The decision for the demonstrations of 1981 was taken in Istanbul, 
in a hidden meeting at the house of Tevfik Saraçoğlu134 (known as, Straja). Saraçoğlu 
informed him personally – in October 1980 – of the coming demonstrations, with the 
 
133 Dating from the 19th century, Pan-Slavism is a political ideology concerned with the advancement of integrity 
and unity for the Slavic-speaking peoples. 
134 Tevfik Saraçoğlu was an immigrant from Prishtina who owned a shop in which he sold handbags and whose 
political orientation was that of "ademdemaqian” and “enverist.” Professor Rizaj wrote that Adem Demaqis’ 
friends always slept in his house in Istanbul. He had good relations with ambassadors from Albania. Rizaj 
described him "as sincere but naive - he spends lots of money for patriotic/Albanian issue."    
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slogans "Kosovo Republic," "Down with the SFRY," "Long live Enver Hoxha," etc. 
Professor Rizaj advised this person to bear in mind that Tito had died but that his reputation 
in the world lived on, whereas Enver Hoxha was not liked by either the Warsaw Pact or the 
NATO states. As an atheist, continued Professor Rizaj, Hoxha was also not liked in the 
Arab world, and, as it is known, important issues such as the Republic of Kosovo could not 
be settled without the involvement of friends and allies. However, the decision to go forward 
with organizing these demonstrations was voted on by the representatives of the Marxism, 
Leninism, and Stalinism party from Kosovo (followers of Adem Demaçi) and 
representatives of the Albanian foreign service (followers of Mehmet Shehu135). Jusuf 
Gërvalla, 136  who participated in this meeting, did not support the idea of starting the 
demonstrations, justifying this view with the fact that there were no conditions for it, 
because Albanians were divided among different groups and ideologies. In the end, 
Gërvalla was killed by agents of Serbian state security. Rizaj insists that the actors in these 
demonstrations were some professors of the UP and the UT who were coordinated by the 
state security institutions of Serbia (UDBA) and Albania (“Sigurimi” under instructions 
from Mehmet Shehu), following instructions from Russia’s secret services. As a statist, 
Rizaj considered the university and high school students to be a naive element of society, 
albeit with a revolutionary spirit. They were manipulated by their teachers and leaders, who, 
according to him, were intoxicated by the opium of Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, Pan-
Slavism, and Atheism. Demonstrations took place in almost every town in Kosovo and 
some of the towns in Macedonia. They were synchronized perfectly because they were 
organized by foreign services: UDBA, KGB, and Sigurimi (of Mehmet Shehu). Rizaj adds 
that Albanians enthusiastically joined these demonstrations, thinking that, like the 
demonstrations of 1968, which brought to the Albanians a university, autonomy, etc., these 
would bring them republic status. He also argues that Enver Hoxha did not know about the 
meeting which took place in Istanbul, even though the decision was made in his name (AK 
SR/1945-1999). Archival documents also show that during the 10th plenary meeting of the 
 
135 Mehmet Shehu was an Albanian communist politician who served as Albania’s prime minister from 1954 to 
1981.  
136 Jusuf Gërvalla was a Kosovo Albanian activist, writer, musician, and the founder of several Marxist-Leninist 
and nationalist political groups proclaiming the liberation of Kosovo. Gërvalla was assassinated in Stuttgart in 
January 1982, allegedly by the Yugoslav secret service. Professor Skënder Rizaj claims that Albanian collaborators 
of UDBA and of Sigurimi killed Jusuf Gërvalla, because he was against the Kosovo demonstrations of 1981. in 
the Istanbul meeting, he convinced some Marxists, Leninists, and Stalinists to stop working against their national 
interests, and he had huge authority among Albanian youth in the diaspora. 
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Albanian Workers Party held June 15-16, 1981, Enver Hoxha blamed "Yugoslav 
revisionists, who, in cooperation with Soviet social-imperialism and with other enemies of 
our country, tried to damage us" (CAA 14/1981/109). However, the main purpose of the 
Pan-Slavists, continues Rizaj, was to use these demonstrations as a pretext for eliminating 
Albanian elites in Kosovo by accusing them of being Enverists. However, if they had 
headed to the border with Albania, Mehmet Shehu would have punished them as "Titoists".  
Mehmet Shehu – who according to Rizaj was a Pan-Slavist spy – wanted to kill 
Enver Hoxha as a "destabilizer" of Yugoslavia. To finalize this plan, he proposed that Enver 
Hoxha declare war against Yugoslavia with the justification that it was Albania’s duty to 
defend Kosovo.  In this way, Yugoslavia, would have attacked Albania, whereas internally 
Mehmet Shehu – using the army and Sigurimi – would take advantage of the opportunity 
to have Enver Hoxha and all of his close supporters in Albania killed. However, according 
to Rizaj, US President George Bush thwarted the realization of this plan because of 
American interests in Albania and Kosovo. The USA and Turkey informed Enver Hoxha 
about this plan, resulting in Mehmet Shehu’s ruination in December 1981. It is worth noting 
that in all of the comments of the American press it was "an accepted fact that Albania does 
not have a finger in the demonstrations of Kosovo" (CAA 2782/1981/28). While the 
circumstances of Mehmet Shehu's death (December 1981) are still a mystery, some think 
that he was killed by Enver Hoxha, whereas official sources said that he killed himself. 
After his death, his family was imprisoned and his wife was poisoned. Only in 2001, in the 
newspaper Koha Ditore (22 July 2001), was information published that Mehmet Shehu's 
bones had been located in a village (Ndroq) near Tirana (see also the July 24, 2001, issue 
of the newspaper Zëri). On the one hand, Enver Hoxha executed the entire family of one of 
the longest-serving prime ministers in Albania (1954-1981); on the other, he took Gërvalla's 
family under his care in Tirana.  
A few months after the demonstrations, Professor Rizaj visited Istanbul and went to 
see the "handbag seller" (Tevfik Saraçoğlu). “I was terrified,” said Rizaj, “when I saw that 
his business had been burned to the ground.” Turkish police beat him up and burned their 
family business, arrested Tevfik Saraçoğlu and his brother. Bujar Hoxha, who was a first 
secretary of the Albanian embassy in Ankara and had organized the meeting in Istanbul, 
disappeared from the political scene in Albania, and there were rumors that he also had been 
assassinated in Tirana (AK SR/1945-1999). Aside from the fact that Professor Rizaj's 
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conclusions on this issue can also be categorized as a sort of "conspiracy theory," the reason 
I decided to include them in my dissertation is that – coincidentally or not – a few enigmas 
that he explicated, in one way or another, correspond to numerous equations related to the 
complex situation of that period and can also be supported by archival materials. For 
example, during the second plenum of the 8th Congress of the Albanian Workers Party held 
December 19, 1981, Mehmet Shehu's "suicide" was discussed as was Shehu’s being "a 
dangerous enemy of the Workers Party due to his great political and ideological guilt." 
Enver Hoxha's speech during this congress stated that "Mehmet fought for power…he 
became a friend of our enemies…every action he took was following a plan that he had in 
his head to take the party and the state and turn it in the way that he wanted" (CAA 
14/1981/112).  
Shkelzen Maliqi, a Kosovar intellectual interviewed in Tirana for this dissertation, 
said that these demonstrations were prepared by a group of Albanian emigrés, but with the 
financial support of the Serbian state security administration and the Russian KGB. Mailiqi 
based this information on two sources. He had heard this interpretation from Mahmut 
Bakalli and from his father (Mehmet Maliqi), who was Secretary of Internal Affairs after 
these demonstrations…they even had operational notes for this" (Maliqi: May 2016). 
Additionally, Fadil Hoxha had mentioned the existence of an office in Tirana which had 
dealt with issues of the SFRY since 1948 and was a department of the Republic of Albania’s 
ministry of internal affairs, and he suspected that there was another such office in Istanbul. 
The SFRY Presidency was informed that they were dealing with well-organized agents 
whose "center is not in Kosovo, but they are organizing the irredentist actions in Kosovo 
from abroad." In addition, Fadil Hoxha admitted that people that were put in jail had "sung," 
but only as much as they knew. "They could not go farther, they do not know more, 
otherwise they cannot be that strong not to talk" (AJ, 837/364-II-2). This shows that even 
the people who were directly engaged in the organization of these events might not have 
been properly informed about whom they were working for. Yet during interviews 
conducted with former members of illegal groups or organizers of the 1981 student 
demonstrations (Gani Koci, Hidajet Hyseni, Ethem Çeku, Jakup Krasniqi), I heard strong 
opposition expressed to any possibility of having been manipulated by the Russian 
intelligence services, declaring that this was misinformation coming from the 
"progressivists," because they needed to justify their crimes.  
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The members of the illegal groups and the student organizers insisted that the 
demonstrations were events aimed at preventing Kosovo from ending up in the same 
position as Vojvodina today. They also accused Kosovo's communist elites of trying to find 
a justification for their crimes and their mistreatment of the students and society in generaly. 
However, as to the question of why Russia would try to dismantle an SFRY whose military 
was mainly dominated by Serbs (Çeku; December 2015), SFRY politicians answered by 
arguing that "a weak Yugoslavia suited the Russians…and Yugoslavia could be weakened 
if threatened with Kosovo and with Macedonia, given that the Bulgarians wanted parts of 
it" (AJ, 837/364-II-2). SFRY communists also argued that Russia would even be ready for 
"Great Albania and Great Bulgaria, but under their control, providing an exit to the Adriatic 
Sea" (ibid.).  
It is also worth mentioning that Albania did not break a bilateral agreement with 
Bulgaria on friendship and mutual assistance. One of the articles of this treaty also obliged 
parties to provide "mutual military assistance in case of foreign aggression or emergency" 
(AJ, 837/364-II-2). Suspicious was also the silence of the East; the Soviet Union did not 
categorize these events as counterrevolutionary, though they wanted the Yugoslavs to 
condemn, for example, the existence of a counterrevolution in Poland. The overall situation 
became every day more and more unclear and unpredictable for all parties involved.  
4.5. Conclusions 
The connections between politics and higher education are obvious in every phase of the 
development of the higher education sector in Kosovo. Each ethnicity within Kosovo, and 
later, each political ideology in the region (SFRY and Republic of Albania), tightly 
interlinked higher education in Kosovo with the objectives of their political domination. 
That is why, depending on the period, "education" for Albanians was either associated with 
a fear of assimilation or seen as a tool for political and national mobilization. Certainly, 
Kosovo and the UP are not exceptions, given that historically education has been used to 
achieve political agendas.  
The UP was (mis)used by different actors, but especially by politicians. Therefore, 
it was not academic values but the intent of promoting political ideologies that seemed to 
have been the primary interest of the multiple parties involved in the struggle for the 
"establishment and development" of the UP. The SFRY leadership proclaimed the political 
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emancipation of Albanians in Kosovo in order to reinforce the "brotherhood and unity" 
platform or "Titoism." The Republic of Albania asserted national "emancipation" amongst 
Albanians in the SFRY while promoting nationalist ideas about a "perfect" Albania and 
"Enverism." Thus, even though functioning to some extent as an academic institution, the 
UP became an arena where different political forces struggled for control. While political 
interference in the educational system in communist and socialist federations/countries was 
"normal," the battle between "Enverist national-communism" ideologies and "brotherhood 
and unity" platforms installed at the UP challenged political borders and raised the 
ambitions of students and, later on, society in general to mobilize on behalf of and 
strengthen Albanian identity in the SFRY.  
In this chapter, I have argued that professors, the dissemination of literature, and 
study visits by Albanians from the SFRY to the Republic of Albania had tremendous 
effects on the political orientation of the students and the wider public in Kosovo. The 
students absorbed and prioritized the ideas absorbed through literature and lectures by 
professors from the Republic of Albania, rather than those by the SFRY, who continued 
to espouse brotherhood and unity. This chapter has also documented that the UP played a 
crucial role in the political and national mobilization of Albanians in Kosovo and the 
SFRY. However, this mobilization did not necessarily produce generations of intellectuals 
capable of the sort of critical thinking that would lead and influence society toward local 
and regional interests. This is because those who established and supported the 
development of the UP, such as the SFRY, Kosovo and the Republic of Albania, did not 
invest in academic values but in the type of "emancipation" (i.e., mobilization) which best 
suited them. The interaction of political and academic actors from the SFRY, the Republic 
of Albania and Kosovo, including students and other actors, made the UP a critical forum 
for imagining and articulating national ideals rather than academic values, which, as 
Anderson maintains, and as already noted above, "once imagined, they are modeled, 
adapted and transformed" (Anderson 1991: 157). When it comes to the question of who 
the "real" organizers of the demonstrations were, the answer remains quite unclear, but the 
findings indicate that the students were not alone on this journey. Different "power-driven" 
actors, authorities, and interests were also involved. It is a common situation that whenever 
such politically important events happen, each interest group tries to take control of what 
is happening and orient it towards its goals, or, if it cannot, at least try to minimize the 
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damages of those particular actions. It is likely that the "real" organizers of these 
movements will only be found after the opening of top-secret materials in the archives of 
the SFRY, the SRS, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Albania. It may take up to 50 
years after events for such materials to be released, and those may be able to provide 
credible answers to the various possible scenarios. The state security services of the 
countries affected by these demonstrations can be expected to have been and probably 
were active, but the findings currently available are insufficient to determine whether they 
were decisive or leading this process. However, involvement and interactions between 
various actors are shown at every stage of the development of student movements. There 
is evidence that the Republic of Albania, or at least Enver Hoxha's clique per se, was not 
directly involved, maybe not even informed, regarding the organization of the 1981 student 
movements in Kosovo. Nevertheless, as a result of economic and political inequalities as 
well as discrimination against Albanians in the SFRY, and, also equally important, the 
politicization of the academic and cultural sectors in Kosovo, the country was faced with 
a student rebellion in early 1981. The demonstrations of March and April 1981 in Prishtina 
started as a student action for better living conditions and ended up as a movement of the 
general population in support of the Republic of Kosovo. Both the nationalist, or, as the 
organizers refer to them, patriotic natures of these demonstrations and the direct 
involvement of illegal groups in the organization of demonstrations (except the one that 
took place on March 11) can be traced, as I attempted to document in this chapter.  
The findings also suggest that while modernists were motivated by SFRY/Titoist 
ideology and illegal groups by Marxist-Leninist-Enverist ideology, the highest price was 
paid by ordinary citizens, particularly the youth. As stated in §4.4.2.2, five people killed 
were high school students, one was a university student, two were factory workers and one 
was a retiree, all from different towns and regions of Kosovo. In contrast, the 
"progressivists" and illegal group activists survived the troubles they caused and continued 
further with their "contribution" to the already complicated situation. One group continued 
to struggle for Kosovo’s integration into the SFRY, whereas another called for a Kosovo 
Republic. It could be argued that the SRS was the actor that derived the greatest political 
benefit from these events: they managed to plant their military boot back in Kosovo, 
whereas the demonstrations brought Kosovo's political elites to the point where they had 
to choose between joining the students’ and illegal groups’ demand for a Republic of 
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Kosovo or sticking to the SFRY political platform, which treated demands for "Republic" 
status for Kosovo as counterrevolutionary and irredentist. The "progressivists" decided to 






Chapter 5: Propaganda: different responses to the 1981 demonstrations 
5.1. Propaganda machines and their influence 
During the April 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo, a propaganda war was in full swing, and 
propaganda was ubiquitous. The SFRY authorities warned about the necessity of being 
careful with propaganda about the situation in Kosovo on an international level, as well as 
about revelations concerning the economic crisis in the SFRY. At the same time, the 
Republic of Albania was conducting propaganda against the SFRY concerning issues 
related to Kosovo by using their embassies and media resources (which were broadcasted 
broadly in Kosovo), etc. Articles in "Zëri i Popullit" published on April 8 and 23 opened 
debates about territorial issues against the SFRY and harmed Yugoslav-Albanian relations. 
An archival report entitled "Information on reactions regarding the events in Kosovo 
(April/May 1981)" highlights how the Republic of Albania's propaganda spread throughout 
the world, damaging the SFRY’s image internationally. The report, however, shows that 
the West did not use these actions to attack the SFRY; on the contrary, they supported the 
independence of the SFRY as a factor for stability in Europe. The Yugoslav political elites 
considered that allowing Albanian emigrés to engage in anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist 
activities was also in the interest of the West as a means to measure the pulse of Yugoslavia. 
The Albanian diaspora organized demonstrations mainly in the USA, Canada, France, 
Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland. Around 30 Ustaša (members of the Croatian Fascist 
revolutionary movement) also participated in one organized on March 25, 1981 in New 
York, right in front of the UN building, and there were also calls for "the liberation of 
Croatia." On April 11, 1981 demonstrations in support of Kosovo were also organized in 
Frankfurt, and on April 12, 1981 in Brussels. In this particular demonstration, Willy 
Kuijpers, who at that time served at the Cultural Council for Dutch Cultural Community 
(1971-1980) and the Flemish Council (1980-1984), also participated. Kuijpers' speech 
invited the democratic powers to address further the "problem of Albanians" in the SFRY 
(AJ, 837/364-II-2). On April 13, 1981 demonstrations were organized in Washington, DC, 
New York, Chicago, and Detroit. Here, besides Albanians, a group of Croatian Ustaša also 
participated, and Hrvoje Lun, a secretary of the Hrvatska Nacionalna Zajednica (Croatian 
National Community), gave a speech. Demonstrations continued during April 1981 in 
Toronto, Zürich, and Munich. A majority of Croatian organizations in exile (especially the 
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HNV) – who were also calling for the dissolution of the SFRY – "showed solidarity" with 
the Albanians and participated in these events. Demonstrations assured high publicity; TV 
interviews were given by the exiled organizers of these demonstrations. In Washington, 
Albanian emigrés Luan Gashi, Jusuf Azemi, and Vehbi Ismajli were received at the White 
House by Republican congressman Richard Blumenthal and by R. Mils, who served as an 
expert on the SFRY in the State Department. The emigrés asked for the support of Congress 
in protecting the rights of the Kosovo Albanians. The State Department informed them that 
these were internal SFRY affairs, and that they did not want to interfere. The SFRY 
Presidency warned against paying special attention to the Albanian proclivity to 
"internationalize the Albanian issue in the SFRY," afraid that internationalization would 
"legalize" Albanian rights to create a republic which would include Albanian-inhabited 
territories in the SFRY, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the federation (AJ, 837/364-
II-2).  
During its 73rd session, held May 8 1981, the Presidency of the SFRY discussed the 
need to increase counterpropaganda against Albania. The Presidency also pointed out the 
need to be to be on the alert for news coming from the Soviet Union and the East. Yugoslav 
communists noted that they had no proof that the demonstrations had been orchestrated by 
the Republic of Albania. That is why SFRY politicians were urged to be especially vigilant 
vis-à-vis the East (Soviet Union), because, according to their sources, there were "more 
indications of the Soviet Union's possible involvement" (ibid.). Indeed, whenever any of 
the SFRY political elites accused the Republic of Albania of being the "organizer of the 
1981 demonstrations," their only argument was that this was best shown by their continuous 
propaganda against the SFRY. And yet through its propaganda, the Republic of Albania 
consistently asserted its non-involvement in the organizing of the demonstrations and its 
contention that the Albanian-inhabited areas of the SFRY were intentionally the most 
neglected and that Albanian citizens were the most discriminated against segment of SFRY 
society (AK LoCPC/1981/99). The lack of coordination between the SFRY and the SRS 
Presidencies is shown in the archival documents as well. For example, when it came to 
monitoring and reporting on Albania’s propagandistic activities, each of these Presidencies 
had different reports on the same issues. As will be revealed in this chapter, after a while 
the SFRY noticed and condemned the SRS's exaggerations and tendency to get involved in 
a propaganda war with the Republic of Albania. At the same time, communist elites made 
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decisions about intensifying internal propaganda actions as well. They started by declaring 
the UP a center for nationalistic indoctrination and separatist teachings, and they 
consequently introduced so-called "ideological-political differentiation." During the 72nd 
session of the Presidency of the SFRY held on April 28, 1981, Fadil Hoxha stated that it 
was necessary to make a serious "differentiation" of those people who were "affected by 
nationalism. We cannot allow the nationalists to teach our children," said Hoxha, while also 
emphasizing the need for assistance in this regard from the entire SFRY (AJ, 803/498). The 
goal of the policy of differentiation was to distinguish loyal from disloyal members of the 
Albanian community, however, loyalty was measured in terms of unquestioning acceptance 
of Yugoslavia's and Serbia's constitutional and territorial order (Kostovicova 2005: 77).  
The "differentiation" process was promoted first by Albanian leadership and 
management in Kosovo (AJ, 837/364-II-2). The Kosovo PC developed an operative plan 
and took extreme measures to stabilize the situation at the UP. One of the activities included 
pushing forward ideological and political differentiation. Except for Ali Hadri and Ukshin 
Hoti, who were punished by the Party, almost all of the other professors and members of 
the intellectual and political elites openly expressed the need to punish the demonstrators 
and other participants in daily newspapers or other media (AK LoC/1981/105). Academic 
Rexhep Qosja,137 for instance, mentioned that he was one of the intellectuals penalized for 
not condemning the student demonstrations of 1981, which turned out to be true (Qosja; 
December 2015). Yet the Rilindja newspaper published a declaration on April 8, 1981 from 
the Institute of Albanology in Prishtina – then headed by Professor Qosja – saying "...we 
condemn the demonstrations of our common foe in Prishtina and Kosovo, we also support 
the security measures taken to assure brotherhood and unity…" (AK Rilindja, April 8, 
1981). During the SFRY Presidency session held May 15, 1981, while reporting on the 
situation as "still unstable," it was decided to dismiss Mustafa Sefedini, Kosovo's Secretary 
for Internal Affairs, from his duty. He was also threatened with political responsibility for 
not finding out in advance about the organization of demonstrations. During the SFRY 
presidency meetings, the tendency of Serbian politicians to take as active a role as possible 
was very much on display, highlighting how, besides Kosovo, the political organs of Serbia 
were also considered responsible for allowing the demonstrations, because they were the 
 
137 Academic Rexhep Qosja (born 1936) is a prominent Albanian politician and literary critic, the author of various 
anthologies and scholarly monographs.  
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republic in which the autonomous province was located (AJ 803/498). A significant number 
of Kosovo Albanians working in state administration were dismissed, sentenced or 
suspended in the name of the "differentiation" measures (AK LoCPC/1981/99). 
Due to these "differentiation" measures, the lists of candidates accepted for 
admission to the UP for the 1981-1982 academic year were first disseminated to the 
respective municipalities so that they could confirm which candidates were 
ideologically/politically suited to be enrolled at the university. The same was done with 
Albanian candidates coming from the neighboring republics of Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia. Azem Vllasi was very specific about this issue, ordering that none who had 
participated in the demonstrations could be enrolled at the university. As for those who were 
already enrolled and had participated in the demonstrations, the regime urged the faculties 
to compile a list of their names, after which the Party was supposed to make the final 
decision. Vllasi also urged authorities and Party structures to put "our" people in the 
university's administration, dormitories, and dining hall. These were the locations where the 
largest number of students had gathered during the demonstrations. Concomitantly, the 
rectorate took measures, calling a halt to all departures abroad for specializations as well as 
limiting travel for symposiums, seminars and academic congresses of an international 
character (AK LoCPC/1981/105, 112). In attempting to justify these actions, Ali Shukriu138 
stressed that the regime was fighting with "counterrevolutionary forces," and only in their 
dreams could they break up these forces within a mere few months. In addition, Shukriu 
urged intelligence units to be very "strong, adventurous, and innovative." Both Veli Deva 
and Ali Shukriu insisted that from then on all information about the meetings and sessions 
of the PC be sent to the LoC in Serbia and the LoC in Yugoslavia (AK LoCPC/1981/112). 
The barrage of propaganda coming from seemingly every direction heightened tensions 
among the different interest groups at local levels. During the 112th session of PC LoC held 
September 5, 1981, Mehmet Maliqi, the newly appointed Secretary of Internal Affairs, 
reported that the security situation in the country was still characterized by intensely hostile 
activities conducted by groups espousing nationalist and irredentist positions. Their actions 
included writing graffiti with nationalistic content, disseminating leaflets, as well as some 
of the activities in which Albanian emigrés abroad were engaged. He also pointed to an 
 
138 Ali Shukriu a Kosovo politician during its period as an autonomous province of Yugoslavia. He served as Prime 
Minister (1963–1967), and later (1981–1982) as a President of Kosovo. 
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increase in activities of a nationalistic nature by Serbs and Montenegrins; these mainly took 
place as comments and reactions. The increasing levels of nationalism from both sides, said 
Maliqi, could not be assuaged without order, and the Kosovo LoC was incapable of dealing 
with the situation that had been created. He also warned that the activities of illegal groups 
were inspiring hostile elements and further actions, which "we are afraid might take place 
at the beginning of the next academic year" (AK LoCPC/1981/112). Whenever the state 
security institutions warned of possible repetitions of the demonstrations, they were granted 
a green light from the Party for further brutal interventions vis-à-vis whoever was suspected. 
As a result, innocent people were also ending up in jails and were mistreated by the police. 
The Secretariat for Internal Affairs reported that over 580,000 persons had passed through 
the police and courts as part of the campaign against "Albanian nationalism and 
irredentism." Thousands of them were convicted, their sentences ranging from thirty days 
to fourteen years of imprisonment (Kullashi 1996; 65, 66). 
5.5.1. Kosovo actions  
Propaganda against Kosovo’s political elites was constantly being intensified, especially by 
the SRS but also by other SFRY politicians. The Albanian political elites in Kosovo were 
blamed for "being part of" or at least for "allowing" the organization of the student 
demonstrations. As a result, the tendency of Albanian political elites to try to look "more 
Catholic than the Pope" or more pro-Yugoslav than the Serbs was on full display in every 
session after the March and April demonstrations. Archival documents show that the 
strongest accusations against the illegal groups or the Republic of Albania, which were 
categorized as "the enemies," came especially from the Albanian political elites in the 
SFRY. Ali Shukriu, for example, stated that the biggest mistake was that the "SFRY's 
cooperation with Albania was allowed to be implemented exclusively through Kosovo" 
(May 5, 1981, Tanjug). He also stated that the damages to public or social properties were 
to be considered as an attack on the system and "those students who were violent will have 
to pay for it" (AK LoCPC/1981/81). Mahmut Bakalli, in a press conference with 
international journalists held April 18, 1981, said "we are aware" that cooperation between 
Kosovo and Albania serves the interests of good neighborly relations between the SFRY 
and Albania, but we will not allow "anyone to manipulate us and provoke hatred among 
Serbs and Albanians in the SFRY" (AK Rilindja, April 19, 1981). Xhavit Nimani also 
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expressed interest in cooperating as long as the cultural exchanges and cooperation between 
Albanians in Kosovo and those in Albania did not lead to bigger inter-ethnic troubles in the 
SFRY (AK Rilindja, April 22, 1981). Fadil Hoxha, while saying that Yugoslavia had 
learned lessons from the behavior of Tirana, added, however, that "we don't want to stop 
cooperation" (April 1981, Radio Prishtina). He also added that Albania, as the poorest 
country in Europe, had more political prisoners than the SFRY, even though the SFRY was 
ten times larger than Albania (AK Rilindja, April 28, 1981). However, their Serbian 
colleagues from the Kosovo LoC, such as Miloš Minić, were also critical, saying that 
Albania had openly defended the Kosovans’ demand for a "Republic." Thus, according to 
Minić, they had committed the unpardonable offense of interfering in the SFRY's internal 
affairs. This was considered as a serious attack on SFRY-Albania relations. Minić accused 
Albania, in its relations with the SFRY, of following a two-faced policy: the first was a 
tendency to cooperate in economic and cultural developments when this was in their 
interest, while the second was developing hostile, irredentist and nationalist policies against 
the SFRY (Tanjug 8th of May 1981).  
Sinan Hasani's interview in RTV Prishtina was published by Tanjug as well as in 
Rilindja. Yugoslavia was ready for cooperation with Albania, but first, according to Hasani, 
they should: "stop interfering in the SFRY's internal affairs, put aside territorial aspirations, 
stop abusing the SFRY's openness vis-à-vis neighbors, halt the propaganda campaign 
against the SFRY, start to respect the rights of Macedonian minorities in Albania, and share 
responsibility for the current state of the relations between Albania and the SFRY" (Tanjug, 
November 17-18. 1981, and Rilindja, November 18-19, 1981). Accusations by political and 
academic elites of the SFRY against the Republic of Albania were numerous. During April 
and May 1981 alone, on the pages of Rilindja,  the Republic of Albania was explicitly 
accused of the following: "interfering in the SFRY's internal affairs" on 55 different pages 
of Rilindja, "Albania's territorial intentions toward the SFRY" on 19 different pages, 
"indoctrination, irredentist, nationalist, and subversive-propagandistic actions" on 32 
different pages, "engagement, support and defending the demonstrations and 
demonstrators" on 9 different pages, "Albania's socio-economic system and foreign policy 
vis-à-vis Yugoslavia" on 25 different pages, "promoting national hate" on 12 different 
pages, and "misusing bilateral relations and lack of reciprocity" on 17 different pages. The 
politicians who spoke out against Albania included the main political figures of the SFRY 
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as well as the main Albanian political figures in the SFRY, including S. Dolance, L. Moisov, 
L. Koliševski, P. Stambolić, M. Minić, D. Vidić, D. Ristić, A. Shukria, Xh. Nimani, A. 
Vllasi, F. Hoxha, M. Maliqi, M. Bakalli, M. Sefedini and others (AMFA 1141/1981).  
On the other hand, despite all of their efforts and measures taken, the Kosovo 
"progressivists" were constantly accused by the SRS and other SFRY republics of tolerating 
the development of illegal groups and fostering nationalist and irredentist feelings. In 
addition to these criticisms, their inability to manage the situation was also widely 
denounced. Rumors persisted that even the members of the families of communist leaders 
were involved in the demonstrations. Public debates allegedly revealed that separatism and 
nationalism were not just in the streets. Instead, they were coming from the streets straight 
to Fadil Hoxha, Mahmut Bakalli, Azem Vllasi, et al. As a result, Mahmut Bakalli resigned, 
saying that "it is one thing to be accused of being irresponsible and an entirely different 
thing to be accused of being part of a problem" (AK LoCPC/1981/90), whereas in the SFRY 
meeting, Fadil Hoxha informed the officials that he had spoken to his son (Sharr) about the 
ongoing accusations regarding his participation in the demonstrations. While trying to 
portray him as a good communist and member of the Party, Hoxha explained that he worked 
in Obiliq and when going home from work, he was very scared, given that he hadn’t been 
able to find any policeman to take him home. Hoxha pointed out that his son described the 
situation "as very scary" and that the majority of people were being manipulated (AJ 
803/498). While the accusation of "Albanians in general" was ongoing, the process of 
"differentiation," according to Sinan Hasani, was integrated into "every pore of life in the 
province." In Kosovo alone, the Party excluded 1,639 people from the LoC, dismissed 278 
teachers from their teaching activities, expelled 890 students from the university, and fired 
457 workers from the factories, while another 902 were arrested (AK, Rilindja, September 
18, 1981). Brutal actions were also being undertaken in the name of "differentiation" vis-à-
vis the families of those who had been "differentiated." Faton Abazi, whose brother was 
first arrested and then, according to the police station report, had killed himself by jumping 
from the fourth floor, explained how after this event his family had faced carefully prepared 
state sanctions. People who visited or spoke with him or his family were stopped in the 
streets and asked, "Why are you talking to them…they are traitors and anti-revolutionaries," 
etc. "The life of our parents was over after that," states Abazi (Abazi; March 2017). Life for 
the entire family took a different direction. Even though the regime had committed a crime 
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by killing (or at least causing the death of) Faton's brother, they did not allow his family to 
live in peace afterward. Faton was a good student but was never allowed to complete his 
university degree or have any other profession (Abazi; March 2017). Despite all of the 
measures taken against Kosovo's population, Albanian communist leaders were still blamed 
by Serbs for inadequate implementation of the differentiation process. Archival material 
and my interviews reveal that after a while the Albanian communist elites were somehow 
convinced that the intentions of their "brothers in unity" did not jibe with what was written 
in the communist books. Various meeting minutes show Fadil Hoxha's frustration with his 
SFRY colleagues, asking them not to allow the differentiation of "our professors because it 
will cause a lot of damage…we do have good professors and academics who are with us, 
who are for this SFRY and its principles, etc." (AJ 803/498). Even though a few months 
earlier Fadil Hoxha had been insisting on implementing the "differentiation" process, when 
the positions of "progressivists" were threatened by this process, he began to realize that it 
was "very important to clarify things related to this differentiation" (ibid.). Later on, Fadil 
Hoxha complained in numerous meetings at the federation level about the pressure and 
propaganda coming from the SRS and the Serbian side in general. While confirming his 
willingness to contribute to the country (SFRY), he said that "now we have come to another 
point." With regard to Kosovo, Hoxha complained that everyone was writing whatever they 
wanted and no one was intervening. Everyone talked about helping Kosovo, but contrary to 
that, certain people (referring to the Serbs) were posing unpleasant questions about the 
failure of Kosovo leadership. Hoxha pointed out to his colleagues that Kosovo could also 
pose questions such as how many Albanians from the SFRY had emigrated to Albania or 
Turkey or what happened during the Ranković era, but where would these questions lead? 
Thus, instead of "opening all doors," Hoxha called for all parties to cease engaging in 
rancorous debate and take steps to ease the tense atmosphere.  During  the 92nd session of 
the Presidency of the SFRY, which was held September 23, 1981, Fadil Hoxha also took a 
stand that people should not be sentenced so harshly, getting eight years simply for 
participating in demonstrations. He notified his colleagues that he too was a revolutionary 
activist and when some of his friends got 3-4 years in prison that was terrible..."imagine 
now what they think about the system." (AJ 803/498). Despite Fadil Hoxha's frustrations, 
Serbian politicians and some influential Serbian citizens used every opportunity to react and 
did their utmost to convince the Serbian political elites in the SRS and the SFRY that Serbs 
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in Kosovo were being treated unfairly and that the Kosovo leadership was to be blamed for 
allowing this. The Serbian leadership, after conducting its own "analysis," came to the 
conclusion that the "irredentists are among the Kosovo leadership" (AJ 803/498).  
Family members of the Kosovo leadership were regularly accused of having 
participated in the demonstrations. Given that these reports were also sent to the Presidency 
of the SFRY, at one point Fadil Hoxha said that if they believed this, "I have no place here 
anymore." In the middle of this chaos, the Republic of Montenegro was pressuring the 
SFRY Presidency to change the law concerning the display of the Albanian flag, and 
Macedonian representatives, led by Lazar Koliševski, added that the issue of the anthem 
had not yet been resolved either. Fadil Hoxha provided historical explanations for why the 
flag of the Albanian "narodnost" was affiliated with Albania, and why he was also against 
taking the initiative to change symbols, arguing that to do so might provoke even more 
tensions in Kosovo. Montenegrins and Macedonians did not agree with Hoxha's 
explanations; their response was that "we know Tito made these decisions, but now things 
have changed" and that this issue must end as well (AJ 803/498). Heated debates were 
taking place even at the Party level. In his 1981 speech during the political activity in 
Kosovo, among other things Fadil Hoxha noted that Kosovo had the same equal rights in 
the SFRY organs and institutions as one of the SFRY constituents. Dragoslav Draža 
Marković, a communist leader of the SRS, and at that time president of the Federal 
Assembly of the SFRY, immediately retorted that the current position of Kosovo as one of 
the SFRY constituents was no longer sustainable for the SRS. Finally, in November 1981, 
F. Hoxha, during an SFRY Presidency meeting, asked his colleagues: What do you want 
from Kosovo? Why is the SRS not letting the Kosovo political elites stabilize the situation? 
When Albanian security agents were asked why things were moving slowly and what was 
going on, they would constantly respond that "we can't get anything done; things are tied 
up in cooperation with the SFRY and Serbian people that are ‘helping' us here!” Hoxha 
reacted by stating that the help of the other SFRY bodies was appreciated but that the 
Kosovo leaders did not want to permit misinformation that accused Albanian society as a 
whole of nationalism. He also asked, "Who will defend us if this presidency does not?" (AJ 
803/498). However, Albanian communist elites started expressing their concerns only when 
they were being blamed and suspected. Throughout 1982 as well, Fadil Hoxha continuously 
reported at the federal level about the extremely volatile political situation in Kosovo, as 
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well as the decrease of production levels in the factories and the lack of enthusiasm about 
the future. Albanian communist elites called for empowerment while complaining that the 
Serbian officers of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs were pushing for "differentiation" of 
cadres which, these elites said, were considered as "ours" and had "fought for us" at the 
university and other public institutions.  
The anxiety of the Albanian communist leaders in Kosovo was palpable. They were 
being accused of being "traitors" by the Republic of Albania and of being supporters of 
illegal groups by their SFRY communist colleagues. Hoxha also mentioned his fears of 
assassination, saying that "so far no one was assassinated, but every moment we are waiting 
in fear to see which one of us will be liquidated" (AJ 803/498). Attacks against the Albanian 
communist elites in the SFRY continued for a long period as did the accusations against 
illegal groups and the Republic of Albania. During the first six months of 1982, for example, 
92 articles were published in the Yugoslav press. The largest number of them were 
published in Rilindja (28 articles), followed by Politika (25), Borba (19), Flaka e 
Vëllazërimit (9), Oslobođenje (7), Novosti (2) and NIN (2). The content of all these articles 
was dominated by aggressive speeches against "counter-revolutionaries" and the Republic 
of Albania. These articles were written by SFRY politicians, especially from the SRS but 
also by Kosovo Serbs (AMFA 1012/1982). The SFRY politicians concluded that except for 
cooperation concerning economic relations, which were federal matters, all other protocols 
of cooperation between cultural and educational institutions of Kosovo with Albania should 
cease (Tanjug, May 12, 1981). 
5.5.2. Serbia’s actions  
During the 72nd joint session of the Presidencies of SKS and SRS held April 23, 1981, 
Albanian communist elites were considered to be responsible for allowing the "spread of 
irredentism and nationalism among high school students and workers" (AS Đ-2/327/1981). 
Afterward, at the SRS level, intermunicipal conferences were organized, such as those in 
Šabac, Niš, and Kragujevac. At these meetings it was reported that the institutions in 
Kosovo had not been careful enough, otherwise it was not understandable how hostile 
groups could organize so well and organize demonstrations at such a level. In Niš, a re-
examination of many cadres and students at the UP and at other high school institutions was 
requested. The assessments of the committee of the University of Niš regarding the "help" 
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that institutions from Serbia gave to Kosova were highly exaggerated. Genuinely harsh 
remarks were also directed at the leadership and security organs in Kosovo due to their 
inability to manage the situation in their areas. The Serbian political and academic elites 
claimed to the masses that Albanian communists had "delayed the information about these 
demonstrations on purpose" (ibid.). Some of the conclusions and questions that were raised 
at the meetings of the Serbs with the general public or students were: We are giving a lot to 
Kosovo, but the communists are not dealing appropriately with the hostile groups. Why 
hadn’t the leadership of Kosovo reacted earlier? Is it true that the sons of some leaders 
participated in the demonstrations in Kosovo? Kosovo leadership allowed the fostering of 
nationalism among Albanians, which is the reason the emigration of ethnic Serbs from 
Kosovo was taking place. Serbian students could not join in the political-social organs of 
the UP because the meetings were being held in the Albanian language. Living and studying 
conditions at the University of Prishtina were better than in Belgrade…the food in dining 
hall was very good, so this was not the reason that the demonstrations had happened. Some 
of the papers circulating included statements such as "Dear brothers, our government is not 
informing you about developments in Kosovo. The Serbian nation is suffering, Albanians 
are raping our children, beating and cursing our Serbian mothers. Serbian blood is 
flowing…Serbs, we should not allow our nation to suffer, our children to be raped, and our 
mothers to be beaten and cursed by the Albanians" (AS Đ-2/304/1981). The issue of Serbs 
and Montenegrins who were leaving Kosovo during the late seventies and eighties was 
brought up by Serbian intellectuals and politicians at almost every meeting at the federal, 
SRS and provincial levels. Serbian songs which praised Ranković were being sung, and 
graffiti showed up in different regions of Serbia. In contrast, Serbian press headlines 
promoted the necessity of fighting against "the enemy and the destabilization of the SFRY" 
(Borba, April 6, 1981). This sort of propagandistic journalism served to heighten Serbian 
nationalism. Newspapers published the minutes of the meetings of Local (Municipal) 
Committees in Suhareka (Rilindja, October 26, 1981), Vushtri/Vučitrn (Rilindja, October 
28, 1981), Gjakova/Đakovica (Rilindja, October 31, 1981) and Ferizaj/Uroševac (Rilindja, 
October 6, 1981), where the reasons for the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from 
Kosovo were discussed. Here Albanian participants argued that "it's the socio-economic 
reasons that are making them leave," whereas the Serbian participants cited the political 
character and "pressure of Albanians" as the main reason for emigration. In one of the 
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comments published in Rilindja, it was stressed that "while Serbian and Montenegrin 
nationalists are trying to dramatize this issue by blaming Albanians, some individuals are 
benefiting from the situation and realizing their career aspirations to get jobs and credits for 
buying houses and apartments in other republics" (Rilindja, October 28, 1981). Ilmi Hetemi 
also pointed out that Serbian authorities further exacerbated the already tense situation by 
insisting that the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo was due to "insecurity and pressure from 
Albanians." Hetemi, having served as chief of a police station in Ferizaj/Uroševac for two 
decades, knew the situation in detail and informed his colleagues from Serbia that there was 
no pressure, and – according to I. Hetemi – Serbs had left for their own reasons. They sold 
their lands – which during Kosovo's colonization139 had been given to Serbs for free – at a 
very high price to Albanians. With that money, according to I. Hetemi, Kosovo Serbs were 
guaranteed a livelihood for at least one or two generations and had also managed to buy 
land in Serbia. Hetemi reminded his colleagues that his claims could be easily verified, 
simply by checking the bank accounts of the Serbs that emigrated from Kosovo. Given that 
his colleagues from the SRS intelligence services kept on insisting on "pressure and 
insecurity," Hetemi formed a special commission composed of both Serbian and Albanian 
investigators to analyze this issue. The commission went to the towns and villages and 
talked to people. All of the Serbian neighbors of those that had emigrated said that no one 
had left due to pressures but for personal reasons. From all those interviewed by the 
commission, only one "džeparoš” (pickpocket) said that he was forced to leave due to 
pressure. Indeed, as Hetemi points out, this guy had fought with an Albanian in the bus, 
who had caught him trying to pick his pocket. The day after I. Hetemi sent this report to the 
Secretariat of Internal Affairs in Prishtina, a newspaper in Belgrade wrote that "the chief of 
the police in Ferizaj/Uroševac supported the demonstrators." Hetemi thinks that for similar 
reasons, they also accused Fadil Hoxha, saying that his son Sharr Hoxha had organized the 
demonstrations in Ferizaj (Hetemi; April 2017). Similarly, from the perspective of 
Malcolm, for example (2001: 301), the main reasons for the movement of people during 
that period were connected with the mismanagement of the Kosovan economy and the level 
of unemployment, which was the highest in Yugoslavia. There are also sources defending 
the idea that there was national pressure involved when it came to Serb and Montenegrin 
 
139 For more information regarding "the colonization of Kosovo," please check out Vladan Jovanović’s insights at 
https://pescanik.net/the-colonization-of-kosovo/ [Last accessed on 19/02/2019] 
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emigration from Kosovo. From my standpoint, however, here the issue is not so much 
making a claim as to who is right or wrong, but pointing out that after the demonstrations 
of 1981, the topic of Serb and Montenegrin emigration became heavily politicized. 
Nevertheless, even several months after the demonstrations, Serbian authorities kept 
reporting the situation in Kosovo as unstable and demonstrations were likely to break out 
at the drop of a hat They were pushing the local institutions for brutal measures and harsh 
"differentiation" toward different people. While in some meetings Serbian politicians 
reported that the worst situation was among high school and UP students, who were 
extremely likely to engage in demonstrations, but later the situation was reported to be "even 
worse" among the workers at factories such as Kombinati Obiliç, Amortizeri, Kombinati 
Ramiz Sadiku, etc. (AS Đ-2/30/1981). The 72nd joint session of Presidencies of LoC of 
Serbia and SRS somehow started with the claim that for the SRS to be able to follow up 
with further analysis, two things should be noted: first, Albanian nationalism in Kosovo 
exists, and, second, there are ideas for the creation of a Greater Albania. Based on these 
assumptions, Serbian communist leaders insisted that "Albanians have anti-Serb ideas 
because, due to the existence of Serbs and Montenegrins, they cannot reach their objectives" 
(AS Đ-2/327/1981). Every argument at this meeting from that point onward was advanced 
on the basis of these prejudices. This shows that the SRS state apparatus – politicians, 
academics, security forces, etc. – was focusing all of its energy and efforts on penalizing 
Albanians as "counterrevolutionary demonstrators" as well as everything or anyone they 
considered had anything to do with those assumptions. Inter-ethnic relations worsened 
further, particularly because of the onslaught of propaganda coming from Serbian 
intellectuals and media reports. Biserko notes that analyses pointing to alleged Albanian 
terror in Kosovo were regularly featured in the Serbian media. Dobrica Ćosić claimed that 
the Kosovo conterrevolution was started by young children who "first started spitting at and 
insulting old Serbs, beating and abusing them.” “Šiptars began raping Serb women and girls 
in Kosmet" (quoted after Biserko 2012: 210). Similarly, in his book "Theoria," Đorđe 
Vuković writes "they rape everywhere: in public spaces, at bus stops, in ambulance cars" 
(quoted after Biserko 2012: 211). It is worth noting that the year this statement appeared, 
only one case of rape was registered in the whole of Kosovo (Biserko 2012: 212140). Despite 
 
140 The Committee of Serbian Lawyers and Experts for the Defence of Human Rights analyzed the data on rapes 
and attempted rapes during the 1980s. This analysis resulted in the conclusion that the frequency of this crime was 
158 
 
the fact that published research contradicts Serbian propaganda of that time, even nowadays 
the school curricula and history textbooks of the Republic of Serbia teach about the 
"pressure against Serbs in Kosovo with repression, rape, destruction of property, and even 
killings out of nationalist hatred."141 Slovenian politician Sergej Kraigher, who served as 
the President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia from 1981 to 1982, highlighted the 
importance of talking about the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The events in Kosovo 
provoked a rise of chauvinistic reactions in Serbia. He claimed that the Federation must 
respond to this issue. Thus, in July 1981 Vladimir Bakarić, one of the main figures of Tito's 
regime, in a discussion with leaders of the LoC of Croatia held in July 1981, criticized 
severely what was being written about the events in Kosovo, saying that the published 
(dis)information was an attack on the Albanians. Similarly, Ibro Hadžić, the President of 
the Information Council for Bosnia, also confirmed that he fully supported Bakarić's 
statements, stating that some news agencies (mainly in Serbia and Macedonia) had turned 
into courts. After that, Sergej Kraigher added in Ljubljana that Serbia should "fight the 
rebirth of all kinds of Serbian nationalism" (CAA 132-1/1981/28). What can be seen here 
is the conflict between the Croatian-Slovenian clique and the Serbian clique, or, reading 
between the lines, of pro-Western and pro-Russian paths, respectively, which was exactly 
what was happening at that time in Yugoslavia. During this period the same conflicts were 
also taking place in the province of Kosovo between the Serbian and Albanian leaderships. 
Mustafa Rushiti accused "Jedinstvo" of being a Serbian organ in Kosovo. He also attacked 
the news magazine "NIN," which on June 14, 1981 published an article according to which 
Albanian national hero Isa Boletini fought against the state structures back in the early 
1900s (ibid.). When "progressivists" realized that Serbs were not treating them as 
"brothers," to use Tito's words, they also started to raise their voices and allowed articles to 
be published about Albanian rights and criticizing SRS politics, which  threatened the 
equality of nationalities as well as the implementation of the SFRY constitution (CAA 14-
A/1981/28). Apart from the fact that Yugoslav politicians were spending a considerable 
amount of time dealing with internal affairs, they also followed the “international anti-
Yugoslav propaganda” led by the Republic of Albania through speeches, pamphlets, and 
 
significantly lower in Kosovo as compared to other countries of Yugoslavia. It was also concluded that in most of 
the cases identified, both the attacker and the victim were of the same ethnic group (see Biserko 2012).  
141 See Đurić, Đorđe and Momčilo Pavlović. Istorija 8. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010, page 137; Đurić, 
Đorđe and Momčilo Pavlović. Istorija 3. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010, pages 208, 235, 243, 245, 248. 
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publications. During this period diplomats of different countries started to view the 
Republic of Albania's attitudes vis-à-vis the situation in Kosovo in a positive light. As a 
result, Western countries started to look critically at the SFRY's implementation of human 
rights, etc. (AJ 803/728).  
5.5.3. Albania’s actions 
Like the SRS and the SFRY in general, the Republic of Albania also stepped up its foreign 
propaganda efforts. Albanian embassies were mobilized to distribute audio and video 
materials and books for Kosovars. The increase in propagandistic materials, as well as the 
presence of groups of artists in the countries where many Kosovars were based (Germany, 
Switzerland, etc.), was initiated by the Albanian embassies (AMFA 1104-2/1982). The 
Albanian authorities developed a plan for creating and disseminating propaganda about the 
rights of Kosovo and of other Albanian-inhabited territories in the SFRY. These efforts 
were implemented by the Institute of History, the Institute of Language and Literature, the 
Institute of National Culture, and the Center for Archeological Research. The plan included 
different publications, pedagogical activities, and activities for mass propaganda distributed 
through the press, radio, TV, etc. (AMFA 1165/1982). During the 10th plenary meeting of 
the Albanian Workers Party held June 15-16, 1981, members of the Workers Party agreed 
on the content of the articles in "Zëri i Popullit" as well as highlighted injustices against 
"brothers in Kosovo who demonstrated to increase their political dignity" (CAA 
14/1981/109). While the SFRY and the SRS blamed the Republic of Albania for their 
nationalistic indoctrination of Albanians in the SFRY, Albania claimed that the degradation 
of relations with Yugoslavia was a result of the "bloodthirsty and barbaric positions of the 
nationalistic Serbs" (ibid.).  
It is worth mentioning that, when compared to the representatives of the southern 
part of Albania, the members of northern towns were far more critical of the SFRY and of 
developments in Kosovo in general. Enver Hoxha kept repeating that despite the fact that 
the number of Albanians was twice that of two other nations in the SFRY (Macedonians 
and Montenegrins), still they lived split among two republics and one province. It was also 
stated that while Albanians in Kosovo enjoyed a bit more in the way of rights, those living 
in Macedonia and Montenegro were totally disenfranchised. Indeed, though “totally” is an 
exaggeration, it was in certain respects the case. Macedonian communist authorities viewed 
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Albanians as a threat to the territorial integrity and existence of Macedonia (Koinova, 2013: 
37). During the 1950s-1960s, many Albanians were pressured to declare themselves as 
Turks and migrate to Turkey to escape from communism (Poulton, 1995:138). Even after 
the changes to the SFRY constitution (1974), Albanians in Macedonia had limited ethnic 
rights (Peshkopia, 2015; 61). In his writings, Enver Hoxha insisted that the "Albanian 
question" and the territories where they lived had not yet been resolved yet. The Republic 
of Albania's leadership’s detailed platforms regarding the demonstrations of 1981 were 
published in the April 8 and April 23 issues of "Zëri i Popullit." The Republic of Albania 
"justified" the actions of the organizers of the demonstrations and viewed the Albanian 
communist elites in the SFRY as "traitors and servants of Belgrade." These articles 
mentioned the demands of demonstrators to create a Republic of Kosovo or the creation of 
a Republic of Albanians living in the federation. However, they did not mention the 
unification of these territories with Albania, but rather the intent to form a new republic. 
While highlighting that the "destiny of Albanian society in the SFRY will be solved," the 
Republic of Albania tried to present its acts as being in accordance with international law, 
claiming that though it had no intention of interfering in the SFRY's internal affairs, it still 
had the right to support the "legal demands of Albanian people in the SFRY" (Zëri i Popullit, 
April 8 and 23, 1981). In the same articles, the Republic of Albania provided "explanations 
for the tragic events" of March and April 1981. The article, "Kosovo's demands for the 
status of a republic is a human right," published May 17, 1981, highlighted some of 
Yugoslavia’s national issues since 1940, which, according to the Republic of Albania, 
proved that the student demands for a Republic of Kosovo were legitimate. The articles 
emphasized the promises and initial agreements that, according to the Republic of Albania, 
the SFRY was supposed to respect after the Second World War. The article stated that Moša 
Pijade, during the Communist Party’s fifth conference held in Zagreb in October 1940, 
proposed that "the solution of the national movements in Kosovo can be reached only 
through forming the free national Republic in Kosovo" (cited after Archive of SFRY. Fond 
CC of CPY. No. 12-14).  
Furthermore, in December 1942 "Proleter" had published a written piece entitled 
"The national issues in Yugoslavia in the light of League of National Liberators," which 
was considered to be a programmatic document of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
(CPY) for national issues. After this article was published, in December 1942 Tito himself 
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published another one where he declared that Yugoslavia would respect the basic principle 
that every nation has the right to self-determination. When Yugoslavia was liberated, 
Albanians were waiting for their right to self-determination, but instead Kosovo became the 
base for a military administration (1945). Hoxha mentioned that while the majority of 
Kosovo Albanian brigades were fighting in Slovenia and Croatia for the liberation of 
Yugoslavia, in Kosovo, Serbian and Montenegrin divisions 52, 46, and division 50 of 
Macedonia killed Albanians on the pretext of various different accusations (Zëri i Popullit, 
May 17, 1981). The Republic of Albania accused the SFRY, and particularly Serbian 
authorities, of systematically ignoring the rights of Albanians, starting from the second 
ANVOJ meeting held on November 29, 1943, when Albanians in the SFRY were 
considered as a national minority which should live under the umbrella of republics such as 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia (ibid.). Thus, the Republic of Albania considered the 
1981 demonstrations as peaceful actions which were turned into bloody events by Serbian 
authorities from Belgrade. These articles, which were published by the Republic of Albania, 
added to the already tense situation. However, they also encouraged and proved that the 
illegal groups were “right” when they continuously spread propaganda that the Republic of 
Albania was militarily "strong" and would protect Albanians of the SFRY, whereas the 
SFRY, and especially the SRS intelligence services, increased both their levels of 
aggression against Albanians in the SFRY as well as their accusations of the Republic of 
Albania’s interference in the SFRY's internal affairs. The Republic of Albania could not or 
did not do anything else to support the Kosovo Albanians. They kept rejecting SFRY and 
SRS accusations, saying that their actions could not be considered to be interference: They 
were only saying that the people of Kosovo wanted a republic and that this was their 
legitimate right. During this period, and in the name of the further intensification of 
propaganda, Enver Hoxha urged responsible institutions to launch historical programs, 
patriotic music, a celebration of historical anniversaries, etc., aimed at the SFRY/Albanian 
emigrés. He also ordered the translation of articles from "Zëri i Populli" into various 
languages and their distribution in various countries. The distribution of the articles and 
brochures in the SFRY was also considered an important part of the propaganda effort. 
Given that even diplomatic posts to the SFRY were checked and opened, the articles and 
other propagandistic materials for the SFRY were sent first to other embassies and then 
somehow transported from other countries to the SFRY (CAA 14/1981/117).  
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5.5.4. The international spread of propagandistic actions 
Even though the Republic of Albania translated and circulated the "Zëri i Popullit" articles 
in different countries, they did not do it in order to internationalize the Kosovo issue. The 
involvement of the great powers did not suit them. Instead, the Republic of Albania wanted 
to be seen as the protector of Kosovans, so that both the Kosovans and the SFRY would 
feel dependent on Albania. The SFRY also did not have an interest in the 
internationalization of the "Albanian issue." The Kosovo demonstrations of 1981 
nonetheless attracted international attention and were described in the press of other 
countries as well. For example, by June 19, 1981, forty-six newspapers in the US had 
written articles on this issue. Whereas altogether these newspapers published 123 articles – 
thirteen of them were published in the New York Times – only four of these articles relied 
on the information from Serbian Tanjug. However, the Republic of Albania's reporters 
viewed Americans as being circumspect as far as the events in Kosovo were concerned. 
Somehow the Americans wanted to show the Yugoslavs that they were against the state’s 
violence while at the same time they did not want the case of Kosovo to get that much 
publicity. It is worth noting that in all of the American press’s comments, it was "accepted 
as fact that Albania does not have a finger in the demonstrations of Kosovo" (CAA 
2782/1981/28). It is also worth noting that these articles were not front-page news. Professor 
Friedman recalls that although the articles appeared, they were not by any means featured 
stories. He remembers finding them on the fourth page or some such, and “being shocked 
that US news sources paid almost no attention to the events in Kosovo at the time” 
(Friedman: December 2015). 
Archival documents collected from the Republic of Albania noted that the Italian 
press published headlines reporting on the presence of the military and tanks in the streets 
of Kosovo to suppress the revolt as well as on the economic situation in Kosovo and its 
backwardness compared to that of the other republics of the SFRY. The newspapers "Il 
Populo" and "Republika" considered Tirana's behavior to be balanced when it came to their 
reactions regarding the events in the SFRY (CAA 17/1981/29). Like the American press, 
the press in other Western countries, such as British and West German newspapers, argued 
that the main reason for the student demonstrations in Kosovo was economic, due to the 
significant inequality of development between Kosovo and the other parts of the SFRY.  
Historical contradictions between the Albanian and Serbian ethnicities, along with the 
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general discriminatory policies against the Albanian population in Kosovo on the part of 
the SFRY leadership were also noted by the US, British and German press. According to 
Albanian archival sources, most Westerners did not support the idea that the demonstrations 
were organized by "Russians and Bulgarians to destabilize the SFRY" (CAA 17/1981/29). 
In discussions with representatives of the Republic of Albania, Western diplomats evaluated 
these assumptions as propaganda, through which "Yugoslavia seeks to solicit the West's 
support as well as to calm down the Western press" (ibid.). The representatives of the 
Republic of Albania noticed that their positions in the articles of Zëri i Popullit had been 
read and analyzed. The Greek newspaper "Akropolis" published an entire article from Zëri 
i Popullit. While generally in Western press the idea that "Albania did not have a finger in 
this issue" predominated, a significant exception was the French newspaper Le Monde, 
which in an article published April 5, 1981 stated that Albania was behind the 
demonstrations in Kosovo (ibid.).  
As for the Chinese press, they mainly referenced information released by the SFRY 
authorities and expressed their position against Albania as well. The Soviet Union was very 
circumspect regarding events in Kosovo. They only reacted April 6 and 8, through their 
TASS agency, using sources that mainly came from Belgrade. Their statement also cited 
the newspapers "Borba" and "Politika," which claimed that the events were causing 
instability as well as being a threat to the territorial integrity of the SFRY (CAA 
1284/1981/28). The Soviets’ attitude could be taken as intended to counter suspicions of 
the involvement by the Soviet Union in these events. The Czechoslovak press entered the 
fray for the first time on April 2, writing that new dissatisfactions had arisen in Kosovo. On 
April 8, while writing that Albania did not want to interfere in the SFRY's internal affairs, 
the Czechoslovak press reiterated that the Republic of Albania did have the right to protect 
its people. The Hungarian press wrote seven articles dedicated to the events in Kosovo, all 
of which reflected the SFRY’s point of view. Reactions from the Polish press were more 
rapid and stronger. They reacted immediately on March 28, and also on April 4, reporting 
about the extraordinary situation in Kosovo, about the number of police officers killed, etc. 
All references were taken from the SFRY's Tanjug news service, and the declarations of the 
President of the SFRY were published. The case of Bulgaria is also interesting. They 
informed their population mainly based on SFRY press sources, indicating the numbers of 
people killed as well as the fact that the protestors were shooting. Archival sources show 
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that Bulgarian authorities carefully followed the demonstrations in Kosovo. First of all, the 
student demonstrations in Kosovo were seen by the Bulgarian authorities as an opportunity 
to deepen the crisis in the SFRY and simultaneously increase Bulgaria's claims for 
Macedonia. Second, in the case of a further crisis, Bulgaria stood ready to take concrete 
steps first toward Macedonia and later toward Kosovo/Albania. Third, Bulgaria was also 
worried about these events due to the presence of Albanians in Macedonia and Albanian 
notions of creating a Republic of Kosovo that would include all Albanian-inhabited 
territories in the SFRY. Fourth, the Bulgarian leadership was ambivalent about these 
demonstrations in Kosovo. They favored them due to their desire for Macedonia and 
opposed them because they were being carried out by Albanians. However, in a meeting 
that Albania's ambassador in Sofia had with the director of the press working for the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was stated that Bulgaria supported the demands of 
the protestors, but that they were supposed to refer to the SFRY press, because they could 
be accused of abetting the organizing of events in Kosovo (CAA 1284/1981/28).  
Albania's archival documents also emphasize that the 1981 movements in Kosovo 
shook the SFRY's relations with the great powers. On the one hand, the USA tried to support 
the "Titoist group" which was in power during 1981, but on the other hand it encouraged 
and supported the propaganda of anti-Yugoslav groups in exile. The Soviet Union similarly 
tried to maintain its relations with "Titoist groups," while at the same time promoting all 
types of political, economic and propagandistic pressures against SFRY. As for Bulgaria’s 
territorial aspirations, the Soviet Union reminded the SFRY leadership about "proletarian 
internationalism" and the "general laws of revolution and building socialism" (CAA 14-
A/1981/28).  
Among the SFRY’s biggest concerns, however, were the provocations and 
nationalist contradictions taking place in the Croatian- and Albanian-inhabited territories as 
well as sensitive situations in Bosnia and Macedonia. Jure Bilić admitted to one of the 
Albanian diplomats that the situation in Croatia was not good: There were 52 strikes and an 
opposition which was also cooperating with the Church and religious leaders in Croatia. 
However, he pointed out that the strikes took place because of the system’s inability to 
provide appropriate solutions to the problems of workers. On the other hand, even 
"progressivist" Albanians in Kosovo – using one of Tito's quotes – had started to raise their 
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voices about their rights and to criticize policies that endangered the equality of nationalities 
as well as the implementation of the SFRY constitution (CAA 14-A/1981/28).  
The foreign sector of the Republic of Albania warned the Workers Party about 
Albanian reactionary groups in exile that were also conducting propaganda attacks on both 
the SFRY and Albania's Workers Party. These groups emerged to express their support for 
the demonstrations in Kosovo while at the same time excoriating the Yugoslav regime and 
the Republic of Albania's dictatorship. The "reactionary organizations" were accused of 
implementing their "actions" in the US and Western European countries. They organized 
demonstrations to protest against the violence used by the Yugoslav regime and to intensify 
propaganda against the dictatorship in Albania. It is evident that the reactionary groups 
hoped to collect around them the masses of the Kosovan emigration and, in the meantime, 
to create a gap between Albanians living abroad and both the SFRY and the Republic of 
Albania. Thus, they intended to neutralize the authority of Enver Hoxha and the Workers 
Party among Albanians residing in the SFRY and abroad (AMFA 1141/1981).  
Established reactionary organizations of Albanian emigrés included:  
1. Prizren League (Lidhja e Prizrenit) was founded in 1962 at the initiative of 
Rexhep Krasniqi and Xhafer Deva. This was an assemblage of anti-communist 
organizations, and the second article of their statute states that the organization 
was always ready to help liberate Albania from the communists. Leka Zogu, the 
son of King Zog I of the Albanians, had a leading role in this organization. This 
organization had branches in Europe and was also against the Slavs (BRSS and 
SFRY).  
2. Kosovar League (Lidhja Kosovare), founded in 1957 in the USA, was an 
organization of Kosovar "ballists142 who accused Albania of betraying Kosovo. 
3. The National Committee "Kosova e Lire” (Free Kosova) was founded in 1965 
in Canada by the brothers Mithat and Isa Vrenezi as a faction of "Lidhja e 
Prizrenit/Prizren League."  
4. Other organizations include: "Beslidhja Kombetare Demokratike Shqiptare" in 
Germany, "Besa Shqiptare," "Shqipria Etnike," "Lidhja e Vardarit" in Belgium, 
 
142 The Balli Kombëtar, known as Balli, was an Albanian nationalist anti-communist resistance movement and a 
political organization established in November 1942 
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etc. Their platforms were also against the communist regime in Albania (AMFA 
1161/1980) 
Thus, following the student demonstrations in Kosovo, the Republic of Albania 
found itself being attacked for its authoritarianism by both the SFRY authorities and anti-
communist Albanian organizations in Western Europe and the USA. It is worth mentioning 
that the SFRY could have used these Albanian organizations in the West against Enver 
Hoxha. Hence, in November 1981, at the SFRY Presidency meeting, it was Fadil Hoxha 
who raised the need to "seek and cooperate with Enver Hoxha's internal enemies." "The 
opposition within Albania is now eliminated," he said, "but there are some of his opposition 
abroad" (AJ 803/498). The SFRY organs were urged to look for ways to use the anti-
Enverist groups in the West or within Albania (ibid.). Yet when discussing with Shkelzen 
Maliqi the matter of the Albanian organizations which had been created or had found refuge 
earlier in Western countries (Balli Kombëtar, etc.), Maliqi mentioned that the SFRY 
intelligence services’ people had infiltrated the structures of these organizations. Thus, 
immediately after the meetings, this information was sent to the SFRY security services. In 
an interview with me, Maliqi said, "My father used to tell me that a day after the meetings 
took place in New York, or anywhere else, he had the pictures as well as transcripts of the 
speeches held there" (Maliqi: May 2016.  
As a result of these propaganda developments directed at an international level 
against the Workers Party and Enver Hoxha, the embassies of the Republic of Albania were 
told to focus on developing a deeper understanding of the "enemy's" work and actions 
(press, the way they live, etc). To control the actions of Albanians abroad and within the 
SFRY, embassies were also urged to establish "clubs" and to try to neutralize reactionary 
groups' "war" against the Republic of Albania. The Kosovans in the diaspora were invited 
to attend events held at the embassies, where propagandistic materials such as newspapers 
and books were delivered. In a similar fashion, the embassies were urged to write articles 
with patriotic content about Kosovo; this was typically supposed to take place at national 
holidays and anniversaries (AMFA 1161/1980). Only at a critical moment like this did the 
Albanian regime decide to increase the number of visas for Kosovo citizens to visit Albania, 
as well as to allow families in Albania to send more telegrams to their families in Kosovo 
inviting them (under the regime's control) to attend such family events as funerals, births or 
marriages (AMFA 1155/1981). Numerous "decodings" coming from different embassies 
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sent as reports to Albania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the problems that activists in 
the illegal group organizations in exile were having with expenses and their need for 
monetary support (AMFA 1194/1982). This shows that the Albanian government was 
financially supporting the establishment and maintenance of some "illegal groups." By 
means of these organizations, the Republic of Albania also wanted to create the impression 
in Serbian circles and the entire SFRY that they would eternally face pressure from 
Albanian movements in the SFRY and that they would never be able to control these 
movements or be able to predict how or when they might erupt.  
Albania’s hope was that the SFRY would come to believe that the situation in 
Kosovo could never be resolved without Albania's assistance (AMFA 1155/1981). Indeed, 
there were some "patriotic elements" within these organizations, but they were also created 
– or allowed to exist – for the purpose of manipulating the masses and assuring political 
benefits to certain interest groups. However, after the demonstrations of 1981 in Kosovo, a 
few organizations (both for and against the communist regime of Albania) united and 
initiated demonstrations in several cities in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Belgium. They also managed to mobilize Croatian fascists and ex-Nazi collaborators known 
as "Ustaša" who had found refuge after World War II in non-communist countries and who 
were dedicated to achieving independence from the SFRY. Around 15-20% of those who 
participated in the demonstrations abroad were Ustaša (AK LoCPC/1981/91). "Fronti i Kuq 
Popullor" (National Red Front) was supported by other organizations in exile and by the 
general Albanian diaspora, which organized these demonstrations against the SFRY and 
Kosovo political elites. Kosovo police identified around 200 participants in these 
demonstrations abroad and took measures against their families in Kosovo. In a similar 
vein, measures were constantly being taken against the families of those imprisoned and 
sentenced in connection with the events of 1981 (AK LoC/1981/99).  
Another organization actively supporting the demonstrations in Kosovo was the 
National Democratic Committee "Free Albania," which also had a branch in the city of 
Izmir. This organization was represented by the brothers Hajredin and Fadil Bytyçi. They 
supported the unification of all organizations and groups, saying that Albania was doing 
nothing for the case of Kosovo, even though they professed to be its defenders. The Bytyçi 
brothers also insisted on making Kosovo a UN issue, calling on US and European politicians 
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to protect Albanians in the SFRY and writing letters and sending telegrams to the US 
president and other Western countries.  
Indeed, numerous "reactionary organizations" considered Tirana's communist 
leadership to be the worst "evil" of the Albanian nation. They decried Albania's army, which 
had the oldest technology, tanks, and weapons that could not be used to help the Kosovans. 
Through verbal and written channels, the reactionary organizations in exile also called for 
armed resistance. The Republic of Albania considered these organizations a threat, because 
they wanted to unify and work against the Workers Party. Moreover, many Albanian 
diplomats reported on these organizations' activities against the interests of the Workers 
Party of Albania, and especially that they were targeting Enver Hoxha personally. "Free 
Albania" kept circulating slogans to the effect that Tirana always ignored Kosovo. Albania 
was also accused of being satisfied with only publishing two or three articles but doing 
nothing concrete to bring the problem of Kosovo before the Security Council of the United 
Nations. Indeed, Albania did not raise its voice in the UN concerning the rights of the 
Albanians in the SFRY, whereas Albanian diplomats continuously spoke about the rights 
of China and the rights of African people, etc. The ongoing attacks by the revolutionary 
organizations in exile frightened the Republic of Albania. Demonstrations organized by 
these organizations in exile were accompanied by pro-Western, anti-communist and anti-
Yugoslav slogans (CAA 5076/1981/28). Although during this period (1980s) in western 
countries the right to demonstrate was equally granted to all manner of political types, the 
fact that the reactionary organizations were granted permission to organize these events 
could be construed as evidence of their supposed Western orientation. On the other hand, 
the fascist origins of some of these organizations makes it problematic to characterize all of 
them as “pro-Western” rather than simply opportunistic. 
5.2. Conclusions  
The demonstrations of 1981 triggered a variety of different reactions from the parties 
affected by these events. In addition to exacerbating deep divisions among Albanians in the 
region, these events also contributed to destabilization and great changes both at the level 
of the SFRY and in Kosovo, unleashing "the devil within" and inspiring nationalistic 
responses from both Kosovo Albanians and the general Serbian population. This 
nationalism had existed before. Even though the SFRY, the SRS, and the Republic of 
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Albania were involved in propagandistic actions, neither the internationalization of the 
"Kosovo issue" nor the involvement of the permanent members of the UN Security Council 
suited any of them. It is documented in this chapter that the 1981 movements in Kosovo, 
and the propagandistic reactions thereafter, damaged the SFRY's relations with the great 
powers. Also, the demonstrations brought back to the political scene reactionary groups 
whose goal was to neutralize the authority of Enver Hoxha among the Albanians of the 
SFRY and abroad (CAA 14-A/1981/28). 
The mobilization of the SRS and Serbian politicians for propagandistic actions 
against the Kosovo student demonstrations of 1981 led to the "rebirth of all kinds of Serbian 
nationalism" (CAA 132-1/1981/28). Despite all of their efforts, Kosovo Albanian 
communist leaders were blamed on the one hand by Serbian authorities for inadequate 
implementation of the "differentiation process," and on the other hand they were branded 
as "traitors" by the Republic of Albania (AJ 803/498). The communist leadership of the 
Republic of Albania was also engaged in propagandistic actions against the communist 
elites of the SFRY, SRS nationalists, as well as against the anti-communist movements that 
were active in exile. The Republic of Albania's attempts to (mis)use Albanian emigrants 
from Kosovo by means of nationalist pamphlets and cultural activities were insufficient to 
halt the impact of the Albanian reactionary groups in exile, which led propaganda 
campaigns against both the SFRY and Albania's Workers Party (AMFA 1141/1981). 
Nevertheless, as has been documented in this chapter, despite various interest groups’ 
attempts at domination, the Albanian students in Kosovo and the members of reactionary 
or illegal groups in exile managed to internationalize the demands for a Republic of Kosovo. 
They also managed to mobilize the Croatian "Ustaša," former Nazi allies dedicated to 
achieving independence from the SFRY (AK LoCPC/1981/91).  
Finally, the 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo revealed the fragility of the SFRY after 
Tito's death. In a way, the 1981 demonstrations support the argument that the SFRY could 
survive only under the authority of Tito or a similar authoritarian figure. Even though these 
demonstrations manifested tensions that had been simmering for quite some time, in 
retrospect, it can be seen that they also signaled the beginning of the end of the SFRY — 
something that some people at the time sensed was the case. In global terms, the 
involvement of the East and West, as well as NATO's blaming of Russia for having a hand 
in the organization of these movements, confirms that one should not forget the fact that 
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these events could also be interpreted as a "proxy war" between two concepts/ideologies 
manifested at a strictly local level for future dominance in this part of the world. Such an 
oversimplified view, however, runs the risk of missing the genuine complexities and 
nuances of the situation.  
Additionally, these movements can also be seen as events that marked the beginning 
of the resistance of Albanian intellectuals, who ultimately developed into self-organized 




Chapter 6: The unfolding of Kosovar activism (the 1990s) 
6.1. Introduction 
The student demonstrations in 1981 began as a local campus disturbance and escalated into 
bloodstained movements demanding republic status for Kosovo. After these 
demonstrations, the SFRY and the SRS regime declared the entire UP "a center for 
nationalistic indoctrination and separatist teachings" (AJ, 803/498, AS Đ-2/327) that 
promoted "enemy and nationalistic demands" (AK LoC/1981/83). Indeed, the presence of 
nationalist elements in the Albanian educational institutions was admitted by Albanian 
political elites and intellectuals. However, as Muhamedin Kullashi states, in all national 
cultures in the SFRY one could encounter the glorification of figures and events from 
national histories, national romanticism, etc. (Kullashi, 1996). Ever since the publication of 
the so-called "Blue Book" in 1977, but especially as a consequence of the student 
movements of 1981, the SRS openly insisted on the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy (AJ 
803/101). As a result of the continuing political and economic crisis, the entire decade of 
the 1980s was marked by vigorous demonstrations. Kosovo Serbs also started to 
demonstrate and seek "Serbia's protection from Albanians" by having it impose its will on 
Kosovo to remain within the SRS. Vladisavljević argues that the Kosovo Serbs’ political 
expectations also rose during the eighties, though it was also a time when they experienced 
the effects of the post-1966 constitutional and political changes and their own demographic 
decline.  Kosovo Serbs’ reactions triggered further mobilization of Albanians over the 
defense of Kosovo's autonomous status within the SFRY (Vladisavljević, 2002). These 
developments paved the way for the rise in 1986 of Slobodan Milošević, who was regarded 
by Serbian nationalists as the savior of Serbia. Milošević's "political solution" included 
rescinding Kosovo’s autonomy and strongly suppressing any separatism in Kosovo. These 
efforts were wholeheartedly joined by the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, and leaders of the Yugoslav 
People's Army and the SRS LoC. Thus, the already acknowledged discordance – in the 
name of "equality" – between Albanians and Serbs in the SFRY further intensified during 
the eighties. Albanians demanded equal status in the SFRY, and so too did the Serbs, who 




However, resistance in support of Kosovo's autonomous status by means of popular 
protests – which were supported by workers' strikes and marches – provoked even harsher 
reprisals from the Serbian regime against Kosovo Albanians in general. At the Kosovo 
Assembly in 1988, it is reported that almost one-third of Kosovo's entire population was 
forced through the police and court system, while thousands were sentenced for political 
activities punishable according to Articles 114 and 133 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code 
(Kullashi 1996; 65, 66). The reactions of the SFRY and the SRS state apparatus discredited 
Albanian communist elites and also encouraged the dissatisfaction of the wider public 
within the SRS and the SFRY. Janjić explained that since the Albanian communist leaders 
at that time were discredited and bureaucratized, "we in Serbia were looking for new 
leaders" (Janjić: February 2016). As a result, Azem Vllasi was initially promoted, mainly 
due to his rigorous stance against "Albanian nationalism and irredentism." However, Vllasi 
and another leading Kosovo politician, Kaqusha Jashari, were unwilling to accept changes 
to the constitutional amendments, which were intended to diminish Kosovo's autonomy. As 
a result of pressure from Serbs in Kosovo, as well as the SRS LoC, both Vllasi and Jashari 
became suspect and were thus regarded by the SRS as being unsuited for their political 
roles.  
Vllasi accused Slobodan Milošević of "sending army and police to arrest and isolate 
us." Afterward, the SRS regime appointed Rrahman Morina as the leader of the Communist 
League of Kosovo. Morina did not enjoy the sympathy of Albanians, because he was a 
former agent and secretary of the interior affairs, and he was also considered to be 
Milošević’s puppet. The arrests and changes in the Albanian communist leadership 
triggered serious reactions from Kosovo Albanians throughout Kosovo. The most important 
included the marches and strikes of the Trepça/Trepča miners, regarded as a symbol of the 
working class. A series of similar actions, protests, marches, hunger strikes, and civil 
disobedience were also manifested among other workers and Albanian citizens in general 
(Magaš, 1993).143 Albanians, who at the beginning of the eighties had protested against the 
"red bourgeoisie" and for republic status for Kosovo, were, at the end of the eighties, 
mobilized in support of Vllasi and the protection of the autonomous status of Kosovo. 
However, the SRS used the "politicized educational system" during the eighties as a 
 
143 A detailed treatment of the Trepça/Trepča workers’ strikes in English may be found in Magaš (1993, 179-186), 
but see also in Malcolm (1998, 343-344). 
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justification for nullifying Kosovo's autonomy. In 1989, Serbian nationalists with their new 
leader undemocratically declared the revocation of autonomy.  
According to Krasniqi, the nullification of Kosovo's autonomy had two major 
opposing but interconnected effects. First, it called into question whether Yugoslavia of the 
late eighties was capable of resolving its political disputes peacefully and weakened its 
internal and external legitimacy. Second, by discrediting the ineffective communist officials 
in Kosovo in the eyes of the local population, the way was opened for the emergence of 
new elites, associations, and parties that aimed to represent the interests of the Kosovo 
Albanians (G. Krasniqi 2012: 83).  
6.2. Roots of unity: LDK, Rugova and the parallel state 
During the 1980s as well – albeit from opposing vantage points – the "progressivists" and 
the "illegal groups" continued to influence Kosovo’s political dynamics. However, after the 
revocation of autonomy (March 1989), Kosovo Albanians almost unanimously considered 
the Albanian communist elites (such as Rrahman Morina and his allies) as illegitimate, 
labeling them "Milošević's puppets." Regarding themselves as unrepresented, in December 
1989 Albanian intellectuals saw the need to institute new political elites. As a result, 
Kosovo's (mainly academic) intelligencia united in establishing organizations which came 
to be of crucial importance during the nineties. The Council for the Defence of Human 
Rights and Freedom [Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e Lirive dhe të Drejtave të Njeriut (KMLDNJ)] 
was established December 14, 1989 (Shala: January 2016), and soon afterward (December 
23) the first democratic political party in Yugoslavia named The Democratic League of 
Kosovo [Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK)144 was established when Ibrahim Rugova 
(1944-2006) was elected its president (Buxhovi: January 2016). Other unions as well as 
political organizations were also established in the nineties.145 However, the LDK remained 
 
144 More details related to the establishment of LDK's are available in Mehmet Kraja’s book Vitet e humbura 
(Tirana: [no publisher], 1995). Tim Judah also provides some insights in his book Kosovo: War and Revenge (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), see pages 66-67.  
145 The Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo [Bashkimi i Sindikatave të Pavarura të Kosovës (BSPK)], 
the Independent Student Union of the University of Pristina [Unioni i Pavarur i Studentëve të Universitetit të 
Prishtinës (UPSUP)], the Women's Illiteracy Programme "Motrat Qiriazi" (The Qiriazi Sisters) and other political 
parties such as the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo [Partia Social Demokrate e Kosovës (PSDK)], the 
Parliamentary Party [Partia Parlamentare e Kosovës (PPK)], the Albanian Christian Democratic Party, the 
Peasant's Party of Kosovo, the Green Party of Kosovo, etc. While all these parties characterized themselves as 
"Kosovar," another group of prominent Kosovar Albanian intellectuals, including Veton Surroi, Shkëlzen Maliqi, 
Muhamedin Kullashi, et al., was engaged in forming the Kosovo branch of the pro-democracy and reform-minded 
174 
 
Kosovo's biggest political organization. Rugova himself, as well as the other new political 
elites, came mainly from the ranks of intellectuals who had been educated during 
Yugoslavia's "liberal" period. Even nowadays, Rugova's figure continues to be among the 
most debated ones within academic and political circles dealing with Kosovo's 
contemporary history of politics. Some authors and politicians glorify him (often referring 
to him as "Kosovo's Mahatma Gandhi"), while others accuse him of being too weak or 
underestimate Rugova's political role and profile in general. However, what remains 
unanalyzed – at least from a sociological perspective – is Rugova's personal tragedy and his 
affiliations with the LCY afterward.  
Both Ibrahim Rugova's father (Ukë) and grandfather (Rrustë) were executed by the 
Yugoslav communists in 1945. Nevertheless, at the end of the sixties, he formally joined 
the LCY. Even though his membership in the LCY was required in order to secure career 
advancement, Rugova's political opponents accuse him of never publicly distancing himself 
from or apologizing for his stirring articles, i.e., "Tito in the Albanian literature of 
Yugoslavia" (Zëri i Rinisë; May 16 and 23, 1981). By the way, most of the intellectuals 
who during the nineties took the lead and stood up for the defense of Albanian rights in 
Kosovo were ex-members of the LCY, UP professors, members of the Academy of Science 
and the Institutes. Due to the Serbian state's censorship and control of the press and media 
in general, Albanian intellectuals published their disagreements in linguistic journals in 
Kosovo or Croatian and Slovenian media (Kullashi, 1996: 67).  
Nevertheless, as noted above, Kosovo's autonomy was rescinded in March 1989. 
This particular meeting held at Kosovo Assembly attracted the highest attendance ever from 
the ranks of both federative and SRS level politicians. Around 180 local and international 
journalists also attended the event. After just a little discussion, the members of the 
Assembly, with a majority of the votes (only 10 votes against and 2 abstentions), approved 
changes to the proposed amendments; this act was accompanied by acclamation (Rlindja: 
March 23, 1989). Soon afterward, Serbian authorities initiated the adoption of a set of laws 
and regulations entitled "Program for the Realization of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo." 
Albanians in Kosovo were targeted and excluded from Kosovo's institutions. Around 
80,000 people were forced out of their jobs in state institutions and publicly owned 
 
Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative [Udruženje za jugoslovensku demokratsku inicijativu (UJDI)] in 
December 1989. Because they initially functioned outside the monist institutional establishment in Kosovo and 
Yugoslavia, these groups came to be known as the Kosovar Alternative (see: Krasniqi 2012). 
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companies, and Albanian media were also suppressed (Malcolm, 1998: 345–6). As a 
response to these acts, despite Serbia’s having suspended the Kosovo Assembly and 
government (July 1990) and arrested some its members, the remaining Albanian members 
of the Assembly of the previously autonomous province of Kosovo managed to draw up a 
declaration of independence in July and September 1990 and adopted the constitution of 
Kosovo. Aiming to delegitimize Serbia's rule, in December 1990 Albanian leaders called 
for a boycott of the Serbian elections. Shortly thereafter, in June 1991, both Slovenia and 
Croatia declared their independence from the SFRY. In October 1991, after organizing a 
referendum (September 26-30, 1991), Kosovo also officially declared its independence 
(October 19, 1991) and Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of LDK, was elected the President of 
the Republic. From this moment on, attempts to resist the revocation of autonomy were 
transformed into demands for political independence from the SFRY. However, due to the 
presence of Serbian military forces, Albanians in Kosovo were not able to realize their 
"declared" statehood. As a result, they proclaimed a shadow "Republic" whose government 
was in exile.  
Kosovo Albanians proceeded with the organization of a parallel system of 
governance, meaning that they boycotted all state-run institutions. This meant the creation 
of a parallel system, which was organized in private houses, garages and abandoned 
basements (Clark 2000; 76, 83, 85). Except for the Republic of Albania, no other state 
recognized Kosovo's self-declared independence. These acts nonetheless led to the 
establishment of a so-called "parallel state." Shkelzen Maliqi recalls that Rugova's or LDK's 
peaceful resistance strategy, which people also referred to as "Gandhism," surprised both 
the Serbian regime as well as Kosovo Albanians. Without much in the way of debate or 
nonviolence campaigns, says Maliqi, peaceful resistance became a somehow "trendy" and 
effective response to Serbia's aggressive plans (Maliqi: May 2016).  
Taking into consideration that the propaganda machine of the SFRY spread negative 
stereotypes about Kosovo Albanians, characterizing them as "uncivilized," "rapists," etc., 
the LDK's decision to respond peacefully to the daily brutalities and provocations of Serbian 
authorities surprised other countries both within and outside the SFRY as well. By the early 
1990s, the LDK had managed to establish an effective system of control, in both urban and 
rural areas, that enabled it for several years to maintain the fragile peace and the mantle of 
nonviolent resistance (Pula 2004: 13).  
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Party branches were also established in the United States and numerous Western 
European countries. From Prishtina, the LDK controlled the provisional government of 
Kosovo that was operated by Bujar Bukoshi in exile. Starting from March 1992, every 
Kosovo Albanian living in the diaspora was obliged to donate three percent of their income 
for the "Fund for the Republic of Kosovo," and the parallel system relied primarily on 
donations to this fund or from Albanian emigrés. However, for much of the 1990s, teachers 
and doctors working in the parallel institutions served without or with merely symbolic 
compensation. While some doctors and medical personnel also established – mainly in their 
own houses or basements – small offices offering private paid medical services, teachers 
and education personnel relied simply on symbolic compensation which was – not regularly 
– paid by Kosovo's government in exile. By showing solidarity, Kosovo Albanians 
sacrificed their personal and family well-being to serve the cause of the republic.  
In the early 1990s, the LDK managed to incorporate under their umbrella a large 
part of the Popular Movement of Kosovo [Lidhja Popullore e Kosovës – (LPK)146], ex-
political prisoners and members of illegal groups (Buxhovi: Jan 2016). This can be 
considered as a period when Albanian political activists and organizations from both camps 
– "progressivists," meaning university professors or ex-Yugoslav intellectuals, and the 
members of "illegal groups," meaning LPK, ex-political prisoners, and ex-members of the 
illegal groups – were merged and unified under the LDK umbrella for the cause of the 
republic.  
Hamiti gives credit to Rugova and the LDK for being the fulcrum of the parallel 
state. The self-declared Republic of Kosovo of the 1990s ran an educational system at all 
levels as well as a welfare and healthcare system, alongside a financial system underpinning 
them and the institutions of state. These institutions were at the core of the peaceful, political 
resistance to Serbian occupation. LDK dominance grew in the media and information sector 
as well. Throughout the 1990s, they controlled the existing press, namely Bujku, which was 
a daily newspaper published in Kosovo and Rilindja and which could be published only in 
the diaspora.  
 
146 The LPK emerged after the 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo and was constituted of several illegal groups and 
organizations. Like other "illegal groups," the LPK also played a significant role in the nineties and promoted 
rather radical forms of a political solution for Kosovo. LPK members are considered to be the founders of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the mid-1990s.  
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During 1990, the LDK also established its own news agency, the Kosovo 
Information Centre (KIC) [Qendra për Informim e Kosovës (QIK)]. The KIC was a news 
agency which, although close to Rugova and the LDK, covered all developments in Kosovo, 
including political and non-political entities critical of them (Hamiti: March 2019). The 
LDK also assured space for two hours of daily broadcast from Tirana through Albania's 
satellite channel (Judah, 2000: 92). Kosovan political and human rights activists realized 
that it was Serbia's violent repression that was attracting Western attention. Thus, both the 
LDK and particularly the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms began 
assiduously documenting cases of police brutality and harsh treatment of Albanians, as well 
as other ethnically driven maltreatment and violence perpetrated by the authorities (Pula, 
2004).  
As a dominant political force in Kosovo, LDK managed to continuously develop 
and deploy their structure throughout the province. Their aim was to prevent the local 
population from responding with violence to Serb provocations. Through regular press 
conferences, which usually took place every Friday, Kosovo Albanians were urged to 
refrain from provoking the Serbian regime and to avoid any type of violence. Buxhovi, who 
was also one of the founders, refers to LDK as a model and the biggest movement which 
"kept education and the state alive" (Buxhovi: Jan 2016). However, this political and social 
mobilization of the Kosovo Albanians was also later called a "phantom state" (Judah, 2000: 
61).  
According to Clark, the Albanians’ goals were multiple: first and foremost was the 
survival of their nation; concomitant goals were disputing the authority of Serbian state 
institutions while utilizing and at the same time legitimizing the authority of Kosovo 
institutions. However, this commitment and civil resistance also aimed at the mobilization 
of international support (Clark, 2006: 86) for an alternative political strategy to change the 
status quo with respect to the relations between the Serbian government and Kosovar 
Albanians. This strategy was effective: during 1989 and 1990 the European Parliament 
adopted two resolutions condemning Serbia's policies in Kosovo. The United States 
Congress did the same by also adopting a series of resolutions. The House of 
Representatives and the Senate blocked US economic aid to Yugoslavia (1990), unless the 
country took measures to respect human rights in Kosovo. Similarly, Western media started 
reporting on developments in Kosovo. Horrific stories of police brutality were reaching the 
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ears of Western policymakers and the general public through organizations such as 
Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch (later Human Rights Watch). However, even 
though Western policymakers liked the LDK's nonviolent approach, they were not in favor 
of independence for Kosovo. The Kosovar government-in-exile applied to the European 
Council on December 1991 for recognition, but its request was refused (Pula, 2004). 
Another problem which became bigger and had larger and long-term consequences for the 
future was the segregation of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs into separate schools, hospitals, 
and administrative and political structures. The negative effects were especially to be seen 
in the coming years. This situation further restricted inter-group interaction and increased 
intra-group homogeneity, which in turn led to strong pressure for clear-cut identities (G. 
Krasniqi, 2010). Additionally, homogenization did not necessarily affect just Albanians or 
Serbs; it also challenged those groups which were seen as "religious and ethnic anomalies," 
such as Roma and Turkish people, Gorans (Slavic Muslims), Turkophone Albanians in 
Prizren or Slavophone Albanians in Rahovec (Duijzings, 2000: 24).  
Homogenization also meant political unity, which in the case of the LDK was well 
managed and coordinated, but only between 1989 and 1992. The LDK's strong victory in 
the elections – held separately from the Serbian regime – of May 1992, increased the 
dissatisfaction among some political figures (such as Qosja and Demaçi), which later 
intensified their criticism of Rugova and the LDK (G. Krasniqi, 2012). However, Rugova's 
figure started to be questioned, especially after signing an agreement on education with 
Milošević on September 1, 1996, according to which Albanians were supposed to return to 
the regular schools from which they had been forced out.  
Hamiti recalls that this educational agreement was the result of long negotiations 
between Kosovar and Serbian delegations. Senior members of the LDK (Fehmi Agani, 
Abdyl Ramaj), but also members of the League of Albanian Teachers (Lidhja e Arsimtarëve 
Shqiptarë - LASH), such as Rexhep Osmani, a senior associate of the Ministry of Education, 
were involved in the negotiations. This specific educational agreement was largely a result 
of pressure from the US government, says Hamiti. Rugova and his associates reluctantly 
subscribed to it. There was not much enthusiasm about it amongst the LDK at the time. 
Milošević got much more from it than Rugova did in effect (Hamiti: March 2019). The 
international community’s insistence on lobbying to convince Belgrade to respect the 
agreement on education was also confirmed by the Republic of Albania's Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs. He recalls that on October 1, 1997, after some sessions at the United 
Nations Assembly in New York, for the first time Paskal Milo had a meeting with the FRY's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milan Milutinović. What they discussed was "the necessity to 
respect the education agreement" (Milo, June 2016). Judging it now, after all these years, 
and also knowing the situation Kosovo was in during the nineties, it can be said that the 
agreement did not represent anything significant; it was a very minimal request. This 
appears to be especially true if one takes into consideration the student demonstrations that 
took place in Prishtina, which I will discuss below. However, with reference to this specific 
meeting, the Serbian press highlighted that Milutinović proposed a "senior-level" meeting 
between the two countries. However, Milo responded that for that to happen, Serbia must 
first withdraw its police regime and change its attitude vis-à-vis Albanians in Kosovo (NIN, 
October 23, 1997). In any case, the signing of the educational agreement was presented by 
Kosovo intellectuals (such as Statovci as and Rugova's other political rivals, Demaçi and 
Qosja) as "LDK's secret negotiations with Serbian officials" (Clark 2000, 132, 133), even 
though indeed these negotiations were mediated by an Italian Catholic body, the Comunità 
di Sant' Egidio (ibid.). On the opposing side was Predrag Simić, political advisor to the 
President of Yugoslavia and later a member of the Serbian delegation to the failed 
negotiations in Rambouillet147 as well as Serbian ambassador to France. He also confirmed 
that discussions between some Serbian and Albanian intellectuals had taken place from the 
beginning of September 1996, but that this began in Germany at an event entitled "Strategies 
and Options for Kosovo" that was organized by the German Foundation Bertelsman 
(Intervju: 28 February 1997). Albanian sources do not provide information about these 
ongoing meetings of intellectuals during September 1996 that took place in Germany. 
Additionally, the term: autonomy plus was already the formulation used by the so-called 
international community, as a way of trying to negotiate a relationship between Serbia and 
Kosovo that would leave Kosovo part of what was by then the FRY but without being 
subjected to Serbian abuse. Professor Friedman was a member of a delegation from the 
Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations in December 1995 where 
this option was discussed with leading members of the LDK. On the same trip, while the 
 
147 The Rambouillet Agreement was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) proposed peace agreement 
between the FRY and Kosovo (1999). Given that the Serbs (Yugoslavia) refused to sign it, NATO initiated military 
intervention in the Kosovo War. According to knowledgeable sources, the purpose of the agreement, which neither 
side actually wanted to sign, was to provide a pretext for the NATO bombing. The Albanian delegation had to be 
(secretly) instructed to express willingness to accept it so that the public relations effect could be achieved. 
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UP students told him they were preparing to take up arms, Serbian intellectuals in Belgrade 
said: "We've lost Kosovo, haven't we." To which the answer was already "Yes" (Friedman: 
December 2015).  
On the other hand, although Rugova and Milošević signed the agreement, the regime 
did not provide support for all schools or university premises for Albanian students. This 
also served as the pretext for dissidents (some within the LDK) to launch the idea of "active 
resistance." However, due to the situation in the region, the recent Yugoslav wars, as well 
as Albania's "civil war" (1997), Albanians tended to hesitate regarding taking concrete 
actions. Yet the Republic of Albania's diplomats at the embassy in Belgrade, despite being 
under constant surveillance and the borders being closed, managed to travel to Prishtina and 
report back home regarding the situation in Kosovo. The reports included information 
regarding Albania's diplomats' meetings with political leaders, anti-LDK dissidents as well 
as activists from the UP student union. However, even though it was aware of the situation 
in Kosovo, at the end of the nineties the Republic of Albania was unable to lobby effectively 
enough for the cause of the Kosovo Albanians. According to the Republic of Albania's 
foreign minister, this was because the international community did not allow them to 
request or lobby for republic status for Kosovo. Westerners, explained Milo, instead wanted 
for Albanians in Kosovo to have a bit more in the way of rights; basically, they supported 
Kosovo's right to return to its former autonomous status, but nothing beyond what it had 
had in 1974 (Milo, June 2016). The European countries' hesitation regarding the Kosovans' 
demands for the status of a republic could also be seen in Wolfgang Ischinger's statement 
that "Germany does not support the idea of Kosovo's independence, but also does not agree 
with the current situation" (Flaka e Vëllazërimit: August 25, 1997).  
However, it is also worth mentioning that Ibrahim Rugova, even though he 
congratulated Fatos Nano on his results in the elections of June 29, 1996 (Flaka e 
Vëllazërimit: July 1, 1997), still held a political position opposing the "leftists"148 of the 
Republic of Albania. Additionally, Milo stated that the Republic of Albania's government 
had invited Rugova to visit Tirana. However, when Rugova was in Tirana, both Prime 
Minister Fatos Nano and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were abroad. Thus, "Rugova could 
have been offended, because we did not expect him in Tirana," but afterward, says Milo, 
 
148 The ex-communist or Party of Labour of Albania (which had been the only ruling party since the end of World 
War II) managed to win the first free elections (March 1991) in Albania. On June 1991, in its efforts to survive in 
the new system, the same party changed its name to the Socialist Party of Albania.  
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Albania's government continuously invited him to come, but Rugova did not (Milo, June 
2016)! Relations between Kosovo and Albania were especially damaged after Fatos Nano's 
meeting with Slobodan Milošević on Crete, Greece (1997) (Flaka e Vëllazërimit: December 
4, 1997). Milošević declared that, according to Fatos Nano, Kosovo was Serbia's internal 
problem. In one of his regular press conferences in Prishtina, Rugova called for Prime 
Minister Nano "to be more careful with his declarations" (Flaka e Vëllazërimit: October 8-
9, 1997). Albania's then Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that "Fatos Nano did this meeting 
on his own, even though it was supposed to be a meeting between delegations" (Milo, June 
2016). Nevertheless, even though Rugova – who remained Kosovo's main political figure 
until his death (2006) – did not go to Albania, Milo confirms that the Republic of Albania's 
government welcomed and supported other Kosovo delegations, including LDK's political 
opponents, student union activists, and later Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders, etc. 
(Milo, June 2016).  
Afrim Krasniqi considered the official relations between Tirana and Pristina 
(parallel institutions run by I. Rugova) tense, mainly because Tirana supported Rugova's 
critics by even encouraging them to react with protests (A. Krasniqi, May 2016). Among 
these political struggles during the nineties, the atmosphere in Kosovo remained politically 
fraught and the Serbian police uniform remained a symbol of fear. However, besides 
increased dissatisfaction, criticism from dissident groups, and shaky relations with the 
Republic of Albania, until the end of the nineties Kosovo was politically dominated by the 
LDK. This is because, according to Clark, Rugova and the LDK came to a national 
consensus on Kosovo that no one outside its leadership could "influence when to bend and 
when to be firm" (Clark, 2000: 168).  
6.3. The University of Prishtina – a symbol of resistance yet again 
The most challenging period for the survival of the UP was the time between 1990 and 
1999. The oppression of the eighties culminated with the expulsion of professors and 
students from the UP premises. The Serbian–Albanian confrontation over the constitutional 
status of Kosovo directly concerned jurisdiction over the educational system in the 
province. Control over Kosovo's schools and the university was, for Serbs and Albanians 
alike, paramount to the protection of their own national identity. In the context of national 
confrontation in Kosovo, this implied Serbs would try to gain control over Kosovo's 
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educational system while attempting to bring about the educational unification of Serbia, 
and Albanians would try to retain educational autonomy (Kostovicova 2005, 93). In the 
period between the 1981-1982 and 1990-1991 academic years, the number of Albanian 
students decreased by 36% (UP 2005149). The changing political conditions after the student 
demonstrations of 1981 had a significant effect on the UP. Finally, in 1990, Belgrade 
usurped authority over education and initiated a Serbian re-nationalization of Kosovo. This 
began when the Serbian Assembly passed a law that resulted in their first closure at the UP, 
which was the Medical Faculty. A year after closing the Medical Faculty, Serbia introduced 
a series of measures to eliminate the university's 13 faculties. All Albanian teaching staff 
were removed, while Serbian lecturers were promoted or installed in their place. This turned 
the university into an exclusively Serbian institution (Clark, 2000: 96, 97, 101).  
The regime also initiated the segregation of Albanians from Serbs and Montenegrins 
in different school buildings and introduced new curricula, which increased the teaching of 
Serbian history and culture, while decreasing the hours for Albanian literature and history. 
A physical division of pupils and students along national lines was imposed in Kosovo's 
schools and student dormitories during the spring of 1990 (Kostovicova, May 2016). This 
was arguably a precursor to total segregation along national lines, not only in schools and 
the university but in all spheres of life in Kosovo. After a decade of political pressures, in 
June 1991 Serbia imposed violent measures against the UP and its faculties. On June 27, 
1991, the Assembly of the SRS approved the following decision: "For the protection of self-
management rights and social property, provisional measures are implemented against the 
UP and the faculties in its structure" (Sluzbeni glasnik (Official Gazette) of the SRS, No. 
38, Belgrade, 27/06/1991). This was the official end of the joint (Albanian and Serb) 
journey on building and developing an institution of higher learning or a university in 
Kosovo.150   
This decision led to further separation and segregation. At the beginning of the 1991-
1992 academic year, the Albanian professors of the UP did not sign the agreement with the 
 
149 In 2005, the University of Prishtina published a special edition aimed at providing information about the overall 
developments of this institution covering the period 1970–2005. The editorial board consisted of Acad. Jashar 
Rexhepagiq, Prof. Dr. Hajrullah Koliqi, Shyqri Nimani, MA, Associate Profesor Prof. Ass. Demë Hoti, Bajram 
Shatri and Destan Halimi. Hereafter this document is cited as “UP 2005.”  
150 Even nowadays (2019) the UP remains separated along these two ethnic lines. Since 1999, the main UP 
(Universiteti i Prishtinës), located in Prishtina, has functioned in the Albanian language. The Serbian community 
established its own "Univerzitet u Prištini," an institution of higher education which is located in Mitrovica and 
functions in the Serbian language with its own administration.  
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Serbian Community of Higher Education and the Community of Faculties. On September 
2, 1991, the Serbian police and army were deployed in front of the school headquarters to 
prevent instruction in the Albanian language. By the end of the day, the majority of 
Albanian language educational institutions were outlawed; this also included the UP. 
Armored vehicles of the Serbian police and army were parked in front of the faculty doors 
(Kosovo Education Center-KEC 2000, 71). On November 26, 1991, a session of the UP 
Assembly was held, where it was decided to continue the teaching process in Albanian 
outside the legal premises (which were occupied by the Serbian administration and police). 
Prof. Ejup Statovci was elected the new rector of the UP, and on December 5, 1991, the 
Deans Collegial Body held its first meeting, at which it was decided how to proceed further 
in the organization of pedagogical and research activity in extraordinary conditions on 
private premises (Kostovicova 2005, 126). The basic legal activity of the UP was based on 
the Law on Higher Education of the SAP of Kosovo (1989) and the Decree Law on the 
Amendments and Supplements to the Higher Education of Kosovo, adopted by the 
government of the Republic of Kosovo in exile on January 10, 1992. This influenced further 
consolidation of the legal basis, the activity, and the reforming of this institution. UP 
activities in extraordinary circumstances were legitimated, and the new specific regime of 
studies was followed under these conditions (UP 2005, 51). The rector of the UP, Prof. 
Statovci, ran the university largely based on a statute adopted by Kosovo's government in 
exile. The UP was also financed from Kosovo's government in exile as well as from tuition 
fees paid by students. Statovci ran the university largely independently, with no undue 
pressure from Kosovo's parallel state (Hamiti: March 2019). However, professors and 
students attended classes without basic facilities, such as teaching devices or heating, in 
small and narrow private premises, though the most stressful thing remained the ongoing 
violence carried out by Serbian police forces. On August 21, 1991, the Helsinki group in 
Vienna issued a statement asserting that Albanian education in Kosovo no longer existed 
and that it had been destroyed by Serbia. Professors organized demonstrations in October 
1992 to return to their facilities. Serbian police forces intervened violently and scattered 
demonstrators in front of the square where they had gathered to demonstrate. Yet no 
concrete measures for releasing the UP premises were taken. Consequently, the parallel 
educational system in Kosovo continued throughout the nineties. The UP played an 
important political role by representing the Albanian non-violent strategy as a legitimate 
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form of national struggle against Serbian repression: "It was both a symbolic and a political 
expression of Kosovo Albanian nationhood" (Kostovicova, May 2016). However, as was 
the case among other dissident groups, during the mid-nineties students and professors lost 
confidence in the LDK's or Rugova's platform of "peaceful resistance." The Dayton 
Agreement (1995), which left the Kosovo issue unresolved, signaled the end of the fragile 
equilibrium between the Belgrade authorities and the "Republic of Kosovo’s" parallel 
institutions. Given that nothing had changed and the political elites were not about to take 
any concrete action, students started talking about returning to the streets. During this period 
education was more or less the only fully functioning parallel institution run by the Kosovo 
Albanian parallel state. 
Controlling education, therefore, became an expression of political power and 
governance.  Albin Kurti, one of the student leaders of the late nineties, says that the credit 
for preserving the autonomy of the UP from Serbia, as well as from daily politics in Kosovo, 
goes to Rector Ejup Statovci and to the leadership of the student union, "which were ready 
for those that they found ready" (Kurti, November 2015). Kurti also admits that without the 
UP's autonomy, students would not have been able to mobilize their peers and think about 
organizing the demonstrations. Ejup Statovci maintained the unity of the students, whereas 
the students strengthened the idea of active resistance for the liberation of the UP premises. 
6.4. Boys from the village (Katunar151) 
By the late nineties, the volatility of the socio-political situation in Kosovo reached its 
zenith. The regime's repression, as well as the segregation of the Albanians and Serbs in all 
spheres of life during the nineties, significantly impacted the rise of nationalism and reduced 
each ethnicity’s empathy for "the other." The newspaper Vreme (August 23, 1997) 
published the results of a public survey conducted in June 1997 by the Forum for Inter-
ethnic Relations in Belgrade in cooperation with the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology 
 
151 Katunar (peasant, villager) is a derogatory term chiefly but not exclusively applied to those closely associated 
with rural areas and perceived to be crass or unsophisticated. Its usage is especially offensive when applied by 
those living in the towns, who tend to present themselves as more ‘civilized’ by putting down others as ‘katunars.’ 
Note that katunar is a colloquial (Geg) form. Standard Albanian would be katundar. Moreover, Tosk (and also 
Standard) would be fshatar. 
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in Prishtina. The findings of this research revealed that over 90% of both Kosovo Albanians 
and Kosovo Serbs claimed the need to be careful of and avoid other ethnicities (figure 5).  
Figure 5. Vis-à-vis other ethnicities, one should be careful 
 
Source: Forum for Inter-ethnic Relations in Belgrade (June 1997) 
Meanwhile, like some of the LDK's opponents, UP students, too, started to question 
Rugova's political philosophy of "peaceful resistance." Yet the existence of parallel 
government structures during the nineties somehow persuaded Kosovo Albanian society 
that this was the most that could be done under the circumstances. Slobodan Milošević 
turned everything to the advantage of his regime, because he wanted to neutralize the 
situation, and thus he kept reiterating to the international community that Serbia was 
working (for example, by signing the educational agreement) with Kosovo Albanians 
toward integration into the existing political structures of Yugoslavia, over which he had 
presided since the late 1980s. The lack of freedom and of prospects for the future, as well 
as the lack of personal and family well-being dismayed the UP students. Leaders of the 
student union who were interviewed declared that the daily violence of the Serbian regime 
and the classical occupation of the country denied basic human rights for normal education 
and life. Especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, notions such as liberalism, democracy, 
and human rights circulated continuously, especially among UP students.  
Kurti recalls how they used to refer to and be influenced by Martin Luther King and 
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However, as during previous student demonstrations in Kosovo, during 1997 the most 
significant role was also played by the dissemination of knowledge and readings about 
Albanian history. This, according to Kurti, was a good source and served as an "engine for 
the mobilization of the students…because whoever reads the history of the Albanian nation 
can see how Albanians were separated unjustly, oppressed politically, misused 
economically, and discriminated against culturally" (Kurti, November 2015). On top of all 
that, Kosovo society for many years had had no access to schools, universities, stadiums, 
squares, factories, etc. And yet the LDK cultivated the idea that by creating parallel 
institutions, the highest patriotic act had already been achieved. However, people's desire 
to even approach public objects, which at that time were labeled as "not ours," had died 
(Lajçi, January 2016). Under these circumstances, it was difficult to convince people that 
there were any choices other than active forms of resistance. Kosovar Albanian students 
declared that "we simply couldn't live like that anymore," and they decided to organize 
demonstrations. Nevertheless, although students challenged Rugova and the LDK platform, 
they were also guided by principles of nonviolence in the organization of student 
demonstrations (Krasniqi, 2012). Still, the students' decision to start preparing for a 
demonstration was seen as "active resistance" and attracted a great deal of attention from 
Western diplomats and media, which had been actively monitoring the Kosovo issue.  
In early 1997 the leadership of the Unionit të Pavarur të Studentëve të Universitetit 
të Prishtinës (or Independent Student Union of the University of Prishtina, hereafter 
UPSUP) changed. Bujar Dugolli, who had previously represented the Faculty of Philosophy 
(1995) at the student union, on February 4, 1997 gained the students’ trust to become the 
President of the UPSUP, a position which automatically assured him a place as a member 
of the UP Senate. New leadership promised to invigorate the UPSUP, not just for the sake 
of leading it, but in order to change things. After the elections, the university rectorate raised 
some issues, because, according to the students, the rectorate was misinformed about the 
goals of the new leadership and supported another candidate. Dugolli's opponents described 
the new leadership as boys from the village (katunar), who were radical and 
uncompromising and also made other claims such as "Demaçi152 is behind them," etc. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that the LDK was a large umbrella organization, composed of 
 
152 Adem Demaçi was a chairman of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms of the People of 
Kosovo. He was also a founder and activist of “illegal political groups” in Kosovo and a longtime political prisoner 
who spent a total of 29 years in prison for speaking out against the treatment of ethnic Albanians in the SFRY. 
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people of diverse backgrounds, including those from the countryside. Thus, labels such as 
"katunar" could have been used by student opponents but not by LDK officials towards the 
UPSUP leaders. During the late nineties, Dugolli described himself as a student of history 
with only two more exams until graduation, coming from a persecuted family and region 
(Drenica), as well as influenced by historical literature and examples of previous student 
leaders who had organized the demonstrations of 1968 and 1981 (Dugolli; November 2015). 
Given that the organizers of the previous student demonstrations were taken as role models, 
this might serve as an indicator that the students were also influenced by Demaçi. The LDK 
indeed noticed that the UPSUP was gradually "dominated by a leftist-leaning (Marxist-
Leninist) contingent of people" (Hamiti: March 2019) who were opposed to the LDK’s 
national democratic program. Later on, the LDK also considered UPSUP leaders to be 
proxies of Rugova's political rivals and accused them of spreading false propaganda (ibid.).  
As a consequence of the ongoing propaganda, during the very first meeting with 
Rector Ejup Statovci, the UPSUP leaders invited the rector to re-check whether the election 
process for the UPSUP had been free and fair. The students wanted to convince the rector 
that their victory was clean and honest. From this moment on, the rectorate was one of the 
biggest supporters of UPSUP. The leadership of the UPSUP consisted of Bujar Dugolli as 
president, Driton Lajçi as vice president, Albin Kurti as the member of the leadership 
responsible for international relations, and Muhamet Mavraj as chairman of the UPSUP 
Assembly and editor-in-chief of the student newspaper "Bota e Re (New World)," which 
was more a political than a student medium. For several months, the four main members of 
the leadership worked together surprisingly well – like a veritable well-oiled machine – 
despite the fact that none of them had known each other for long before beginning their 
cooperation in the UPSUP, given that they were all studying in different departments and 
came from different regions. The UPSUP also had branch offices in Mitrovica (led by 
students Ali Ahmeti, Naxhije Mripa, Mrika Begu, etc.), Ferizaj/Uroševac (chaired by 
Vjollca Hyseni), Prizren (chaired by Suzana Selmanaj), Pejë/Peć (Luan Elshani), etc. 
Together with Rector Statovci, the students honored their commitment to preparing for a 
demonstration. 
Before the elections for this position, Dugolli promised the students that if he were 
elected, the UPSUP would organize a peaceful demonstration in support of liberating the 
UP premises; "we had had enough of studying in private houses" (Dugolli; November 
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2015). The students' enthusiasm was high, but the idea of a demonstration was not supported 
by political leaders, especially Ibrahim Rugova and the LDK. A few international diplomats 
also put pressure on Kosovo's political scene as well as the students not to organize 
demonstrations.  
One example is Polish diplomat Sllavomir Dobrava, who said to the students, "You 
are just small kids" and Europe is urging you to postpone the demonstration. The UPSUP's 
leadership’s relationship with Adem Demaçi was also confirmed when Dugolli and Kurti 
went to inform Demaçi that despite all pressures, the students planned to organize protests 
for October 1, 1997. Surprisingly enough, even Demaçi urged the students to "leave these 
things to the ‘big guys'…don't you see that everyone is saying you shouldn't organize them" 
(Dugolli 2013). The students’ response to both Demaçi and Dobrova was heroic: "We are 
‘small,' but our rights are big," and the demonstrations will be organized. The UPSUP 
leadership reported encountering many obstacles, threats, traps, blackmail, pressures, and 
endless propaganda, but still the students continued to insist on achieving their aim. 
6.4.1. Before the demonstrations 
On March 11, 1997, the UPSUP students organized a symbolic commemoration of the 
student demonstrations of 1981. At this particular event, they also announced their initiative 
to organize student demonstrations for October 1, 1997. The main purpose of these 
nonviolent demonstrations was intended to be "the liberation of the university spaces" 
(Dugolli 2013). For six years students had sat in private houses, garages, and basements. 
During the period of passive resistance in Kosovo, the educational sector, as represented by 
the home schools, functioned as the symbolic front line in the battle for the restoration of 
Kosovo’s autonomy. Students – highlighted Kurti – attended these home schools, hoping 
that it would be for some months or maybe a year, but it became six years, and "we simply 
couldn't stand it anymore" (Kurti, November 2015).  
The demonstrations of 1997 took place five years after the last protests by Kosovo 
Albanians against Serbian forces. The marches of October 1992 had also been organized 
precisely because of the Serbian regime’s blockage of the school premises and instruction 
in the Albanian language. That is why, after such a long hiatus, it was very difficult to 
convince students to undertake concrete actions. There were various ideas on how to engage 
in active resistance and huge moral support from other UP students as well, but no real 
189 
 
willingness or readiness to act. The leaders of the UPSUP, however, established an 
Organizing Council (OC) comprised of five students and four professors to coordinate the 
student demonstrations of October 1, 1997 (see photo 1). While Dugolli, as president of the 
USPUP, was the chair of the OC, Professor Ejup Statovci, as the UP’s rector, took on the 
role of the deputy chair of the OC.  It is important to note that because the students had been 
able to bring the rector over to their side, they had the weight of his office behind them, 
which ultimately enabled them to be successful. The OC drafted a protest platform and 
decided that the protests should be led by the students, but that the university would support 
them. The OC made sure that the student platform was in line with international conventions 
on Higher Education (Dugolli; November 2015).  
Photo 1. Here are seven out of nine members of the Organization Council (the picture was 
supplied by the organizers of the demonstrations)153 
 
The platform was translated and distributed to all foreign embassies based in 
Belgrade at that time. The OC established the following committees: media, foreign 
 
153 Most of the pictures that survived from the archives of UPSUP are published in Bujar Dugolli’s book; Dugolli, 
B. (2013) 1 TETORI I KTHESËS - Lëvizja studentore 1997 – 1999, Publisher University of Prishtina. This book 
also provides details identifying the individuals in the pictures and other details about the place(s) and date(s) when 
the pictures were taken.  
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relations, technical issues, health and order. Even though very few people in Kosovo were 
aware of the internet at that time, the students set up UPSUP's website, where the goals of 
and information about the coming protests were presented (Newspaper Epoka e Re, 3rd 
October 2005).  
Gradually important international diplomats began visiting Kosovo, expressing 
serious interest in the students’ purposes. Kosovo was considered the Western Balkans’ 
"ticking bomb," with a huge potential for spreading disturbances to neighboring states as 
well. Dugolli talked about his meetings with renowned political individuals, including 
Robert Gelbard (President Clinton's special envoy in Belgrade), Huber Vedrine (French 
representative), Klaus Kinkel (German representative), Robin Cook (British 
representative), Florian Nova (Albanian Ambassador in Belgrade), etc. He confirmed that 
the biggest support came from the US Embassy, e.g., Richard Miles, Chief of Mission in 
Belgrade, Nicolas Hill, American diplomat, etc. 
Dugolli also mentioned the opening of the United State Information Agency (USIA) 
office in Kosovo. Michael MacLellan was the first head of the USIA office, and Dugolli 
considered him as "a bit more reserved because he mainly supported the LDK." However, 
the next US representative in Kosovo, Richard Hakenbe, was described as "closer" to the 
students (Dugolli: November 2015). This was a sign that by the late 1990s, US diplomacy 
was supporting Kosovo Albanians, who favored more active resistance. 
The most concrete steps were felt in August 1997. The newspaper Flaka e 
Vëllazërimit confirmed that "at the invitation of Richard Holbrooke, Kosovo leaders will 
visit the US Embassy in Belgrade" (Flaka e Vëllazërimit: 8th of August 1997). Student 
representatives were also invited as a part of a Kosovo delegation meeting at the US 
Embassy in Belgrade. Lajçi explained that once in Belgrade, the students realized that they 
had been invited by President Clinton's special envoy for the Balkans, Robert Gelbard. The 
members of the delegation from Kosovo who participated in that meeting were: Fehmi 
Agani, Head of Delegation, Adem Demaçi, Vetoni Surroi, and Driton Lajçi as a 
representative of the UPSUP.  
Lajçi mentioned that during the meeting Gelbard called Kosovo's political leaders 
"lazy," telling them that "you did not manage to raise the issue of Kosovo at the level of 
human rights" (Lajçi, January 2016). The students then proposed their platform for peaceful 
protests. After hearing it, Gelbard – who had been a student leader himself – expressed his 
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sympathy for the students, saying that "it is worth sacrificing for peace." The students were 
also promised that if they implemented the platform on October 1, the US government 
would support them by sending their diplomats.  
That turned out to be true: on the day of protest, American diplomats Richard Hakebi 
and Nikolas Hill were present in order to monitor the situation (Lajçi, January 2016). This 
can be considered as a major concrete breakthrough in US foreign policy toward Kosovo. 
The students I interviewed also shared their views with France and Germany, which back 
then were respectively represented by Foreign Ministers Huber Vedrine and Klaus Kinkel. 
Both of these European countries opposed the student demonstrations and urged the 
students to withdraw their demands for independence and accept autonomy. These reactions 
surprised the students, given that the LDK's political leaders used to feed the public entirely 
different stories about the opinions of the so-called Quint countries (the US, UK, France, 
Germany, and Italy) regarding Kosovo's future status.  
The Serbian press continued to claim that the idea of a Republic of Kosovo did not 
have the support of the world powers (Jedinstvo, September 30, 1997). During the 
preparatory phase of the protests, students met with all the existing political parties in 
Kosovo, the representatives of religious communities, the Association of Political 
Prisoners, well-known intellectuals, etc. In all of these meetings, the students presented the 
OC platform, expressed their determination to protest, and sought other actors’ support for 
it. In their meetings with LDK delegations, which were usually led by Fehmi Agani, the 
"education agreement" was defended. At one moment Mavraj had had enough and criticized 
them by saying: "What is this hypocrisy? You are responsible for my seven lost years" 
(Mavraj, November 2015).  
The students were of the opinion that the failure of LDK policies and of the political 
elites in general obliged them to leave their studies and participate in the protests. Given 
that the LKD was not supporting the students’ aims for demonstrations, they were asked at 
least not to obstruct the students. Mavraj also complained about one of the LDK's factions, 
which, according to him, tried to divide the students. Several weeks before the 
demonstrations of 1997, to test the students' mood, the UPSUP organized so-called "protest 
walks in korzo." The youth simply went out in the evenings, at around 19:00, in groups of 
3-4 people and walked in the areas of the city center which they perceived as “theirs.” This 
was not common because, during the nineties, Albanian youth mainly walked or gathered 
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in cafes, which were located in the suburbs of the city. However, within a few weeks, the 
korzo began to be frequented in the evenings by hundreds of young people. Dugolli 
explains, how before the organized “protest walks in korzo,” if, for example, a couple 
happened to be passing by, very often police would stop them and usually humiliate the guy 
in front of his girlfriend (Dugolli, December 2015). In concert with these activities, the 
UPSUP leadership continued to meet with representatives of the Union of Independent 
Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK) and the leadership of the Islamic and Catholic 
communities in Kosovo. Hajrulla Gorani from the BSPK supported the demonstrations. 
Impressive – according to Lajçi – was the reaction of Naim Tërrnava, then director of 
Medrese Alaudin. He placed the premises of the Medrese School and the Faculty of Islamic 
Studies at the students’ disposal and also offered food and beds to hundreds of students. 
Pulling out the keys to his office, Tërrnava assured Lajçi that, "From today, this office 
belongs to you – the students" (Lajçi January 2016). Don Shan Zefi of the Catholic Church 
said that the protests should first obtain the "blessings" of President Rugova. Another 
interesting individual – according to Lajçi - was Monsinjor Pale, who represented the Italian 
Catholic body, the Comunità di Sant' Egidio and mediated the Rugova-Milošević 
educational agreement. Accompanied by a man who purported to be an Albanian from 
Calabria, Mosinjor Pale tried to convince the students to respect the Education Agreement 
and asked the students to give up the idea of organizing the demonstrations. They tried to 
bribe us – says Lajçi – by offering "attractive visits to Rome," etc. (ibid.).  
The last meeting between the students and Ibrahim Rugova prior to the 
demonstrations took place on September 29, 1997. According to the students, Rugova first 
tried to threaten them, stressing the consequences if the demonstrations took place, but when 
he realized that the students were not afraid, Rugova – similar to Mosinjor Pale – also tried 
to seduce them by asking if any of them "wanted to go for studies in Paris?" Rugova justified 
the LDK's insistence on postponing the demonstrations, arguing that they had received 
suggestions "from above," referring to international diplomats. According to Hamiti, 
Rugova wanted the students to postpone the demonstrations until after his meeting with 
senior US diplomats, including US Envoy for the Balkans Robert Gelbard.  
Hamiti personally participated in this meeting and confirmed that Gelbard pressed 
Rugova to "show leadership" and not allow things to get out of hand. If Serbia were to crack 
down on the demonstrators, "We are not going to step in," Gelbard told Rugova. Thus, 
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according to Hamiti, President Rugova was not personally against the student 
demonstrations (Hamiti, March 2019). It can be seen that here as well that the international 
community played a double game. For example, in Prishtina Gelbard had pressed Rugova 
to show leadership, whereas during his meeting with Kosovo's delegation in Belgrade, 
Gelbard called Kosovo's political leaders "lazy" and expressed his sympathy for the 
students, assuring them of the US government's support. Students argued that before the 
demonstrations, the UPSUP leadership met with all of the international actors, and their 
request to postpone the demonstrations, according to the student leaders, was not "so 
serious."  
Like Rugova, a few deans and members of the Senate, who were also members of 
the LDK, were also against the demonstrations, reminding the students that Kosovo had a 
president, a government, and a parliament – and the students could not take such actions. 
The students openly questioned these institutions and whether anyone recognized them. 
Indeed, there were parliamentary elections in Kosovo during the nineties, but the parliament 
never met. As for the Kosovo government, the only thing that students knew about it was 
that there was a government somewhere in exile, but it was not in touch with them.  
To avoid further arguments, the student leaders declared that they accepted the 
Kosovo "institutions," however, the demonstrations were against Serbia, which was not 
allowing the students access to university buildings. The politicians’ lack of confidence in 
the younger generations was obvious, but the LDK’s own agenda was to remain in control 
of the continually evolving situation. It was a matter of political culture, mentality, and 
vision. The most important thing, however, was Rector Statovci's insistence that the protests 
belonged to the students and that the UP was obliged to support them. During a press 
conference after the meetings with the LDK leadership, Dugolli also managed to "let it be 
understood" that Rugova had said "no" due to diplomatic pressure, but that the students had 
"received his blessings" to proceed with the demonstrations (Dugolli November 2015). In 
addition to this press conference, on the same day Television Albania (TVSH) launched a 
recently produced documentary about the anticipated student demonstrations. That TV 
documentary played a significant role: in addition to showing the declarations of numerous 
intellectuals and political figures who supported the UPSUP, it also broadcast interviews 
with students maturely explaining that "we know what we are doing." Aside from meetings 
with different international, political, and religious actors, etc.,  thousands of meetings were 
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held with students in basements, houses and private student apartments (Mavraj, November 
2015).  
The UPSUP managed to mobilize around 5,000 students to work on the organization 
of the demonstrations of 1997. The Faculty of Medicine, for example, prepared squads to 
offer medical first aid if needed. A security unit was also established for the purpose of 
preventing unknown people from infiltrating the demonstrations. The platform demanded 
that citizens remain on the sidelines, and only those with student IDs and white shirts had 
the right to walk between the cordons.  
While students were proposing slogans, professors were making sure that they were 
following the International Human Rights Convention. Some of the main slogans included, 
for example, "Everyone has the right to education," "Discrimination in education," "Europe, 
where are you," "UNESCO, where are you," "No violence," etc. The UP's architecture 
department prepared the slogans, and they also painted other artistic slogans: for example, 
images showing feet stepping on international conventions, etc. (Dugolli; November 2015). 
There were around 33 slogans, including the one that Kurti liked the most: "Merrni frymë 
si ne” (Take a breath like us), which was a critique also of the Albanian political structures 
(Kurti, November 2015).  
The Embassy of the Republic of Albania in Belgrade understood the cause of the 
UPSUP students and while unable to apply political pressure in Belgrade, they lobbied 
among international diplomats for support for the UPSUP demonstration. Florian Nova, one 
of the Republic of Albania's diplomats, visited and stayed with students often. He also 
offered an embassy car with diplomatic plates to assist in distributing students' newspapers 
or other materials for the demonstrations. Thus, the UPSUP benefited from logistical 
support provided by the Albanian embassy in Belgrade as well. The main support – 
according to the students – came from the American embassy in Belgrade, and Dugolli 
confirms that Nicholas Hill, the first US Embassy Secretary in dealing with Kosovo visited 
the UPSUP often. Together with the UK and Swedish diplomats, Americans were interested 
in finding out the ideas and other general details about the demonstrations. The diplomats 
of these three countries were also accused by Serbia of encouraging the students, but – 
according to the students – they were just showing solidarity, because they saw the students' 
sincerity and the fact that the students had no other option.  
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The fear of being arrested before the demonstrations was ever present among the 
UPSUP leadership. Due to regular meetings with political leaders and international 
diplomats, student leaders became known to the regime. Trying to avoid potential clashes 
with the police, UPSUP leaders slept every night in a different place. The anxiety that 
someone might get killed was also constantly present during this period. If this were to 
happen, the UPSUP leaders wanted it at least to happen to one of the organizers. Before the 
demonstrations, LDK propaganda threatened the UPSUP that if something did happen, the 
organizers would be responsible, because they had ramped up tensions. 
6.4.2. During the demonstrations 
On the morning of October 1, the OC met at the rectorate. The organizers emphasized that 
among the protesters were also American diplomats Nicholas Hill and Richard Hakebi, 
umbrellas in hand. The student protestors, who were seeing slogans for the very first time 
in their lives, were nudging each other about the slogans. The main slogans were: "Lirim 
paqësor i lokaleve të hapësirës Universitaire” (Peaceful liberation of the university 
premises), "Merrni frymë si ne” (Breathe like us), "We want our schools back," "Europe, 
where are you," "UNESCO, where are you," "No violence."  
Thousands of students and citizens gathered in Prishtina. The UPSUP subcouncils 
of Mitrovica, Prizren, Gjakova/Đakovica, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Ferizaj/Uroševac, and Peja/Peć 
also organized demonstrations in their towns. The OC’s and the students' hard work, as well 
as the support from local and international media, had made these demonstrations possible. 
As was planned, the demonstration in Prishtina was led by the four student leaders of the 
UPSUP with Rector Ejup Statovci right in the middle of them (see photo 2). Mavraj explains 
how the moment he saw himself in the first line of the demonstrations, he realized even 
more that his country was in a very bad situation. Otherwise, "Who am I (a kid) to be in the 
first line of the demonstration?" (Mavraj, November 2015). However, given that politicians 





Photo 2. Student demonstration march in Prishtina on October 1, 1997. First-line from the 
left: Muhamet Mavraj, Bujar Dugolli, Ejup Statovci, Driton Lajçi and Albin Kurti (the 
picture was supplied by the organizers of the demonstrations) 
 
The distance between the starting point of the demonstrators and the barricades of 
the Serbian police and military forces was several hundred meters. In front of the column 
of the protestors, journalists were taking pictures and recording the event. The students 
stopped around 1-2 meters from the police cordons. As can be seen from the pictures taken 
by ex-UPSUP leaders, the police forces were heavily armed, with helmets and anti-tear gas 
masks, tending to provoke fear among the demonstrators. Students remained in position for 
about one and a half hours. The UPSUP leaders described the scenes at these first-line 
demonstrations as similar to those moments in "boxing matches," when the opponents are 
face to face, challenging each other and waiting for the fight to start.  
In this particular case, the students’ opponents were armed and sitting on tanks, 
while the students, dressed in white shirts, looked at them. Lajçi mentioned that a few 
minutes before the police intervened, a journalist asked Rector Statovci: what will be your 
next steps? Statovci responded that they were going to act according to the protest platform. 
The journalist followed up by asking whether there was anything "you're worried about in 




Photo 3. Demonstrators stand in front of the barricades (the picture was supplied by the 
organizers of the demonstrations)  
 
The police were prepared for an attack, implying that the situation was controlled by 
the MUP center and Serbian politicians in Prishtina and Belgrade. The helicopters which 
were flying low overhead were used to try to scare the protestors. Vice chief of the Kosovo 
district Veljko Odalović assured American and European diplomats that if the protests were 
peaceful, the Serbian police would not use violence. According to the participants I 
interviewed, this was not true. Students were peaceful, but police still used violence. Just 
before the regime reacted, foreign journalists sitting close to the demonstrators were 
removed, then orders "krenemo” (let's go) and "udri” (hit) were heard. According to the 
protest platform, if police started to engage in violence, the organizers would sit down on 
the ground. However, within a few minutes the UPSUP leadership, Rector Ejup Statovci, 





Photo 4. Moments during the arrests of Professor Statovci and members of the UPSUP 
leadership (the picture was supplied by the organizers of the demonstrations)  
 
Numerous people were hurt, but no one was killed. That same night Television 
Albania (TVSH) released video material showing terrified boys and girls escaping police 
violence and police firing tear gas at the masses (Documentary, Student Protest 1997). 
International diplomats witnessed the regime’s brutal intervention against the peaceful 
demonstrators and immediately increased pressure for the release of the organizers and 
other students who had been arrested. The rector refused to agree to leave the police station 
without the release of every single arrested student. According to the organizers, the arrested 
protestors were treated brutally at the police station. As soon as they were released, the 
students of the Faculty of Medicine provided medical care. There was widespread 
propaganda that this would be a big bloody demonstration. The Serbian press accused 
Albanians of planning to kill the students and then blaming the innocent Serbian people for 
doing it. Even though the opponents of the students, from both the Albanian political party 
(LDK) and Serbian regime’s side, had all the necessary propaganda tools at hand – money, 
networks, media and strength – the students were still successful in organizing the 
demonstrations. Two hours after Dugolli's release from prison, diplomats from the 
embassies of the USA, UK, and Sweden went to visit him. Dugolli remembers that they 
thanked the UPSUP for the high level of organization. Western diplomats admitted that "we 
didn't know that we were dealing with such responsible youth" (Dugolli; November 2015). 
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The diplomats also informed the UPSUP leaders that their reports were already being 
distributed in their countries.  
6.4.3. After the demonstrations 
Ibrahim Rugova thanked the UP students and professors for the peaceful demonstrations 
and condemned the Serbian regime's aggression against the peaceful protestors (Bujku, 
November 1, 1997). Thus, the political elites in Prishtina supported the protest afterward 
and were envious, because in the end the things that they as well wanted had happened, but 
the politicians had not accomplished these things themselves (Mavraj, November 2015). 
The Republic of Albania condemned the Serbian regime’s use of force against the student 
demonstrators in Prishtina and other cities of Kosovo (Zëri i Popullit, October 2, 1997), 
whereas the President of the Republic of Albania, Rexhep Meidani (1997–2002), also 
warned Yugoslavia that "Kosovo will not become Bosnia" (NIN, October 27, 1997). Besnik 
Konçi, Charge d'Affairs at the embassy of the Republic of Albania in Belgrade, in his 
interview for NIN magazine, stated that relations between Albania and Serbia were also 
dependent on the way the Republic of Serbia treated Albanians in Kosovo. Serbian 
propaganda continuously insisted that Albanians in Kosovo lived better than those in 
Albania. However, during this interview, Konçi stated that if that were the case, why did 
Albanians in Kosovo want to establish their own republic and leave the FRY (NIN, October 
2, 1997). Serbian politicians and press kept saying that the situation in Kosovo should be 
resolved through negotiations, but they took no steps in this regard. Students who had been 
pushed by circumstances at least to organize peaceful demonstrations were blamed for 
playing "dangerous games." Radivoje Popović, the rector of the University of Prishtina led 
by the Serbian regime, stated that that "university is open for all those that want to learn" 
(Jedinstvo, October 1, 1997). However, this meant that only those who were willing to be 
educated in the Serbian language and curriculum could enter the university premises. 
Popović also emphasized that the university could not belong to national minorities and that 
he was leading one of the most open universities, but that the "separatist Albanians" wanted 
things which were against the Serbian constitution (Jedinstvo, October 8, 1997).  
Similarly, Mirko Marjanović, Prime Minister of Serbia (1994–2000), also 
emphasized that Serbia would never allow the existence of a Kosovo state with special 
schools or a university (Politika, October 2, 1997). Even though the students had protested 
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peacefully, the demonstrations were still constantly labeled by Serbian political and 
intellectual elites as those of separatist Albanians who wanted to send their message to the 
world that their human and educational rights were being abused (Jedinstvo, October 2, 
1997). Despite the fact that journalist S. Živković and cameramen V. Jovanović and D. 
Todić participated in the event and witnessed the exercise of force by the regime, they 
reported an entirely different story to the readers of Jedinstvo. They claimed that even 
though students organized a protest against "our university" and with their "dirty game" 
tried to provoke the police, "thanks to the regional commander," violence against the 
demonstrators has not been used (Jedinstvo, October 2, 1997).  
This newspaper also reserved limited space for reporting on the student 
demonstrations in other towns of Kosovo. In these articles as well, one can read the 
misreporting by the Serbian journalists, who, among other things, claimed that "children 
and woman were misused and forced to participate in the demonstration" (Jedinstvo, 
October 2, 1997). This was not the case in this particular demonstration, given that only 
bona fide students wearing white shirts were allowed to join the protest lines. Serbian 
articles condemning "Šiptar demonstrations" followed, especially during the first weeks of 
October 1997. In the reports of the Serbian press, one can observe two types of approaches 
to the student demonstrations in Kosovo. Some media tried to present the Serbian police 
officers as the ones who "did not respond to the students’ provocations," while other media 
showed pictures of Serbian police officers looking like commandos, dragging away female 
students, accompanied by nationalist headlines such as "Kosovo is Serbia" (Novosti, 
October 2, 1997). Some Serbian newspapers also used open threats against Albanians and 
particularly students, saying that the students are "playing with fire" (NIN, October 2, 
1997). The findings document that the Serbian or sometimes the Yugoslav public was 
severely misinformed about the real situation in Kosovo. The Serbian political and 
intellectual elites, through their articles, dislayed their strategy of playing the victim, as if 
the Albanian students wanted to take their university from them rather than, as was already 
known, Albanian pupils and students had been excluded from school or university premises 
since the early 1990s. Predrag Simić warned that Serbia would not benefit from the 
internationalization of the issue of Kosovo (NIN, November 13, 1997), but CNN, 
Euronews, Reuters, etc., broadcast videos showing the Serbian regime’s brutality toward 
the student demonstrations (Zëri i Popullit, October 2, 1997). The police brutality directed 
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toward peaceful students surprised international diplomats and media but did not surprise 
the Albanians, who had been living under such circumstances for more than a decade. The 
student demonstrations attracted the attention of international diplomats. German Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel said that ”Reflectors have turned to Kosovo!”, meaning that the eyes 
of the world were on Kosovo. He also added that what was happening in Kosovo did not 
have to do only with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and that it was also a 
European issue (Zëri i Popullit, October 3, 1997). However, of extraordinary importance 
were the reactions of the presidency of the European Union, the US State Department, 
Congressman Eliot Engel and 25 other congressmen who sent a letter to Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright not only to keep sanctions on the FRY, but to intensify them even further 
after the violent intervention against the peaceful and civilized protest of students. American 
and UK embassy representatives encouraged and thanked the students for their high level 
of organization, saying that "we did not know that Kosovo has such an advanced youth." 
Here as well, Dugolli heard the words of the US representatives that the students had the 
"full support of the government of the USA" (Dugolli; November 2015). Only two weeks 
after the demonstrations, UPSUP leaders were invited to visit the USA. They met with the 
senior officers of the State Department, the EU Commission/Parliament, and officers of 
foreign affairs from different countries, etc. This made the student leaders a political factor 
in Kosovo. By 1997, it was already clear that the KLA or Kosovo Liberation Army [Ushtria 
Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK)] was operating among the students at the UP (Mavraj, 
November 2015). Dugolli states that although active, until October 1, 1997 the KLA did 
not have more than 100 members. He also thinks that the KLA would not have been able to 
grow in size without the initial discrediting of the Serbian regime and the people's victory 
over their fear. Students did overcome their fear - thinks Dugolli – because they confronted 
a heavily armed regime with only empty hands. The UPSUP leadership was asked by US 
and European diplomats about the KLA. To these questions, Dugolli responded, "Do not 
consider them as terrorists; they are ordinary people who were forced to take up arms." 
When Gelbard asked if "there are students in this guerrilla group," Dugolli responded that 
"half of them are students" (Dugolli; November 2015). Indeed, some students were 
affiliated with the KLA, which, according to the Serbian regime, was considered a terrorist 
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organization. This was also how they were first characterized in the Western media.154 
However, it was a much more complex situation, and it was the unjustified violence of the 
Serbian regime that drove students to join the KLA. Despite the fact that especially after 
1997, numerous students, including the UPSUP leaders, joined the KLA forces, this 
dissertation does not treat the developments after the student demonstrations of October 
1997. 155  Here it should be emphasized, as already indicated above, that during the 
demonstrations of October 1, 1997, none of the students’ slogans called for a "Republic of 
Kosovo." However, during later demonstrations, which continued on a smaller scale on 
October 29, 1997, December 30, 1997, and March 2, 9, 13, and 19, 1998, students and 
citizens also started chanting "Kosova Republik (Republic of Kosovo), "UÇK (KLA)" 
(Kurti, November 2015).  
6.5. Conclusions 
During the nineties, Kosovo Albanians were affected by the overall bizarre situation of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Actually, besides the effects of the demonstrations of 1984 
highlighted in the fourth and fifteen chapters, SRS policies forced Albanians into even 
worse conditions. The trajectory of Albanian activism in Kosovo during the nineties was a 
response to Serbian policy as such. Even though the LDK's "parallel state" and student 
movements grew into a national movement, this cannot necessarily be considered to be a 
"nationalistic" mobilization. Both camps of Kosovo's national movement – the LDK and 
the first Republic of Kosovo, on the one hand, and the LDK's opponents, students, and the 
KLA, on the other – converged much more than it seemed at the time. The parallel state 
was a success in the sense that Serbia was removed from the very psyche of Kosovan people 
 
154 See, for example, Fabian Schmidt’s OMRI report (No. 35, Part II, February 19, 1996) entitled “Kosovo Terrorist 
Group Claims Responsibility for Refugee Camp Bombing.” Here it was claimed that a previously unknown 
terrorist group had claimed responsibility for the bombing of Serbian refugee camps in Kosovo on February 11 
(see OMRI Daily Digest, 13 February). The Kosovo Liberation Army sent a letter to Rilindja saying the attacks 
were only a "first warning" to the Serbs, whom it accused of wanting to "colonize" the province, AFP reported on 
February 17. The group called on the international community to recognize the self-declared independence of the 
province. Meanwhile, an unidentified leader of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo told Gazeta 
Shqiptare on February 18 that the group was preparing for a guerrilla war. Neither of these groups was supported 
by the main political formations in the province (see, Fabian Schmidt OMRI DAILY DIGEST). 
155 Those interested in learning more about this issue should see James Pettifer’s recent book, which offers – mainly 
descriptive – information about the origins, development, and transformation of the KLA, including its spillover 
effects in Serbia and Macedonia in 2001. This source particularly focuses on the emergence of the KLA as a major 
military and political factor in the Kosovo crisis at the end of the 1990s (Pettifer, 2014). 
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who boycotted Serbia in every way possible and engendered their own republic. Without 
the long peaceful struggle and institutional resistance, Kosovo's people could not have 
achieved massive student mobilization and support for an armed struggle afterward. 
Education cuts across society, and, understandably, most of the people had been affected 
by years of an educational system under strain. Kosovo's young generation made up the 
majority of the people of Kosovo. It was students, along with some intellectuals and 
professors (some of whom had been LDK supporters at a certain point during the nineties), 
who realized that a more activist approach was needed to fight for the inalienable rights of 
people. Student leaders felt that the failure of the political elites obliged them to proceed 
with organizing active resistance and demonstrations. Although students aspired to hold 
peaceful demonstrations, which was also the policy promoted by Rugova, it can be 
successfully argued that their reactions were influenced by repression as well as by relations 
between Albanians and Serbs. Intellectually influenced by the ideas of active resistance as 
opposed to passive resistance, UPSUP leaders and UP students learned to challenge the 
regime's policies. Filled with the desire and energy to change the status quo, students 
established an OC, developed a platform, and managed to obtain the sympathy and trust of 
their professors, some local and international political actors, and, what is most important, 
the trust of their peers. By carefully selecting their slogans and focusing on demands for 
human rights, the students responded to the Serbian regime as well as to the LDK policies 
which had created a parallel state that – according to the students – was not leading 
anywhere. Student demands touched upon basic, fundamental human rights, namely asking 
for the right to education and normal living and study conditions. It was the first time since 
the earliest 1981 demonstrations that UP students did not demonstrate for high level 
political demands such as a republic. This may also be the reason that the UPSUP leaders 
managed to obtain international community support. Defeating fear and gaining the courage 
to act were two elements which united the students to protest. Before these movements, the 
social and political atmosphere in Kosovo was one of pessimism. The organizers of the 
demonstrations whom I interviewed declared that society and  the students in particular 
were enraged that the political elites and their parallel system were not ready to risk their 
positions and that the international community did not pay appropriate attention to Kosovo. 
According to the organizers, the student movements created a new spirit and restored hope 
that youth could bring about change and that the Serbian regime could be defeated through 
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a massive mobilization of citizens. The students also sent the message to international media 
and diplomats that the people had gathered to demonstrate due to the difficulties that they 
were facing and not simply because they did not like Serbia or the LKD. The 1997 student 
movement in Kosovo, even though it was organized only by Kosovo Albanian citizens, had 
a democratic rather than a narrowly nationalist character. The organizers of the 
demonstrations declared that the university premises were theirs as well, which in turn also 
implied that Kosovo was theirs. The 1997 demonstrations did not ask for an ethnic Kosovo 
or for unification with Albania but rather demanded a democratic environment and that 
citizens should be the ultimate decision makers of their fates, however, they also believed 
that this was something that would only be feasible as long as the eyes and the protection 
of the West remained on Kosovo. These outspoken demands of the students unified national 
identity with democracy. Thus, the demonstrations had a positive impact on Kosovo for 
both the short term and the long term. Political elites in Kosovo were forced to reflect, and 
this increased intra-Albanian competition.  
The events revealed the brutal nature of the Milošević's regime and also revealed to 
the region and the international community the predominantly peaceful culture of the 
Kosovo Albanian citizens at that point in time. At the same time, the rhetoric about dialogue 
and agreements by Belgrade and the LDK were exposed as empty. Due to its well-crafted 
approach, the student movement of 1997 can be considered in Kosovo's contemporary 
history as a phase between the passive politics of the LDK and emerging KLA militantism. 
Additionally, these marches were the Albanians' last effort in the FRY to gain their rights 
via peaceful movements. Afterward, it became clear that the only remaining way to emerge 
from the deadlocked situation was through active military resistance. However, because of 
the longstanding parallel system, the LDK still possessed the mechanisms and power to 
control political processes after the protests, as it happened. The LDK was a "tested partner" 
of the international community, and in any case, they would be their allies in the ensuing 
talks or consultations. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions  
By utilizing mainly historical approaches to exploring the Kosovo student movements 
(1968, 1981 and 1997), this dissertation has analyzed the politically determined conditions 
and contexts in which the student demonstrations occurred. Looking at these events from 
multiple perspectives, the impact of the Kosovo student demonstrations on the political lives 
of Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Albania has also been a focus of this dissertation. My 
conclusion is that the regime’s repression, the political maturity of the students, and the 
overall political context affected the emergence of each demonstration and also framed the 
students’ demands. Looking at the findings across the three sets of demonstrations, 
emerging from three different generations of students, reveals that it was not altogether clear 
at first whether the students wanted "unification with the Republic of Albania" or the 
establishment of a “Kosovo Republic” within the SFRY. Over time, however, there was a 
consolidation of the drive for a “Republic” and a marginalization of demands for unification 
with Albania. 
After consulting video materials, library and archival sources from Kosovo, Albania, 
Serbia and Yugoslavia as well as utilizing insights from interviews conducted with activists, 
academics and politicians, I analyzed the students’ struggles for “Republic” status for 
Kosovo during three different historical and political periods: the first was in 1968, when 
Kosovo experienced limited autonomy; the second was in the 1980s, a period of maximum 
autonomy; and the third was in the 1990s, a bizarre time of no autonomy, yet when Kosovo 
Albanians were nevertheless “free” to create their parallel state. I have disentangled the 
causes and consequences of each demonstration by looking at three distinct temporal 
phases: before, during and after each demonstration. In this manner I have analyzed the 
subjects related to the topic of this work and all of the many actors (students, citizens, and 
the regime, and, to some extent, international actors). By using micro-, meso- and macro-
level paradigms, this dissertation has examined the students’ emotions, experiences and 
identities and also presented the points of contention and convergence between various 
political, intellectual, and academic elites, on the one hand, and the students – especially 
what could be called student elites - on the other. Following the example of Greenberg’s 
research on Serbian student movements as they transition their activism from the streets 
back into the halls of the university, I distinguished the role and place of students in the 
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wake of Kosovo’s major critical events where students played a central role (Greenberg, 
2014).  
I have also described the influence of student movements both regionally and 
internationally. Furthermore, to aid in understanding the overall picture, I have outlined 
previous state transformations and relations between ethnicities living in the area. The roots 
of the tensions among Albanians and Serbs date back to an earlier period and are well 
documented, and they can be found in the claims of origin and other historical-political 
interests. Still, the Serbs’ negative stereotypes of Albanians were, in the post-Tito period, 
fostered mainly by academic and political institutions, both of which were, either de jure or 
de facto, state-controlled. The continuous stigmatization of Albanians engendered hatred, 
distrust, and other negative consequences on both sides. After the Second World War 
(1945), pre-war tensions endured, given that the issue of Albanians in Yugoslavia remained 
inadequately defined. Although the political context was the trigger for the student 
demonstrations, it was within academic institutions that the protests actually erupted. 
Political and ethnic tensions influenced the disputes that Albanians and Serbs had about 
education. The issue of education in Kosovo had been closely tied to questions of political 
domination ever since its inception. This is why, historically, schools as well universities 
(in Kosovo, specifically the UP) stood for much more than just a place of learning. The 
challenges presented by the establishment of the UP and instruction in the Albanian 
language reveal Albanian and Serbian sensitivity regarding university-level education. The 
Kosovo Albanians’ long-lasting lack of access to instruction in their native language 
resulted in their placing an even higher value on education. Consequently, when people 
from the educational sector – such as students – stood up for social or national causes, the 
people’s support was enthusiastic. 
This study confirms that Kosovo’s student movements cannot be divorced from their 
global and regional contexts. Like other demonstrations of the sixties happening across the 
globe, those that took place in Kosovo fed off of one another. Thus, without the social 
movements of the sixties at the global and regional level, it is likely that the Kosovo social 
movement would not have occurred either. Moreover, the 1968 demonstrations provided a 
reference point for the demonstrations that later took place in 1981 and 1997.  
However, in seeking to understand the emergence and development of social 
movements during the late 1960s, particularly those of Belgrade and Kosovo, the 
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comparative analysis here concludes that there were significant differences among the 
student movements of the sixties. The geographical, political, historical and social contexts 
in which the demonstrations took place determined the nature of the students’ demands, 
whether they were for social change, justice, or geared toward nationalistic impulses. Thus, 
in the United States and Western Europe, depending on location, youth aspired to move 
away from capitalism or war, or toward civil rights. Meanwhile their SFRY counterparts 
sought "better implementation of Communism," and their counterparts in Kosovo, the status 
of a "Republic."156  
In the case of the demonstrations in Prishtina, I tracked the interaction between the 
state(s), the university and the students. After the Second World War (post-1945), the 
Albanians’ initial demands were for the unification of Kosovo with Albania, but during the 
mid-sixties (1966), Prishtina started demanding the advancement of Kosovo’s 
constitutional position within the SFRY, which was expressed by the slogan “Kosovo 
Republic.” Even though the students were the ones who publicly demanded it, the idea for 
a “Republic of Kosovo” came from the political and academic elites. However, the students’ 
spirit pushed forwarded an issue that was already being discussed. Yet, even though the 
demonstrations themselves were carried out by the students, the Kosovo Albanian 
communist elites and university professors can be considered to be the "real" organizers 
behind the demonstrations of 1968. The relationships between Kosovo and Albania and 
between the Albanian "progressivists" and the "illegal groups" were quite complex, but 
even without specific coordination, both parties, who can be characterized as "Titoists" and 
"Enverists" respectively, demanded the advancement of the rights of Albanians within the 
SFRY via the student demonstrations of 1968. The Republic of Albania, which was seen by 
many Kosovo Albanians as their only savior, did interact with the illegal groups or students, 
some of whom were also the organizers of the demonstrations. However, Enver Hoxha 
prioritized his own political interests and also was of the belief that a “Republic of Kosovo" 
would not solve the problem of Albanians in the SFRY (AMFA 360/1968). Whether it was 
coordinated or not, the interaction between Kosovo’s political representatives, professors, 
and students, managed to harmonize various interests among Kosovo Albanians. This 
harmonious moment created the space for students to proceed with their slogans calling for 
 
156 It is worth noting that while, for example, the civil rights movement of the US involved both black and white 
citizens agitating for equality, the Albanian movement in Kosovo did not include Serbs. 
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“Kosova Republik” (Republic of Kosovo). Nevertheless, when the demand for “Republic” 
was refused by the leadership of the LCY, without any huge consequences for the Kosovo 
communist elites that stood behind it, the “progressivists” abandoned the students and their 
vision for a “Republic of Kosovo.” The politicians sat on their hands, leaving the students 
alone in their quest for a “Republic of Kosovo.” However, because of these demonstrations, 
some successes were achieved, including a general relaxation of relations with Albania and 
the agreement of cooperation with the University of Tirana. The demonstrations also sped 
up the opening of the UP. The biggest accomplishment was the approval of the SFRY’s 
constitution (1974), which defined Kosovo as a constitutional element of the SFRY.  
Another of the successes following on the heels of the 1968 demonstrations was the 
establishment of the UP. It is important to note that the two major ethnicities within Kosovo, 
and, later, each political ideology in the region (the SFRY’s, the SRS’s and the Republic of 
Albania’s) closely equated the role of higher education with their own objectives for 
political domination. The promotion of their own specific political ideology seems to have 
been the primary interest of multiple parties involved in the struggle to establish and then 
dominate the UP. While the SFRY leadership proclaimed a "brotherhood and unity" 
platform or "Titoism," the Republic of Albania promoted nationalist ideas about a "perfect" 
Albania and "Enverism." Even though it functioned to some extent as an academic 
institution, given that most of the cadres working in Kosovo's public sector were educated 
in this university, the UP became an arena where different political forces struggled for 
control. Exchanges of cadres and literature as well as the joint cultural activities of the UP 
and the UT had tremendous effects on the political orientation of the students and the 
Kosovo’s wider public. It is not surprising that Kosovo students would be more inclined to 
absorb and prioritize the ideas they received through the literature and lectures of professors 
from the Republic of Albania rather than those of the SFRY, whose messages of 
brotherhood and unity were belied by their actual long-standing, discriminatory treatment 
of Kosovo Albanians. The political circumstances in the SFRY during the 1970s, as well as 
the interaction of politicians, academics, and the students, made the UP a critical venue for 
imagining and articulating national ideals, and as Anderson maintains, “Once imagined, 
they are modeled, adapted and transformed” (Anderson 1991: 157).  
As for the demonstrations of March and April 1981 in Prishtina, they started as an 
impulsive and unplanned action in the dining hall by students dissatisfied with their living 
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conditions but ended as a general popular movement aimed at securing a Republic of 
Kosovo. I have traced and documented the direct involvement of different interest groups 
in the organization of the demonstrations, but the question of who the “real” organizers of 
these events were remains to be completely answered; nevertheless, my findings indicate 
that the students did not act alone. It seems obvious that a great variety of different actors 
were involved, including, possibly, actors from beyond the borders of the SFRY. It is likely 
that the “real” organizers of these movements will only be able to be determined after the 
opening of top-secret materials from the archives of the SFRY, the SRS, the Republic of 
Kosovo, the Republic of Albania, and possibly the Soviet Union, etc. Top-secret documents 
are typically opened 50 years after being archived; if or when these materials are released, 
they may be able to offer credible answers to the hypothetical scenarios that have been 
posited in relation to the organization of student movements of 1981. The state security 
services of all the countries affected by these demonstrations are expected to have been and 
probably were active, but existing evidence is insufficient to determine whether and which 
of them might have played a decisive role or even been leading the process. The student 
demonstrations of 1981 were among the bloodiest. While the student organizers and 
political leaders survived this tumultuous episode and continued to make “contributions,” 
the highest price, as noted in §4.4.2.2 and §4.5, was paid by innocent high school students, 
five of whom were killed in these demonstrations, together with two factory workers, one 
retiree and one university student.  
The 1981 demonstrations brought the Kosovo communist elites to the point where 
they had to choose between joining the students in their demands for a “Republic of 
Kosovo” or sticking with the SFRY political platform, which rejected the Albanians’ 
demands for a "Republic." The Kosovo political elites – and, the vast majority of academics 
– opted to follow the SFRY platform. This decision led first to their involvement in severe 
repressive measures against their compatriots and later to their abandonment by their 
Yugoslav “brothers in unity.”  
By reinstalling their military presence in Kosovo, the SRS managed to complete one 
of their main goals. After the demonstrations of 1981, Serbian chauvinism entered a new 
phase. My findings document the SRS’s “re-occupation” of state security institutions and, 
at the same time, their insistence on blocking Kosovo authorities from calming the situation 
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after the student demonstrations, blaming them as collaborators with the 
“counterrevolutionary forces.”  
With respect to the communist leadership of the Republic of Albania, during 1981 
they too prioritized their own political interests. The Republic of Albania wrote a few 
articles in their country's official newspaper in support of the demands of the students and 
declaring the SFRY regime’s interventions to be brutal and inhumane, but afterward the 
Republic of Albania immediately resumed its efforts to manipulate the Kosovo Albanian 
diaspora; one of the main purposes seemed to be defending the Albanian Worker’s Party 
from opposition movements, which were active in exile. It is evident that at least during 
1968 and 1981, youth and political “illegal groups” in Kosovo misjudged the relationship 
with the ideology promoted by Tirana. They idealized the Republic of Albania and Enver 
Hoxha not just as political models, but as national models, in terms of their identification 
with the nation-state. Still, the evidence of NATO’s blaming Russia for having its finger in 
the organization of the 1981 student movements in Kosovo is a reminder that one should 
not forget that these events can also be considered as a local level "war" between two 
concepts or ideologies for future dominance in this part of the globe. The demonstrations 
of 1981 destabilized and contributed to great changes both in the SFRY and in Kosovo. 
These events provoked further the already existing nationalism of both the Kosovo 
Albanian and general Serbian sides. The student movements also exposed the SFRY’s 
weaknesses after Tito's death and served as evidence that this federation could only have 
survived under the authority of Tito or a similar figure. However, Albanian students and 
members of illegal groups, together with the demonstrations taking place in the USA and 
other European countries by Albanians in the diaspora, managed to internationalize 
demands for a Republic of Kosovo. Additionally, these movements marked the beginning 
of resistance by Albanian intellectuals, something that ultimately developed into self-
organized parallel institutions during the nineties.  
During the nineties, SRS policies placed Albanians in even more dire straits. In 
response and under the leadership of the LDK, Kosovo established a parallel state. This 
parallel state may be considered a success story, given that the Kosovar people’s total 
boycott of Serbia led to strengthened bonds among the people and a pride in their own self-
reliance, which ultimately helped them to engender their own republic. UP students 
eventually came to the conclusion that the political elites’ “passive resistance” approach 
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was a failure, which is why they came to initiate active resistance through demonstrations. 
As compared to their colleagues of 1968 and 1981, who proclaimed themselves to be 
“Enverists,” this time UP students had been intellectually influenced by the ideas of Gandhi, 
Malcolm X, etc. In their preparations to challenge the regime's policies, the students 
established an Organizing Council, developed a platform, and managed to gain the 
sympathy and trust of their professors, some local and international political actors, and, 
most important, the trust of their peers. The slogans they deployed during demonstrations 
mainly touched upon basic, fundamental human rights, the right to education and normal 
living and studying conditions. Again, it was the student movements of 1997 that restored 
Kosovo Albanian hopes that youth could bring about change and that a massive 
mobilization of the citizens could defeat the Serbian regime. Through well-organized 
demonstrations, students channeled the message to the international media and diplomats 
that students were not willing to study in private houses anymore. The slogans of the 
demonstrations of October 1, 1997 contained no calls for a Republic of Kosovo or 
unification with Albania, but by referring to the universal declaration of human rights, 
students appealed to the West to watch over and safeguard their rights. The demonstrations 
of 1997 mark the moment when Kosovo moved from passive resistance to active resistance. 
The Serbian regime’s brutal response to the students’ peaceful protests exposed its true 
nature. These actions, followed by smaller-scale protests on October 29, and in December 
1997 and March 1998, where banners were raised calling for “Kosova Republik” (Republic 
of Kosovo), “UÇK” (KLA), etc., marked Kosovo Albanians’ final effort to achieve their 
liberty through peaceful action. Afterward, it became clear that the only option left to them 
to accomplish their goal of a “Republic of Kosovo” was active military resistance.  
What my dissertation has made clear is that in each period — 1968, 1981, and 1997 
— the trigger for the demonstrations was not political in and of itself, but in each case the 
demonstrations were quickly harnessed for — or passed on to — political purposes. That 
the groundwork had been laid for these political purposes is clear, but the initial cause of 
each demonstration was an issue specific to the students. In 1968, it was access to 
instruction in their mother tongue, in 1981 it was the terrible living conditions at the UP, 
and in 1997 it was a combination of both of these factors. In each case, the atmosphere of 
oppression made it easy for these demonstrations to be turned to larger political purposes. 
Moreover, it can be argued that in each instance the conditions against which the students 
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initially protested were the results of political or politically-motivated decisions. In 1968 
and 1997 this is obvious, but it can easily be argued that the conditions protested against in 
1981 were a result of state decisions, since the state controlled all the resources. In the 1981 
case, it is clear that there were external factors at work as well, while in the first and last 
cases, the situation is less clear-cut. However, in each instance, the initial issue was student-
specific. Student-specific grievances reflected larger social issues, and the student 
demonstrations could therefore be easily directed toward those issues. As for “political 
maturity,” this was very clearly demonstrated in the 1997 demonstrations, but it seems to 
me that the 1968 and 1981 demonstrations reflected a mixture of both maturity and naivete: 
they possessed the maturity to be aware of and demand their human and national rights, 
while at the same time being naïve enough that a political actor like the Republic of Albania 
was able to manipulate them for its own purposes reflected a mixture of both maturity and 
naivete.  
This work confirms the essential role of the students in passing along the vision of a 
“Republic” from one generation to another. The students were not the originators but rather 
the realizers of the vision for the Republic of Kosovo. Even though all three student 
demonstrations grew into national movements, one cannot – at least easily – categorize 
them as “nationalistic” movements. One can also argue that the activism of Kosovo 
Albanian students primarily emerged in response to the Yugoslav and later Serbian 
discriminatory policies against ethnic Albanians living in the SFRY. Also, Kosovo students 
did not demonstrate against, express any animosity toward or – at least publicly – commit 
any harm against Serbian students and the Serbian population living in Kosovo at that time. 
Instead, they mobilized against the system(s) which, they believed, had left Kosovo as the 
poorest region in the federation and the Albanians in the SFRY without a republic, even 
though, according to the statistics, Albanians were more numerous than Macedonians and 
Montenegrins, both of whom enjoyed the right of having their own republics within the 
SFRY. It must be noted that the SRS accused the Kosovo Albanians of forcing Serbian and 
Montenegrin citizens to “escape” from Kosovo.  
One of the charges leveled against the UP, in particular the departments of history 
and linguistics, was that it promoted nationalist teachings and the indoctrination of the 
students.  It is true that after the students (and their professors) were forced out of the UP 
and established a parallel university, they were not only able to receive instruction in their 
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native language but were more at liberty to explore their own history and culture. 
Nevertheless, this charge ignores the fact that, historically, national movements have largely 
been inspired by ideas of the enlightenment, a period of history that would obviously be 
part of the curriculum of any good history department. They have been movements of social 
equity and directed discriminatory practices directed against groups considered as 
belonging to the lower echelons of a society.  Yes, seen historically, movements of social 
unrest and dissent are always liable to take a national turn, especially when social divides 
coincide with cultural and linguistic divides. 
A close examination of the dynamics of the demonstrations – their dimensions, 
forms, and implications – reveals the close interconnections between higher education (the 
UP), political influences, and the students. It also reveals the involvement of other actors 
with their own goals, confirming struggles for dominance by local (Kosovo), federal 
(SFRY), regional (Albania and Serbia) and international actors (outside the Balkans). This 
dissertation shows that while the state(s) and elites had power-related interests, the students 
were the principal actors fighting for and making sacrifices for basic freedoms and human 
rights: they were first line of resistance. Lacking a well-defined political identity, it appears 
that they chose to line up behind such “big names” as political [“progressivists” (1968), 
“illegal groups” (1968, 1981)] or academic elites [Professor Statovci (1997), etc.], as the 
easiest route to get their message across and to achieve their goals. It is certain, however, 
that the students played a crucial role in preserving and passing on from one generation to 
another the vision of a "Republic." Without this vision, Kosovo would not be a state 
today. The contribution of politicians or academics cannot be neglected, but students 
arguably did the hardest work and paid the highest price. 
This study also shows that the excessive and inappropriate use of force to which the 
SFRY and SRS regimes resorted did not solve the problem. On the contrary, it provoked a 
backlash and served to mobilize students and society alike. Aside from the deaths of one 
student in 1968 and nine protestors in 1981, from 1981 to 1988 alone (as noted in §5.1 and 
§6.1) over 580,000 individuals passed through the police and courts as part of the campaign 
against "Albanian nationalism and irredentism," and thousands of students and Kosovo 
Albanian citizens received sentences ranging from thirty days to fourteen years of 
imprisonment (Kullashi 1996; 65, 66). As it turns out, there was a significant correlation 
between the regime’s repression and brutality and the Kosovo Albanians’ mobilization to 
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resist: the greater the violence, the greater the mobilization and resistance. State repression 
is an important element in the emergence of social movements. Yet, in the case of Kosovo 
Albanians – a historically repressed society – it can be seen that apart from repression, 
political awareness was also a key element in the emergence of social movements. It is thus 
not surprising that social movements are more likely to emerge in more highly educated 
societies. This is why in 1968, 1981 as well as in 1997, the readiness to initiate organized 
resistance originated among the students, who were the most politically aware, active, and, 
in some respects, mature part of Kosovo’s society. Memories of prior student struggles 
influenced new generations by providing positive and negative experiences upon which to 


























As has already been highlighted, this dissertation opens ways for future research on the UP's 
role during the period 1999–2020. Furthermore, given that this is an empirical study, using 
mainly historical approaches, a certain type of theoretical analysis could be also developed 
here given that the empirical data is available to make that kind of study as well. The 
dissertation contains material to contribute toward further discussions on social movements, 
nationalism and state theories. This epilogue is meant to identify the potential of the present 
work in terms of theoretical engagement, which would enhance the usefulness of this study 
for academics and intellectuals coming from other disciplines or theoretical backgrounds. 
Benedict Anderson’s specific quote is repeated intentionally in this dissertation 
when referring to the national ideals that are being constructed or imagined in the process 
of struggle and mobilization: "once imagined, they are modeled, adapted and transformed" 
(Anderson 1991: 157). There is a potential to work out these ideas through the rich empirics 
assembled in this study. As highlighted by Dr. Koenraad Bogaert in his examination report 
for this dissertation, further elaboration of this concept could provide stronger theoretical 
argument linking the “imagination-work” done by the student mobilizations to the historical 
processes discussed in the second chapter and the conclusion at the end “it was the 
importation of western values that destroyed these Ottoman values”. For those interested to 
expand further in this regard, there is a rich literature on the (cross-national) diffusion of 
ideas in social movements (e.g. McAdam & Rucht, 1993) or the resonance of struggles and 
the ideas they spread (e.g. Roos and Oikonomakis, 2014).  
When it comes to the state theories, more engagement with the academic literature 
can be done in this area as well, including with the so-called “anthropology of the state” 
literature (Sharma and Gupta, 2006). This dissertations’ analysis discusses how students 
related and reacted to the multiple levels of state presence since 1968. However, building 
on Althusser's (1971) theory of the state, in which state power is disseminated through 
ideological state apparatuses that rely on school, education, religion, and family, the 
formation of social movements in Kosovo under Socialist Yugoslavia and their 
transformations in the "post-Yugoslav (1990-1997)” could be further examined. With 
regard to the multiple parties involved in the struggle for RK, post-structural theories of the 
state could also be involved. Especially borrowing on Foucault's concept of 
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governmentality to describe the organized practices (mentalities, rationalities, and 
techniques) through which subjects are governed or made governable (Foucault 2000). A 
deeper and more critical engagement with this body of literature could not only theorize, 
but would also greatly enhance the wider relevance of the data and detailed work the 
dissertation has assembled. Moreover, Dr. Koenraad Bogaert also specifies that a deeper 
theoretical insight into the structures of the state and the political economy would also allow 
more profound reflections about the strategies of mobilization, the use or provocations of 
violence and the widely discussed relationship between agency and structure. 
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